Opinion
No. 5-341 / 05-0360
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karla J. Fultz, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. AFFIRMED.
Julie DeVries of DeVries Law Office, LLC, Des Moines, for appellant-father.
John Swartz of Urbandale, for appellee-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and John Sarcone, County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Rachael Seymore, Des Moines, for child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
A father, R.C., appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. He contends the State failed to prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. He further contends termination is not in the child's best interest. We review these claims de novo. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).
R.C.'s parental rights were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), and (f) (2003). We need only find termination proper under one ground to affirm. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Termination is appropriate under section 232.116(1)(b) where the court finds, "there is clear and convincing evidence that the child has been abandoned or deserted." Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(b). Abandonment is characterized as the giving up of parental rights and responsibilities along with the intent to forego them. In re A.B., 554 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
We conclude there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination under section 232.116(1)(b). R.C. has not had contact with the child since the summer of 2000. He was incarcerated in 2002 and was convicted in 2003 of third-degree sexual abuse, for which he is currently serving a ten-year prison sentence. Following his June 2007 release, he is to have no contact with minor children. Although termination is not a necessary result of conviction of a crime and resulting imprisonment, R.C. cannot use his incarceration as a justification for his lack of relationship with the child. In re M.M S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Iowa 1993). This is especially true when the incarceration results from a lifestyle that is chosen in preference to, and at the expense of, a relationship with a child. Id.
We also conclude termination is in the child's best interest. Prior to his incarceration, R.C. did not provide any financial support to the child. The child has not has contact with her father for the majority of her life. Although R.C. contends he did not have contact with the child from 2000 until his incarceration in 2002 because the mother suspended visitation, he made no attempt to have visitation reinstated. While he attempts to shift the responsibility for his lack of relationship onto others, the fact remains that he has no bond with his child. R.C. is unable to have contact with the child, even after his release from prison, due to his status as a sex offender. The child cannot now, and can never be, returned to the father's care. Children should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Because termination is in the child's best interest, we affirm.