Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SCRDJDSQ072724301
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the minor, Sean. R., came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he had committed misdemeanor battery. (Pen. Code, § 242.) He was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation for six months.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On appeal, the minor contends: (1) the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss as he was not 14 years old at the time of the offense and there is insufficient evidence that he knew the wrongfulness of his act; and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the petition, as the victim’s testimony was inherently improbable. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2007, Andrew M. and the minor spent the night at their friend E.’s house. When Mrs. M. picked Andrew up the next evening, he looked as though he had been beaten up, his lip was “busted” and his face appeared to have rug burn. Andrew immediately stated, “I didn’t get beat up.... I fell off the bed.” The next day, Andrew’s school called Mrs. M. and told her that Andrew had been beaten up and school officials had contacted the authorities. Mrs. M. picked Andrew up and took him to the emergency room.
At the hearing, Andrew testified he was sitting in a chair when the minor got mad about something and ran up and pushed Andrew off the chair. Andrew lost consciousness and did not remember what else happened. When he awoke, he had a headache, his face was bloody, he had a bloody nose, rug burns “all over” his face, and there were marks on his stomach that looked as if someone had kicked him in the “gut.” The minor stayed in E.’s mother’s room, and Andrew and the minor had no further contact. Andrew told his mother he had fallen off a chair because he was afraid the minor would try to beat him up again if he told her what had happened. The minor had previously beaten Andrew up, and he was afraid of him.
Andrew initially told the principal and a teacher at school that he had sustained his injuries when he fell out of a chair, but they did not believe him. When they persisted in their questioning, he told them the truth. Andrew also spoke with a sheriff’s deputy and told him that the injuries to his face occurred when he was dragged around. Although he was unconscious, he could tell he had not fallen forward onto his face because of the direction he was facing when he regained consciousness. He saw the minor push him. He knew it was the minor who had dragged him around and kicked him, rather than E., because he had a good relationship with E. He did not have a good relationship with the minor, and he had been in a fight with the minor earlier in the year.
E. had known both Andrew and the minor since about third grade. He was friends with Andrew, and the minor was family, “almost” his cousin. Around August 2007, the minor and Andrew had had a fight. On September 9, 2007, the minor apologized to Andrew. The next morning, the minor and E. went to play video games while Andrew continued to sleep. The minor and E. heard noises coming from Andrew. The minor went to check on Andrew and reported back to E. that Andrew had fallen out of the chair and was bleeding from his nose and mouth. When E. went into the room, Andrew was lying on the ground with marks on his face. He tried to wake Andrew up and determine why he had fallen out of the chair, but he could not. When Andrew woke up, he seemed confused.
The minor’s younger sister testified that Andrew had told her two different stories about the incident. He first told her that the minor had dragged Andrew across the carpet. Then he told her that the minor had dragged him outside and thrown him in the creek.
The minor testified he and Andrew had been friends since third grade. He claimed he and Andrew had not had any problems or arguments. He testified he and E. were playing video games when they heard Andrew wheezing and crying in the bedroom. He went to check on Andrew and found him on the floor with blood on his face. He appeared to be “like sleep walking,” there was a mark on his left cheek that looked like a rug burn and it appeared that he had a bloody nose. He went to get E. and the two tried to help Andrew back in the chair. He denied pushing Andrew out of the chair, dragging him around the room, kicking him or threatening him.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 27, 2007, a petition was filed under section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that the minor had committed a misdemeanor battery against Andrew M. The minor was 13 years old at the time of the alleged offense.
A contested jurisdictional hearing was held on March 20, 2008. At the close of the prosecution’s case, the minor’s counsel moved for dismissal under section 701.1. The motion was based on the fact that the minor was 13 years old at the time of the offense and the prosecution had not proven, as required under Penal Code section 26, that he understood the wrongfulness of his act. The court denied the motion.
Section 701.1 provides: “At the hearing, the court, on motion of the minor or on its own motion, shall order that the petition be dismissed and that the minor be discharged from any detention or restriction therefore ordered, after the presentation of evidence on behalf of the petitioner has been closed, if the court, upon weighing the evidence then before it, finds that the minor is not a person described by Section 601 or 602. If such a motion at the close of evidence offered by the petitioner is not granted, the minor may offer evidence without first having reserved that right.”
Following presentation of the minor’s case, the court sustained the petition, finding the allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt. At the dispositional hearing, the minor was placed on probation for six months.
DISCUSSION
I
The minor contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for dismissal under section 701.1 as he was under 14 years old at the time and there was no evidence he knew the wrongfulness of his act. We disagree.
“Courts have held that [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 701.1 is substantially similar to Penal Code section 1118 governing motions to acquit in criminal trials and that therefore the ‘rules and procedures applicable to [Penal Code] section 1118... apply with equal force to juvenile proceedings.’ [Citation.] [¶] Thus, the requirement in a criminal case that on a motion for acquittal the trial court is required ‘to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and determine that the case against the defendant is “proved beyond a reasonable doubt before [the defendant] is required to put on a defense”’ applies equally well to motions to dismiss brought in juvenile proceedings. [Citation.]” (In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 727, fn. omitted.)
The minor premises his claim that his motion to dismiss should have been granted on the presumption in Penal Code section 26, which states in pertinent part: “All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] One--Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.” That is, the prosecutor “must present clear and convincing evidence that the minor knows the wrongfulness of his conduct....” (In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 234.)
“Although a minor's knowledge of wrongfulness may not be inferred from the commission of the act itself, ‘the attendant circumstances of the crime, such as its preparation, the particular method of its commission, and its concealment’ may be considered. [Citation.] Moreover, a minor's ‘age is a basic and important consideration [citation], and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer [he] approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that [he] appreciates the wrongfulness of [his] acts.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378.)
The minor was less than one month away from his 14th birthday when he committed this assault. Andrew was afraid of the minor and afraid of further repercussions from the minor if Andrew told his mother what had happened. Andrew was rendered unconscious by the minor, and while Andrew was unconscious, the minor dragged Andrew across the floor and repeatedly kicked him in the stomach.
It is not unreasonable to infer that Andrew’s fear of telling his mother what the minor had done stemmed from a threat of reprisals from the minor. Furthermore, one can reasonably expect a 13 year old, less than one month away from his 14th birthday, to understand that it is wrong to hit someone, drag him around on his face and kick him, particularly when that person is unconscious. (See In re Nirran W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1161.) Battery is not an act that requires advanced years or mental sophistication to appreciate its wrongfulness. From the earliest ages, children are told and taught not to hit and kick others. It is perhaps one of the very first things children understand to be wrong. By the time a child is 13 years old, this message has certainly been received. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence before the court at the time the section 701.1 motion was made that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of his act, and the court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.
The Attorney General relies largely on the probation report prepared on April 30, 2008. We have not summarized this evidence here, nor do we rely on it. The minor appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss and we are therefore limited in our review to the prosecution's case-in-chief. (In re Stephen P. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 123, 128, disapproved on another ground in People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 275, fn. 5.)
II
The minor next contends there is insufficient evidence to support the sustained petition as Andrew’s “inconsistent testimony[] makes his allegation inherently improbable.” We disagree.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must draw all inferences in support of the judgment that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence, and must uphold the judgment if, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1199-1200.) If the evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact's findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1213; In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 362.)
The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. (People v. McCleod (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1221; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the judgment, and we indulge every reasonable inference the trier of fact could draw from the evidence. (Autry, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.)
When Andrew went to E.’s house, he had no injuries. The following day, when his mother picked him up, he had a “busted” lip and abrasions on his face. His injuries were severe enough that a teacher and principal realized Andrew had been beaten up and felt compelled to call the authorities. They were also serious enough that Andrew had to be taken to the emergency room for treatment.
Andrew saw the minor push him out of the chair. The minor and Andrew had a history, which included the minor having beaten Andrew up in the past, and Andrew was afraid of the minor. Andrew’s past relationship with E. was friendly. Andrew’s injuries were consistent with his description of being dragged across the floor. His vague responses or lack of memory in other areas of his testimony are consistent with his having lost consciousness.
“‘“To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations.] Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]”’” (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 366, pp. 424-425.)
The court believed Andrew testified truthfully. Andrew’s testimony was neither physically impossible nor so apparently false that we can reject his statements. His testimony is sufficient evidence upon which to sustain the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: RAYE , J., ROBIE , J.