Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV08214
BUTZ, J.The mother, T.C., timely appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) She contends no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding it was likely the minor would be adopted. We shall conclude the record supports that finding, and affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because of the limited issue raised on appeal, we omit much of the factual and procedural background.
The minor, S.C., was detained in Sacramento County in mid-August 2007, when she was three years old. She was declared a dependent child on October 11, 2007, and was placed back with her mother, under supervision. On January 9, 2008, she was taken into protective custody, and two days later a supplemental petition (§ 387) was filed. The petition was sustained, and a transfer of the case to Yolo County was completed on April 2, 2008.
A status review report dated March 2, 2009, states the minor had broken her arm in a fall and had allergies and asthma, but no other medical issues were noted. She was receiving counseling, which had been increased “after there was some behavioral acting out in the foster home, due to other foster children temporarily coming into the home.” The counseling would stop in late March 2009, “because she has met her treatment goals and she is increasing her appropriate behaviors.” In part, the goals addressed “sexualized” behavior due to molestation by the mother’s boyfriend. She “might” need a future attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) evaluation “due to her high energy level, her impulsivity, and her inability to maintain focus, but, at this time, the foster mother’s structure, guidance, and clear expectations direct [the minor’s] high energy behaviors.” Those foster parents struggled “with [the minor’s] acting out, hyperactivity and attachment issues. [The minor] does not deal well when new children come into the foster parents’ home, and when new children moved into the home she started acting out.”
Reunification services were terminated on April 16, 2009, and a permanency plan report was filed in advance of a permanency hearing set for August 12, 2009.
The permanency report described the minor as in good health, with no developmental problems, although she was “slightly delayed” in her education. She had been placed in a new prospective adoptive home on July 8, 2009. Her “emotional status appears to be stable; however, her anxiety may escalate due to her recent move and she may again need services to assist her with the transition.”
The permanency report states the new prospective adoptive parents had a stable marriage, both were employed, and they had been “certified through Sierra Adoptions Foster Family Agency.” “The preliminary assessment indicates this family appears suitable for adoption of [the minor]. It appears that the [prospective] adoptive parents will be able to meet [the minor’s] needs.” The minor was “an adoptable child who would benefit from the establishment of a permanent parent/child relationship with the identified potential adoptive applicants through adoption. It is likely that the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated.”
On August 12, 2009, the permanency hearing was continued to September 2, 2009. On August 26, 2009, the mother filed a petition to modify prior court orders, seeking further reunification services. (§ 388.) On September 2, 2009, the juvenile court ordered a combined hearing on her petition and on the permanency plan.
Because the mother does not challenge the denial of her modification petition, we omit the facts relating to it.
On October 9, 2009, the prospective adoptive parents filed a report stating the minor had entered kindergarten, was thriving, and called them “Mommy and Daddy.”
At the combined hearing on October 16, 2009, a social worker testified the minor said she wanted to live with the prospective parents, and she did not recognize the mother as her mother. The minor had had behavioral problems in the past, but none had been noted with the current home. She gets anxious about social worker visits and court dates because she is afraid she will have to move. Her prior behavior problems included sexually acting out, anger issues and tantrums, possibly as a result of molestation by the mother’s boyfriend, and she had had an arm broken by abuse in a prior foster placement. She also reported being molested by a prior foster father. The prospective parents were aware of these issues and were willing to adopt her. They had “strong extended family support” and resources within the community to address any issues likely to arise. Indeed, it was because she trusted her prospective parents that she revealed some of this abuse. They were currently working with another social worker to obtain counseling for the minor, not because of any current issues, but “to deal with issues that may come up.”
When asked whether another adoptive placement could be found, if the current prospective adoptive parents did not work out, the social worker replied, “She’s been deemed adoptable by state adoptions.” This was supported by an “Adoption Assessment” prepared by the State Department of Social Services, dated June 26, 2009, that was attached to the permanency report. Although, as the mother points out, this assessment did not explicitly state the minor was “generally” adoptable, that is its clear tenor: The assessment recommends a permanent plan of adoption, and describes the minor’s circumstances in detail, indicating no facts suggesting she was not generally adoptable.
The prospective adoptive mother testified “I am her mother, fully committed. Anything that she needs, I will provide it at all costs.” The minor had not displayed any unusual behaviors, but the family was aware of possible future problems, and was prepared to address them as needed.
The juvenile court found the minor likely to be adopted, and terminated parental rights. The mother timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
In terminating the mother’s parental rights, the juvenile court was required in part to find “by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The juvenile court made such a finding. The mother contends no substantial evidence supports this finding for three reasons. We disagree.
“On appeal, the substantial evidence rule applies to the clear and convincing standard of proof the same as in other cases.” (In re Terry D. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 890, 899; see In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290 [adoptability finding “reviewed under the substantial evidence test”].) “We give the court’s adoptability finding the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the judgment of the trial court.” (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1232.)
“The issue of adoptability requires the court to focus on the child, and whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. [Citations.] It is not necessary that the child already be placed in a preadoptive home, or that a proposed adoptive parent be waiting. [Citations.] However, there must be convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will take place within a reasonable time.” (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.)
First, the mother contends that because of the minor’s “behavior issues and history of abuse, she may not be deemed ‘generally adoptable.’” The mother contends that because no approved homestudy had been completed, the juvenile court could not find the minor was generally adoptable, and the fact there was one family willing to adopt her was insufficient to show that she was adoptable.
This is an invitation to reweigh the evidence. There was nothing apparently wrong with the minor that would make her unadoptable. She was in good physical and emotional health and was thriving with the prospective adoptive family. “Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650 (Sarah M.).) The fact that only one prospective adoptive family was being evaluated is unimportant, because “it is not necessary that backup families be identified.” (In re I.I. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 857, 870.)
Second, the mother contends that the minor’s prior victimization, sexually and physically, made her unadoptable because “She was not in any type of counseling, and there was no expert evidence offered of her prognosis given the abuse and multiple placements that she had suffered.” The minor displayed no physical or emotional problems stemming from the prior abuse, and had been able to reveal what she had experienced to her prospective adoptive parents. The fact she had been abused, without more, does not compel the inference that she was not adoptable. Nor does the fact she previously had behavioral and “attachment” issues compel such inference. The minor received counseling in the past, to the point where it was not needed, and the evidence before the juvenile court was that counseling would be provided if she again needed it. The mother also contends the Adoption Assessment stated the minor “would need therapeutic intervention to transition to another home.” This overstates the record: The Adoption Assessment states that prospective adoptive parents “will be encouraged to closely monitor [the minor] and access necessary resources, including counseling.” That is what the prospective parents were doing, by arranging for counseling if needed.
In a related claim regarding the minor’s health, the mother contends the minor was not adoptable because there was no evidence she had been evaluated for ADHD. A status report stated such an evaluation “might” be needed in the future. The record does not show an evaluation was later needed. There was no diagnosis of ADHD, nor must the record contain proof of lack of ADHD to show adoptability.
Third, the mother questions the fitness of the prospective adoptive parents. She may not do so. “Since the issue whether a dependent child is likely to be adopted focuses on the child rather than on the prospective adoptive family, we held in Scott M. that a parent whose right to care and custody of the child is at stake in a section 366.26 hearing may not inquire about the ‘suitability’ of a potential adoptive family because the family’s suitability to adopt is irrelevant to the issue whether the minors are likely to be adopted.” (Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650; see In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 844.)
We conclude the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was adoptable.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: HULL, Acting P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.