Opinion
155 CA 20-00507
05-07-2021
In the MATTER OF the Application of Tom SCHLEE, Unit Chief of Central New York Psychiatric Center, Five Points Satellite Unit, Petitioner-Respondent, for an Order Authorizing the Involuntary Treatment of Clarence E., Respondent-Appellant.
TODD G. MONAHAN, LITTLE FALLS, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. LETITIA JAMES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (ALLYSON B. LEVINE OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
TODD G. MONAHAN, LITTLE FALLS, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
LETITIA JAMES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (ALLYSON B. LEVINE OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, CURRAN, BANNISTER, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking authorization to administer antipsychotic medications to respondent over his objection pursuant to the parens patriae power of the State of New York (see Matter of Sawyer [R.G.] , 68 A.D.3d 1734, 1734-1735, 891 N.Y.S.2d 813 [4th Dept. 2009] ; see generally Rivers v. Katz , 67 N.Y.2d 485, 496-498, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337 [1986], rearg denied 68 N.Y.2d 808, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1039, 498 N.E.2d 438 [1986] ). We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted the petition. Contrary to respondent's contention, petitioner met his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that respondent lacks "the capacity to make a reasoned decision with respect to [the] proposed treatment" ( Rivers , 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337 ). Petitioner's evidence demonstrated that respondent suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type and that respondent was delusional and lacked insight regarding his illness (see Matter of William S. , 31 A.D.3d 567, 568, 817 N.Y.S.2d 674 [2d Dept. 2006] ; Matter of Mausner v. William E. , 264 A.D.2d 485, 486, 694 N.Y.S.2d 165 [2d Dept. 1999] ). Indeed, petitioner established that respondent did not believe that he needed medication for his mental illness, which highlighted his inability to fully appreciate his diagnosis and its effect on him and those around him (see Sawyer , 68 A.D.3d at 1734, 891 N.Y.S.2d 813 ; Matter of Paris M. v. Creedmoor Psychiatric Ctr. , 30 A.D.3d 425, 426, 818 N.Y.S.2d 109 [2d Dept. 2006] ; Matter of McConnell , 147 A.D.2d 881, 882, 538 N.Y.S.2d 101 [3d Dept. 1989], appeal dismissed and lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 759, 545 N.Y.S.2d 99, 543 N.E.2d 742 [1989] ). Although respondent testified on his own behalf that he would accept properly administered medication, he also testified that his "mental health problem" did not require treatment by medication. We perceive no basis to disturb the court's determination to the contrary given petitioner's evidence and the discrepancies in respondent's testimony (see William S. , 31 A.D.3d at 568, 817 N.Y.S.2d 674 ).
Contrary to respondent's further contention, petitioner also established by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed two-year treatment plan was "narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to [respondent's] liberty interest" ( Rivers , 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337 ; see Sawyer , 68 A.D.3d at 1735, 891 N.Y.S.2d 813 ). Respondent's treating and reviewing physicians each determined that respondent's prognosis for improvement without changing his course of treatment was minimal. Additionally, both evaluation reports prepared by the physicians in support of the petition identified the proposed medications for respondent's treatment; the purported benefits thereof, including the expectation that respondent's delusions would abate; and any reasonably foreseeable adverse side effects. The reports also included a plan for monitoring respondent for adverse side effects through, inter alia, regular blood work and organ function tests.
Respondent further contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on, inter alia, counsel's failure to successfully advocate for a second adjournment and to convince the court that an independent examination of respondent was warranted. We reject that contention because, even assuming, arguendo, that respondent has the right to meaningful assistance of counsel during proceedings such as these, he failed to "demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations" for counsel's alleged deficiencies ( People v. Caban , 5 N.Y.3d 143, 154, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 [2005] ), and we conclude that his attorney provided meaningful representation (see Matter of State of New York v. Leslie L. , 174 A.D.3d 1326, 1327, 101 N.Y.S.3d 806 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 903, 2019 WL 5558964 [2019] ; see generally People v. Baldi , 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 [1981] ).
Finally, we reject respondent's remaining due process contentions inasmuch as the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for an independent psychiatric examination (see generally Matter of Kings Park Psychiatric Ctr. [Gerald L.] , 204 A.D.2d 724, 724, 612 N.Y.S.2d 428 [2d Dept. 1994] ).