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describing ongoing physical limitations of minor victims who were struck by a vehicle
Summary of this case from Wright v. WrightOpinion
Nos. 91-MS-3, 91-MS-4.
Decided November 18, 1991.
Clark, Perdue Roberts, Co., L.P.A., for petitioners.
James Barrington, Guardian for Tina M. and Kari L. Betts.
These proceedings were instituted on applications filed on July 10, 1991 for court approval of settlements for less than $10,000 by the biological parents of minors Tina Marie Betts and Kari Lynn Betts for personal injuries received by the minors.
R.C. 2111.18 provides in part:
"When personal injury * * * is caused to a ward by wrongful act, neglect, or default that would entitle the ward to maintain an action and recover damages * * *, the guardian of the estate of the ward may adjust the settle the claim with the advice, approval, and consent of the probate court. In the settlement, if the ward is a minor, the parent or parents may waive all claim for damages on account of loss of service of the minor, and that claim may be included in the settlement. However, when it is proposed that the claim involved is settled for ten thousand dollars or less, the court may, upon application by any person whom the court may authorize to receive and receipt for the settlement, authorize the settlement without the appointment of a guardian and authorize the delivery of the moneys to the natural guardian of the minor, to the person by whom the minor is maintained, or to the minor himself. The court may authorize the minor or person receiving the moneys to execute a complete release on account of the receipt. The payment shall be a complete and final discharge of any such claim."
The parents in the instant proceeding did not waive claims for damages for loss of services or medical expenses for the minors.
Tina, age ten, and her sister Kari, age eleven, were riding a bicycle on Massieville Road in Ross County on May 10, 1989 at approximately 4:30 p.m. when Michael Bennett, after leaving a tavern, drove his vehicle off the right side of the road, taking out some guardrail and striking the two children, causing them extensive injuries and resulting in a lengthy period of disability for them.
Bennett pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, testing .26, and was sentenced. The municipal court's case file contained proof of financial responsibility insurance.
The two sisters were removed to the Ross County Medical Center Hospital by emergency squad and then flown by Sky Med to Children's Hospital.
Tina had internal injuries. Her right wrist, left foot and pelvis were also broken. Tina was also placed in traction, and was in intensive care for six days. Tina was released on July 1, 1989, after forty-five days of hospital stay. She suffered continual nightmares about the accident, resulting in sleep loss. The doctors advise that she will not be able to deliver a child vaginally and will possibly need a hip replacement due to prognosed hip joint arthritis arising from the injuries. The last medical note says that all is healed, with a full painless range of motion with knee and hip but still using crutches.
Kari's right leg was broken above and below the knee, her skull was fractured and she was in intensive care until May 18, 1989 at 5:00 p.m. Kari was placed in traction. She was released after twenty-two days in the hospital, in a body cast. Her leg did not mend well, requiring numerous follow-up visits to doctors. Doctors had to reset the femur fracture three and one-half months after the accident due to "delayed and malunion of fracture." The cast was removed from her leg on December 6, 1989. Kari's right leg is now one inch shorter than her left leg, requiring a heel lift in her shoe (which Kari is reluctant to wear). The last medical note dated August 22, 1990 states "no pain, no limp, no limitation of movement and no complaints."
The medical chronologies supplied by counsel for the parents ends at August 22, 1990 for Kari and October 5, 1990 for Tina.
C.P.Sup.R. 36(B), which provides for settlement of claims for injuries to minors, states that "[t]he application may be accompanied by a current statement of the examining physician in respect to the injuries sustained, the extent of recovery thereof, and the physician's prognosis."
In the absence of the required statement, the girls' guardian met with them on July 24, 1991, and after discussion with them and witnessing their walking and range of movement, his impressions follow:
1. School — Both girls will be at Mt. Logan School this year, Kari in the 8th grade and Tina in the 6th grade. Both girls are bright and have been told by their teachers that they could have straight A's if they worked harder. Kari is the more serious student (probably due to being older), achieving A's and B's in the major subjects, and some C's. She attended McArthur School until mid-5th grade when the family lived on King Street, and attended Tiffin School after that. Kari definitely wants to go to college and study pre-law or pre-medicine. Both children were held back a grade in early elementary school due to no Head Start program for Kari and just one year for Tina, i.e., inadequate pre-school. Tina would like to work with children in a day care center, but has not ruled out college. Both girls are attractive, have a good self image, are friendly, and essentially appear to have no impediments to upward mobility.
2. Current living arrangements — As of October 7, 1990, Kari moved in with her father, Rick Betts, on Jefferson Street, and Tina remains with her mother in Massieville.
3. Current medical status — The girls go to the Ambulatory Clinic for medical care. Their doctor had been Dr. Jan-Whitt but when Kari became thirteen years old she was switched to Dr. Jones. Both girls are "required" to return to Children's Hospital once a year. Their last visits were April 1991 for Tina and February 1991 for Kari. There are no records for those visits. The girls were seen by Dr. Ruth Ann Holzhauser probably for testimony, but she has "retired," according to letters of counsel, and wouldn't write up her medical findings. There have been no follow-up exams as to the permanence of the injuries.
4. Current limitations — Kari, whose skull was fractured, had headaches for a year, and still has recurrences. Her femur not being set and/or healing improperly is a source of severe pain that prevents her from sustained running. She discovered this condition while playing volleyball. Tina, whose pelvic area was crushed and whose wrist was broken, has been told that she will have hip problems and child birth limitations. She says striking a volleyball with both hands sends pain up her arm and paralyzes her wrist (which has a one-inch circular scar on it). On cold days her hip is "sore," indicating that arthritis is probably starting. She has occasional nightmares.
Rick Betts, Becky Betts (now Scarberry), Tina Marie Betts and Kari Lynn Betts were and are currently recipients of assistance pursuant to R.C. Chapter 5111 or 5113.
The total cost of medical, hospital and related expenses incurred during the forty-five day stay of Tina Marie Betts in the hospital was in excess of $31,788.70.
The total cost of medical, hospital and related expenses incurred during the twenty-two-day stay of Kari Lynn Betts in the hospital was in excess of $17,940.99.
Counsel for petitioners requested authority for the biological parents of the girls to accept the offer of settlement. In the proffered offer the children would receive no immediate benefits; however, each would be the beneficiary of a structured settlement, payments to begin when they become adults, and continuing through years 2016 and 2017.
An amended complaint did not materially alter the proffered offer. An independent guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the children. The report of the guardian ad litem reflected that: these children were injured in the same accident, were each being offered $100,000 for a total of $200,000 in settlement of their personal injuries; the Ohio Department of Human Services was to be subrogated against the claim of parents for medical services rendered for $49,729.69 which had been negotiated down to $11,714.64; and that counsel requested attorney fees in the sum of $66,666.66 based upon a recovery of $200,000. The parents and counsel had executed a "contingency" fee agreement agreeing to pay the attorneys forty percent of all monies recovered on behalf of themselves and the children, and further agreeing to save the clients harmless from costs if no recovery is made. The attorneys later reduced their "contingency" fee to thirty-three and one-third percent. The proffered release recited the consideration to be $100,000 with $45,000 up front and $55,000 structured in each case.
On August 6, 1991 the petitioners filed their third amended application reciting that the offer of settlement was $87,500 for each child, that the attorney fees are reasonably worth thirty-three and one-third percent of amount recovered, to wit: $29,166.67, and that the applicants propose to purchase an annuity for the child for $55,000, with the sum of $3,333.33 remaining to be paid to the parents for the benefit of each child; therefore, no legal guardian is necessary.
C.P.Sup.R. 36 provides in part:
"(D) The application shall state what additional consideration, if any, is being paid to persons other than the minor.
"(E) The application shall state what arrangement, if any, had been made with respect to counsel fees, which fees shall be subject to review by the Court."
Pursuant to the above rule, counsel filed a report and copy of the settlement agreement disclosing that the parents had received $25,000, which was distributed as follows:
$ 8,333.33 Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., Attorney fees L.P.A. $ 2,055.26 Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., Expenses L.P.A. $11,714.64 Ohio Department of Human Medicaid Services payments reimbursed $ 1,448.38 Ricky Betts Parent Claim for loss of services and all claims for damages $ 1,448.38 Becky (Betts) Scarberry Parent Claim for loss of services and all claims for damages
Generally, a minor may not combine an action for both physical injury and medical expenses, since two separate causes of action exist, one by the minor and the other by the parent for medical expenses he was obligated to pay. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Godfrey (1967), 12 Ohio Misc. 143, 41 O.O.2d 166, 230 N.E.2d 560.
"A derivative action clearly stems from a single accident or occurrence. Indeed, the derivative actions would not exist but for the primary action." Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 521 N.E.2d 789, 792.
"`Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one person. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in the same accident.'" (Emphasis deleted.) Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 15, 540 N.E.2d 716, 720.
Thus, it was concluded that in each case the policy limits of $100,000 for each child included the $12,500 paid to the parents for their individual claim for loss of services and damages including medical expenses.
"A parent may recover from the wrongdoer the reasonable value of the care or attendance which he himself renders to his child as a result of a negligent injury to the child." Rouse v. Riverside Methodist Hospital (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 206, 9 OBR 355, 459 N.E.2d 593, paragraph one of the syllabus.
Similarly, parents legally responsible for medical services necessarily furnished their injured minor child can recover in their own action from the person responsible for the injury that amount reasonably expended therefor, or for which they have become liable; an award may also be made to a parent for the cost of future medical care, if determinable. A minor child, suing for personal injuries cannot recover for medical services, because the father and mother are legally responsible for the bill therefor. The fact that the parent has not paid the bills or made a contract therefor would be no objection as the law would imply a contract, the services being for necessaries. See 47 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1983) 374, Family Law, Section 850.
On August 28, 1991, the court approved the settlement offer on behalf of the child in the amount of $87,500, ordered a guardian to be appointed for the purpose of receiving the settlement and impounded funds upon receipt thereof subject to further order of distribution.
The guardian after appointment requested a hearing to determine the attorney fees and disposition of remainder of the settlement proceeds. The law firm of Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. contends that its legal services are of reasonable value of thirty-three and one-third percent of the amount recovered, pursuant to the contingency fee contract.
C.P.Sup.R. 39, which provides for counsel fees in connection with settlement of claims for wrongful death, and conscious pain and suffering; claims for personal injuries to persons under guardianship; and settlement of claims for personal injuries to minors under R.C. 2111.18, states that:
"When representation is on a contingent fee basis, counsel will be allowed fees on the amount obtained, subject to the approval of Court."
C.P.Sup.R. 40, which provides for counsel fees, states in part:
"(A) Attorney fees relative to all matters shall be governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106.
"* * *
"(H) The Court does not have, nor is there recognized, any minimum or maximum fees which will automatically be approved by the Court. Prior to a fiduciary entering into a contingent fee contract with an attorney for services, an application for authority to enter into the agreement shall be filed with the Court."
In the instant proceeding the parents acting in a quasi-fiduciary role did not file an application pursuant to C.P.Sup.R. 39 for authority to enter into a contingent fee contract with the law firm of Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. for legal services.
In the instant case, counsel attached to the original application for approval of a minor settlement for less that $10,000 a copy of the "contingency" fee agreement executed by Becky and Ricky Betts engaging the law firm of Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A., as attorneys to recover from Michael Bennett for personal injuries sustained by Kari and Tina Betts on May 17, 1989. This document appears to have been executed on May 23, 1989 and agrees to pay the attorneys forty percent of all moneys and things recovered on their behalf.
No evidence was submitted suggesting a negotiated amendment to the contract was made by request of either party. Therefore it must be concluded that the decision to reduce the claim from forty percent of the recovery to thirty-three and one-third percent of the recovery for legal services was a unilateral decision by the law firm.
The reasonableness of proposed attorney fees is well within the subject matter of minor settlement. See C.P.Sup.R. 36, 37, 39 and 40; Martin v. Guardianship of Jadwisiak (Feb. 8, 1991), Ottawa App. No. OT-89-24, unreported, 1991 WL 16511; In re Guardianship of Davis (Dec. 22, 1987), Tuscarawas App. No. 87AP060049, unreported, 1987 WL 34308, hereinafter referred to as the Davis case.
The fee arrangement herein is claimed to be a contingent fee contract signed by the parents of the children on May 23, 1989, calling for a forty percent fee plus listed categories of expense. This fee agreement was not submitted to the court for pre-approval as required by Rules of Superintendence cited above and the local rule of this court. The attorneys have applied for a fee of thirty-three and one-third percent of the gross recovery in these two minor settlements of $87,500 each, or a total fee of $58,333.33 in both cases. Counsel have previously received $8,333.33 for fees.
Contingent fee contracts affecting a minor's claim are "especially subject to restriction" in the words of the Davis court. The Davis court cites the federal appeals decision of Cappel v. Adams (C.A.5, 1970), 434 F.2d 1278, which held (per Judge Wisdom) that a trial court could properly reduce a written one-third contingent fee contract to one-fifth in the case of the children's claims. The court cited a similar case ( Wiener v. United Air Lines [S.D.Cal. 1964], 237 F. Supp. 90, at 96) which reduced fees against minors' shares from thirty-three and one-third percent to twenty-two percent, regardless of contract.
Payment of a contingent fee depends a fortiori upon there being an express written contingent fee contract. See 7A Corpus Juris Secundum (1980) 597, Attorney and Client, Section 313; and R.C. 4705.15(B). By counsel's failure to obtain court pre-approval of a contingent fee contract with regard to these minors, as required by applicable law, there can be no contingent fee contract binding these children.
Even if a contingent fee contract had been "pre-approved" by the court, the court would still have jurisdiction to look into the reasonableness of the approved fee. The requirement of reasonableness is also imposed by DR 2-106, and the eight-factor test set forth in subsections (B)(1) through (8). The primary consideration is set forth as "the time and labor required." The guardian here was unable to determine this factor due to counsel's not keeping time records. Other sources available for factors used in determining a "reasonable fee" include: 6 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1978) 696, Attorneys at Law, Section 157; 7A Corpus Juris Secundum (1980) 628, Attorney and Client, Section 325; and Moraine v. Baker (1971), 34 Ohio Misc. 77, 60 O.O.2d 361, 297 N.E.2d 122, which presents a splendid judicial analysis of how these Disciplinary Rule factors are to be examined. Once again, time spent is of high value in determining the fee; also, whether the issues were novel or difficult. Our case, for example, didn't present complex issues, and the Moraine court would say that this fact should "limit" the fee. Another significant factor is risk of non-recovery.
(1) Risk — Counsel admitted that there was little risk proving liability or damages in this case. Those are the two basic factors of a negligence action. Counsel phrased the "risk" in terms of whether there would be any payoff (whether there was adequate insurance or a solvent drunk driver) and the potentially great expense involved in setting up a dram shop cause or medmal.
DR 2-106 states:
"(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
"(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
"(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
"(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
"(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
"(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
"(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
"(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
"(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services."
In Moraine, the court stated at 79-80, 60 O.O.2d at 362, 297 N.E.2d at 126, that:
"The court finds that the making of an award for attorney fees under the particular facts and circumstances in this case is a complex and difficult task. The award must be reasonable, fair and consistent with the facts, circumstances and the law. In determining the value of professional services, the court may consider the novelty or difficulty of the issue, the nature and extent of the services, the time occupied in the performance of the services, the standing of counsel for proficiency and skill and legal ability, the results accomplished in the rendition of the service, the value of the property or interest involved, the customary charges for similar services in the same locality, the minimum fee schedules of the bar association, the fact that compensation is contingent on success, and the skill and eminence of opposing counsel."
The Moraine court in additional language that is also relevant to the instant case stated at 80-81, 60 O.O.2d at 363, 297 N.E.2d at 126, that:
"It is said that one of the basic factors to be considered in determining the reasonable value of legal services is the nature, extent and difficulty of the services rendered. Burnett v. Graves (1956), 230 F.2d 49, 56 A.L.R.2d 1; Monaghan v. Hill (1944), 140 F.2d 31. Conversely, the fact that an action involved no novel or difficult questions has been given as a reason for limiting attorneys fees. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theater Corp. (1952), 194 F.2d 846; 56 A.L.R.2d 23, Section 3. There has been no evidence brought to the attention of the court that the novelty of any issues involved in the litigation were deemed to affect the difficulties and, hence, the value of legal services. Certainly the thrust of the representation by counsel for the defendants had no novel or difficult connotations."
There has been no evidence brought to the attention of the court that the novelty of any issues involved in this proceeding were deemed to affect the difficulties, hence, the value of legal services. Certainly the thrust of the representation by counsel for the petitioners had no novel or difficult connotation.
"On the other hand, this court is of the opinion that inasmuch as there is now no contract or controlling rule or statute to be considered in determining the reasonable value of the service rendered by the attorneys, the court may consider the skill and eminence of opposing counsel since the character of the opposition to some extent determines the difficulty of the services. 143 A.L.R. 682; 56 A.L.R.2d 23, Section 3." Id. at 81, 60 O.O.2d at 363, 297 N.E.2d at 126.
In the instant proceeding there was no counsel resisting the claims of the petitioners for policy limits, no suit filed, no discovery, deposition, no controverted facts.
"Obviously an important element to be considered in determining the reasonable value of attorney services, is the time spent in the performance of those services. It has been asserted, however, that time spent in doing professional work is not a controlling factor in assessing the value of services. Sometimes, however, the time spent is of minor importance since an experienced or skillful attorney might accomplish in a very short time what another would require a much longer time to accomplish. In re Huffman's Estate (1944), 349 Pa. 59, 36 A.2d 640. Brickell v. Di Pietro (1943), 152 Fla. 429, 12 So.2d 782; Trimble v. Kansas City, S. G. Ry. Co. (1907), 201 Mo. 372, 100 S.W. 7; Garden v. Riley (1935), 116 W. Va. 723, 183 S.E. 46." Id.
In the case under consideration, the law firm stated that no time records were maintained, as it was dependent upon the contract of employment.
"In assessing the reasonable value of an attorney's services, his standing for learning, ability, skill and integrity should be considered. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank Union Trust Co. (1952), 104 F. Supp. 59, 48 A.L.R.2d 172; In re Atwood's Trust (1949), 227 Minn. 495, 35 N.W.2d 736. On the other hand, an attorney's unique skill is not an important factor where the case involved is not such as to call for such specialized ability. Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's (1951), 190 F.2d 561." Id. at 81-82, 60 O.O.2d at 363, 297 N.E.2d at 127.
There is no question that the law firm of Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. had high professional standing for ability and skill. The firm widely advertises such skills specializing in handling "drunk driving" cases. The testimony of the "expert" witness was complimentary. The instant claims did not call upon their specialized ability. The firm did not investigate for nor seek other potential tortfeasors, being seemingly satisfied that the "policy limits" provided the necessary fiscal resource to satisfy the claims of the injured children and their parents. Counsel discovered early on that there was a substantial insurance policy ($100,000/$300,000 limits) and submitted its first demand for settlement at the policy limits on March 28, 1991. The insurer countered with a structured settlement which the insurer felt was equivalent to the policy limits ($100,000), and which counsel accepted after adjustment. In point of fact, there never was any risk in this case of a non-recovery.
"A most significant factor in determining the reasonable value of professional services is the amount of money for the value of property or interest involved. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank Union Trust Company, supra; In re Atwood's Trust, supra; Beard v. Westmoreland (1954), 90 Ga. App. 632, 84 S.E.2d 93; 56 A.L.R.2d 31, Section 7. The responsibility assumed by an attorney where the interests are great should be given substantial weight in determining the compensation to which he is entitled. Although the labor of an attorney in conducting a case wherein great sums or interests are involved may be no greater than would be required in a case of trifling importance, yet the responsibility is greater. This, therefore, should be considered in determining his compensation. Further, the amount involved is to be considered in fixing an allowance to an attorney because that determines the risk to the client and the commensurate responsibility of the lawyer. In re Osofsky (1931), 50 F.2d 925; Smith v. C., N.W.R. Co. (1883), 60 Iowa 515, 15 N.W. 291; 56 A.L.R.2d 35, Section 7. See Canon 12(4), Canons of Professional Ethics.
"The results secured for the benefit of the client are, of course, important in determining the reasonable value of the attorney's services. However, it is clear that the result should not be the only factor. Also, lack of success does not justify the denial of compensation. In re Atwood's Trust, supra; In re Huffman's Estate, supra.
"Some courts have deemed it proper to consider the amounts customarily charged or allowed for similar services in the same locality. However this criterion is of no value where litigation is complex and highly specialized. In re Atwood's Trust, supra; Burnett v. Graves, supra.
"* * *
"Employment undertaken on a contingent basis is a proper factor to be considered in assessing reasonable compensation. Obviously a larger fee will be authorized when its payment depends upon the attorney's success, than where it is to be paid regardless of success. If, however, there is little hazard involved in the litigation, the fact that a retainer is on a contingent fee basis may be entitled to little weight. Bordonaro Bros. Theaters v. Paramount Pictures (1953), 113 F. Supp. 196; 56 A.L.R.2d 36, Section 8; Canon 12(5), Canons of Professional Ethics." Id. at 82-83, 60 O.O.2d at 364, 297 N.E.2d at 127.
Contingent fee contracts have long been commonly accepted in the United States in civil proceedings to enforce claims. Such arrangements have been traditionally justified on the ground that they provide many litigants with the only practical means by which they can secure legal services to enforce their claims. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-20 (Final Draft, July 1, 1969). Nevertheless, the right to contract for a contingent fee has never been thought to be unrestrained. Contingent fee contracts have been declared invalid when the agreement was to secure a divorce, or defend a criminal prosecution, or influence the passage of legislation. Cappel v. Adams ([C.A.5] 1970), 434 F.2d 1278.
The court has reviewed the various factors that may or could be relied upon encompassing the award of compensation for services performed by counsel on behalf of Tina Marie Betts and Kari Lynn Betts, the injured minor children herein. It would appear that the only factors that may be considered under the peculiar and particular facts and circumstances of this case are time required, skill and standing of counsel, value of interest involved, and results secured.
After due consideration of the record of these proceedings, the evidence and exhibits, affidavits, reports, depositions, files, records and briefs of counsel, it is found that the law firm of Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A., rendered necessary legal services on behalf of Tina Marie Betts, a minor. Taking into consideration all factors hereinbefore mentioned, the reasonable value of such legal services are hereby determined to be $17,500 and it is so found.
After due consideration of the record of these proceedings, the evidence and exhibits, affidavits, reports, depositions, files, records and briefs of counsel, it is found that the law firm of Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A., rendered necessary legal services on behalf of Kari Lynn Betts, a minor, and taking into consideration all factors hereinbefore mentioned, the reasonable value of such legal services is hereby determined to be $17,500 and it is so found.
It will be further found that Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. did without prior approval of the court receive $90,000 advanced payment in trust from Meridian Insurance on the settlement of these claims: $45,000 on May 17, 1991 and $45,000 on May 20, 1991. The funds were returned to Meridian Insurance Company on August 7, 1991 by Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. A reasonable return of five and one-half percent interest of such trust on behalf of each of the minor children in this proceeding would be $2,475 per annum or $6.78 per diem.
The award of legal fees determined on behalf of Tina Marie Betts is reduced by $461.04, income that could have reasonably been expected from the investment of $45,000 at five and one-half percent interest for sixty-eight days.
The award of legal fees determined on behalf of Kari Lynn Betts is accordingly reduced by $440.70, income that could have reasonably been expected from the investment of $45,000 at five and one-half percent interest for sixty-five days.
The legal guardian of Tina Marie Betts is directed to pay to Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. the sum of $17,038.96 for legal services rendered on behalf of Tina Marie Betts in this proceeding.
The legal guardian of Kari Lynn Betts is directed to pay to Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. the sum of $17,059.30 for legal services rendered on behalf of Kari Lynn Betts.
The record reflects that all expenses incurred by Clark, Perdue Roberts Co., L.P.A. in these proceedings in the amount of $2,055.26 were distributed to them in the "settlement agreement" with the parents in addition to the $8,333.33 attorney fees paid in that settlement.
It is further ordered that this memorandum opinion and the judgment entry shall constitute a final order subject to appeal as set forth.
Costs are to be taxed against petitioners.
So ordered.