" ( In re Randalynne G. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1169 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 880].) Citing In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1599 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 193], appellant reasons that once reunification services are ordered and there is a finding that potential reunification with the parent might be in the child's best interest, there is an implied finding that if the parent's efforts are successful, it would be in the child's best interest to modify the existing permanent plan. Appellant suggests that a second section 388 petition to terminate a guardianship is necessary if the court only grants reunification services.
(ยง 350.) The dependency system seeks to keep to a minimum the amount of potential detriment to a minor resulting from court delay. ( In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1597.) "[D]elay disserves the interests of the minor, the parents, and the courts, and is clearly inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature."
If, therefore, prejudicial error was committed in the administration of mother's 388 motion, reversal of the selection and implementation order would be required in order to permit reconsideration of the 388 motion. (See In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 193.) Any order resulting from a 388 motion comes within the general ambit of appealability as prescribed by section 395, qualifying as "any subsequent order" following a judgment in a proceeding under section 300, and not precluded by the special requirement of writ review for orders referring the case to a selection and implementation hearing, under section 366.26, subdivision (k).
Continuances should be difficult to obtain. (See In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1599 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 193]; In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 743 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 810].) Section 352 provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Upon request of counsel for the parent, guardian, minor, or petitioner, the court may continue any hearing under this chapter beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held, provided that no continuance shall be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor.
At this point we are moved to review and reflect upon the objectives sought to be achieved by the new law and its very new judicial gloss. (7) As we stated in In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 193], a juvenile dependency case "proceeds along a legislatively mandated time grid." Review hearings are mandated at specific time intervals, finality in child placement being required within 18 months after initial jurisdiction is assumed.
Although the court in Sarah D. cautioned that "`continuances are expressly discouraged'" (see In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 743 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 810]), the fact remains that "there is no legal impediment for slight and justified delays." ( In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1599 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 193]; In re Michael R. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 687, 694 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 139] see also In re Michael S., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1461, fn. 4; In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 73, 81 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 462] ["[I]t is open to question whether a court has discretion to order further reunification services after 18 months."]; In re Cory M. supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 935, 946.
(See e.g. In re Heather P. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 886 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 545]; In re Taya C. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 810]; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 913, review granted Apr. 23, 1992 (S025807); In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 148]; In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 193]; In re Marilyn H. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 138 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 79] review granted Apr. 23, 1992 (S025592).) As noted above our reticence here is solely because the constitutional issues pertaining to the section 366.21 hearing are now moot.
Martin relies exclusively on In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594 to support her position. That case is markedly different from the present dispute.
These and other bedrock timelines provide children who have been taken away from their parents with the permanence and stability to which they are legally entitled. (See id ., subd. (a); Renee S. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 187, 197, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 134 ; In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1597, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 193.) The deadlines are to be extended only for "good cause" and/or "exceptional circumstances."
These and other bedrock timelines provide children who have been taken away from their parents with the permanence and stability to which they are legally entitled. (See id., subd. (a); Renee S. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 187, 197; In re Sean E. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1594, 1597.) The deadlines are to be extended only for "good cause" and/or "exceptional circumstances."