Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. NJ14149 Michael J. Imhoff, Commissioner.
IRION, J.
S.L. appeals a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his minor son, Sergio L., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. S.L. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding Sergio was likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. He also contends the court erred by denying his request for a continuance of the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for the purpose of identifying a prospective adoptive home for Sergio. We affirm the order.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sergio was born with a positive toxicology for drugs. In September 2009, six-week-old Sergio became a dependent of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b), and was removed from parental custody based on findings his parents had a history of substance abuse and his mother, S.A., admittedly used drugs during her pregnancy. The court placed Sergio in foster care and ordered reunification services for the parents.
S.A. has not appealed.
During the next six months, the parents continued to use drugs and were in and out of jail. They did not participate in reunification services or consistently visit Sergio, who was happy, healthy and thriving in his foster care placement. At a six-month review hearing, the court terminated services and set a hearing under section 366.26 to select and implement a permanent plan for Sergio.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) assessed Sergio as adoptable. He was described as a healthy, adorable, happy and easy-going one-year-old child. He was babbling, beginning to stand and learning to feed himself, and was receiving treatment for his medical conditions. The social worker believed Sergio's medical issues were correctable and his prognosis was good. Agency was in the process of finding an adoptive placement for Sergio, and had identified 31 approved families willing to adopt a child with Sergio's characteristics. The social worker was confident that an appropriate family would be identified for Sergio.
Sergio's medical conditions included "torticollis, " a contraction of the neck muscles so that the head is tipped to one side while the chin is turned to the other; and "plagiocephaly, " a condition characterized by an asymmetrical distortion of the skull. (Stedman's Medical Dict. (28th ed. 2006) pp. 2002, 1503.)
In August 2010 Agency initiated a home evaluation for Annette A., the maternal stepgrandmother, under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Annette failed to respond to Agency's inquiries for more than three weeks, claiming she had been busy with job training. She did not contact Sergio even though she said she was still interested in caring for him.
At the selection and implementation hearing on September 23, the parents unsuccessfully sought a continuance so that Annette's ICPC home evaluation could be completed. The court found Sergio was generally adoptable and none of the exceptions to adoption applied to preclude terminating parental rights. When S.L. renewed his request for a continuance, the court noted Sergio needed stability and permanence, and the ICPC process would continue beyond termination of parental rights because Sergio was not in a concurrent planning home. The court terminated parental rights and referred Sergio for adoptive placement.
DISCUSSION
I
S.L. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's adoptability finding under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). He asserts Agency did not meet its burden of showing Sergio was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time because: (1) he was born with opiates in his system and could have future physical, mental or developmental issues; (2) there was no evidence of the nature and extent of Sergio's other medical conditions or his long-term prognosis; and (3) Agency had not identified any families willing to adopt a child with Sergio's medical conditions.
A
The court can terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence the minor is likely to be adopted. (§ 366. 26, subd. (c)(1).) The statute requires clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood adoption will be realized within a reasonable time. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406; In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1231.) In determining adoptability, the focus ordinarily is on whether a child's age, physical condition and emotional state will create difficulty in locating a family willing to adopt. (In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 378.) The possibility a child may have future problems does not mean the child is not likely to be adopted. (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223-225.) Further, a minor considered to be adoptable need not be in a prospective adoptive home, and there need not be a prospective adoptive parent " 'waiting in the wings.' " (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.)
When reviewing a court's finding that a minor is adoptable, we apply the substantial evidence test. (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or weigh the evidence. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) Instead, we view the record favorably to the juvenile court's order and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. (Id. at pp. 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Here, the evidence showed Sergio was generally adoptable based on his age, health, ethnicity, sociability, personality and development. Sergio was a healthy, adorable, sweet and happy one-year-old. At the time of the selection and implementation hearing, Sergio was no longer experiencing withdrawal symptoms related to his exposure to opiates, and his ongoing medical problems were being addressed. Sergio's reflux was abating and was not a major concern. He was wearing a helmet to correct his misshapen head. There were no concerns regarding his long-term prognosis, which looked "very good." Contrary to S.L.'s argument, any risk of future problems does not render Sergio unadoptable. (In re Jennilee T., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.) Indeed, the record shows Sergio's overall health has improved, and there is no indication it will not continue to further improve.
Moreover, although Sergio was not currently in a prospective adoptive home, Agency had identified 31 approved adoptive families willing to adopt a child like Sergio, and these families were aware of his medical condition. The social worker was confident Sergio was adoptable. The court was entitled to find the social worker's opinion credible and give great weight to her assessment. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) We cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. (Id. at pp. 52-53.) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding Sergio was adoptable.
II
S.L. contends the court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance of the selection and implementation hearing. He asserts good cause supported a continuance in order to complete the ICPC evaluation of Annette's home or to find another adoptive home for Sergio so that he would not become a " 'legal orphan.' "
A
Under section 352, the juvenile court may grant a continuance of any hearing only on a showing of good cause and only if the continuance is not contrary to a minor's best interests. In considering the minor's interests, "the court shall give substantial weight to a minor's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements." (§ 352, subd. (a); In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810.) Because "time is of the essence" for dependent children, continuances in juvenile cases are disfavored. (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 674; Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242.) We reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 605; In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.)
B
Here, S.L. did not meet his burden of showing good cause for a continuance. Because Sergio was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, he was not at risk of becoming a " 'legal orphan.' " Delaying the selection and implementation hearing until Sergio could be placed in an adoptive home or an ICPC evaluation could be completed was not in Sergio's best interests. As the juvenile court noted, an evaluation of Annette's home would continue after Sergio was freed for adoptive placement. A continuance would serve only to prolong Sergio's temporary placement, and would impact his need for prompt resolution of his custody status and the need to provide him with a stable environment. (§ 352, subd. (a).) The court acted well within its discretion by denying S.L.'s continuance request.
S.L. relies on section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) to support his argument that a continuance was required until an adoptive home was found for Sergio. However, that statute applies to minors, unlike Sergio, who are "difficult to place for adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(3); see In re B.D., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239 [children who had special needs and challenging behaviors were difficult to place as sibling group of five].) As we previously discussed, Sergio's medical problems were being treated, and there were no concerns regarding his long-term prognosis, which looked "very good." Because Sergio was not difficult to place for adoption, a continuance under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) was neither required nor in Sergio's best interests.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., HALLER, J.