Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ09012716
Jenkins, J.
Defendant and appellant S.C., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order. The juvenile court placed defendant on probation without wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a) after finding true beyond a reasonable doubt allegations that S.C. committed misdemeanor violations of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (c) (grand theft from a person) and section 242 (battery). Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings that the allegations were true beyond a reasonable doubt. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Background
The Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile wardship petition filed on June 2, 2009, states that defendant is 15 years old and alleges in count one that on or about May 30, 2009, she committed felony grand theft in violation of section 487, subdivision (c) by taking from the person of Ofelia Navarette property consisting of corn. Also, the petition alleged in count two that on the same date S.C. committed a misdemeanor battery on Ofelia Naverette in violation of section 242. The probation officer’s jurisdictional report filed on June 3, 2009, states that the victim is 60 years old and suffered some swelling to her right cheek in the incident.
The jurisdictional hearing was held on August 3, 2009. At the hearing, the juvenile court granted petitioner’s motion to amend count one to change the felony violation of section 487, subdivision (c) to a misdemeanor. At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony on behalf of the petitioner from the victim, Ofelia Navarette, and Oakland Police Officer Holly Williams. Defendant testified on her own behalf. After presentation of evidence, the juvenile court found the allegations as amended true beyond a reasonable doubt.
The dispositional hearing was held on September 2, 2009. The juvenile court placed defendant on probation without wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 23, 2009.
The testimony presented at the jurisdictional hearing may be summarized as follows: The victim, Ofelia Navarette, testified through an interpreter that on May 30, 2009, at around 5.30 p.m. she was selling corn on the cob and fruit on a street corner at International at 90th in Oakland. Four persons approached her. Three of them said they wanted fruit and corn on the cob. After Navarette served them, they took the corn and fruit and ran off. The fourth person (a girl) said she wanted corn on the cob. Navarette prepared and presented the corn to the girl but the girl did not show Navarette any money or otherwise attempt to pay for the corn. Navarette grabbed her cart and started to move away. The girl came after her and hit her on the forehead with a closed fist from behind. Naverette “went down” and lost consciousness. Navarette did not look at the girl when the girl asked for corn so she did not see the girl’s face clearly, she only saw the girl’s body. The girl who punched her had straight black hair. Later, the police showed Navarette a person who may have been involved in the incident. Navarette recognized the person as the girl who punched her: Navarette said she recognized the girl “by her body” and identified the girl as her assailant. Navarette spoke to a police officer at the scene about what happened. People at the scene translated what Navarette was saying to the officer. The officer wrote down what Navarette told him on a piece of paper, and Navarette signed it. Navarette identified defendant in court as the person who hit her.
On cross-examination, Navarette stated she identified defendant in court “by her body” and acknowledged that from the witness chair she could only see half of defendant’s body. Navarette further stated on cross-examination that she did not notice what color or type of clothing the girl who hit her was wearing. The girl was about Navarette’s height and was “not tall.” On re-direct, Navarette stated that the girl who punched her did not wear a skirt. When the police brought the girl to the show-up, Navarette noticed the girl was wearing orange pants or shorts with flowers on them and a dark colored sweater.
Oakland Police Officer Holly Williams testified that on May 30, 2009, she was dispatched to 90th Avenue and International at about 5:40 p.m. Upon arrival, Williams noted another patrol unit was already at the scene. The two officers from that unit were at the corner with two possible suspects and indicated to Williams that the victim was around the corner. When Williams started to interview the victim, she realized the victim did not speak English. A seven-year-old boy who was at the scene assisted Williams with translation. According to Williams, the boy understood what she was saying and displayed no signs that he was struggling to understand either Williams or the victim. Through the young interpreter, the victim described her assailant as a young black female with a dark complexion wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, bright orange pants and boots. Another officer took over the interview while Williams and her partner went to look for a suspect matching the description provided by the victim. Nearby, they saw a female subject (defendant) who matched the description. Defendant was with two other females but neither of them wore clothes matching the description. The officers detained defendant and took her for a field show-up at the crime scene. After the field show-up, the officers informed defendant that she was being detained for assaulting and taking food from a street vendor. The officers admonished defendant and took a statement from her. Defendant said something like, “No, I didn’t take the corn. The other girl did.” When the officers asked defendant, “If you didn’t do this, then who did?”, defendant did not reply.
Defendant testified that she is a tenth grader in high school. On the day in question, defendant rode the bus to International and 90th with her sister, R., and a girl named Champagne to meet another girl named Ashley. After meeting up with Ashley, the four girls went to get some corn from the lady at the corner. Champagne started to make her own corn by putting chilli and stuff on it and defendant waited while the lady made corn for her. Defendant was about to pay for the corn and had the money in her hand. Before defendant could take the corn or hand over the money, Champagne snatched the money out of defendant’s hand and said, “You’re not about to pay for her corn.” Defendant retrieved her money from Champagne. Defendant held out her hand and offered the lady the money for the corn. The lady held out the corn as if to give it to defendant then pulled it back. At that, “Ashley came up to her and socked her.” After Ashley hit the lady in the face, everyone started walking away. Defendant put her money back in her pocket and did not get any corn. Champagne walked away with corn. Shortly afterwards, the police approached defendant, her sister and Champagne. Ashley had already left. Defendant was wearing orange pants, a black sweater and purple boots, and wore her hair up on the top of her head. That day Ashley was also wearing orange jeans and a black top, and her hair was in a ponytail. The police accused defendant of stealing corn, placed her in handcuffs, and took her back to 90th Avenue. Defendant testified that when she asked for corn that day she intended to pay for it and that she did not know Ashley was going to hit the lady. Defendant also testified that when she was arrested she pointed out to the officer that it was Ashley who hit the lady and Champagne who stole the corn.
After the parties concluded the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court entertained argument before ruling as follows: “Well, I think the victim’s identification was pretty clear, and in order for me to believe what [defendant] said here on the stand there would have to have been a lot of other information that is clearly not there either from the officer or the victim. I just don’t believe [defendant’s] version of this, that there was another girl there who is dressed exactly the same who just happened to be the one who committed the assault while [defendant] was not involved. That’s just not a credible story to me given the identification by Miss Navarette. So I am going to make a finding on both counts.... Counts 1 and 2 of the petition are true.”
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A minor’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings of the juvenile court in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 proceeding is governed by the same standard of review applicable to such challenges in adult criminal proceedings. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809; In re Oscar R. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 770, 773.) We review the entire record to determine if it contains substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and presume in support of the jurisdictional findings the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 576-577.) In this regard, we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the judgment, and we indulge in every reasonable inference the trier of fact could draw from the evidence. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) While we must ensure the evidence supporting the order is substantial, it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and the truth or falsity of the facts on which a determination depends. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.) If the evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact’s findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1213; People v. Schwartz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1324.)
B. Section 487 Allegation
Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the allegation that defendant committed grand theft person in violation of section 487, subdivision (c). The Attorney General (AG) does not attempt to argue that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the allegation with respect to defendant as a principal. However, the AG contends the evidence is sufficient to support the allegation that defendant was an aider and abettor to grand theft person. We agree.
Section 487 provides: “Grand theft is theft committed in any of the following cases:... [¶]... [¶] (c) When the property is taken from the person of another.” (§ 487, subd. (c).)
We reject defendant’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence of grand theft person by any of youths involved. The essence of “grand theft” is the “felonious stealing, taking or driving away the personal property of another.” (People v. Flores (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 764, 768.) To constitute a taking from the person pursuant to section 487, subdivision (c), the property must, in some way, be physically attached to the person. (People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471 (Williams).) As stated in Williams, “[T]he crime of theft from the person contemplates that ‘... the property shall at the time be in some way actually upon or attached to the person, or carried or held in actual physical possession... or... held or carried in the hands, or by other means, upon the person;... [the crime] was not intended to include property removed from the person and laid aside, however immediately it may be retained in the presence or constructive control or possession of the owner while so laid away from his person and out of his hands.’ (Citations.)” (Williams, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471.) Thus, the Court of Appeal in In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088 held that the theft of a bag of groceries from a shopping cart as the victim was pushing the cart in the parking lot of a market constituted grand theft person because the victim carried the bag by means of the shopping cart and the contents of the shopping cart were attached to the victim through the medium of the shopping cart. (Id. at pp. 1091-1092.) Here, the testimony of the victim supports the reasonable inference that defendant’s friends took corn, either from the victim’s hands or out of the victim’s cart, before running off without paying. Thus, the record is sufficient to support a finding that the victim suffered grand theft person.
To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a person must “act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) One who aids and abets the commission of a criminal offense is considered a principal in the crime. (§ 31.) For that reason, “the same criminal liability attaches whether a defendant directly perpetrates the offense or aids and abets the perpetrator.” (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1038-1039.) Criminal liability may attach even where the contribution of the aider and abettor is slight. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 532.) “Thus, the law imposes criminal liability upon all persons ‘concerned’ in the commission of a crime.” (Id. at p. 529, quoting § 31.) “Whether a person has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime ordinarily is a question of fact.” (In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094; accord, In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) “Among the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. [Citations.] In addition, flight is... relevant in determining consciousness of guilt.” (In re Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1094-1095.)
Several pertinent factors are present here. First, as defendant admitted, she was at the scene of the crime. Second, there is evidence of companionship among defendant and the other three persons who took corn and fruit from the victim and ran off, because defendant testified that she rode the bus to International and 90th with her sister, R., and a girl named Champagne to meet another girl named Ashley. Third, under the totality of circumstances, the trier of fact was entitled to draw the reasonable inference that defendant’s friends took their corn and ran off without paying, that the victim declined to hand over defendant’s corn before first receiving payment and that defendant punched the victim for refusing to give her corn. This is probative on the question of her role as an aider and abettor, as it supports a finding of a shared common purpose. Fourth, defendant, like her friends, fled the scene after the incident, which indicates consciousness of guilt. (In re Lynette G., supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 1095.) In sum, there is substantial record evidence that the defendant was “concerned” in the grand theft person under an aiding and abetting theory. (§ 31.) Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding with respect to the section 487 allegation.
C. Section 242
Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the allegation that defendant committed a battery in violation of section 242. Specifically, defendant contends the victim’s identification of her as the assailant was questionable. However, Officer Williams testified that the victim described the distinctive clothing worn by her assailant, that Williams found defendant a few blocks away dressed in clothing that matched the victim’s description, and that the victim identified defendant as her assailant when Williams presented defendant to the victim in a show-up. Officer William’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty of battery beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578.) Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding with respect to the section 242 allegation.
Disposition
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P. J., Siggins, J.