Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD210694
ROBIE, J.
James C., father of the minor, appeals from orders terminating his parental rights. Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding the minor was likely to be adopted and that his due process rights were violated by orders limiting the minor’s testimony and permitting the minor to testify in closed session. We affirm.
FACTS
The now 16-year-old minor was first removed from parental custody in 1996 due to physical abuse perpetrated on, and witnessed by, the minor. The parents failed to reunify and the minor was placed in long-term foster care in 1999. Due to the abuse the minor suffered and observed in the home, he displayed serious behavioral problems which required medication therapy and eventually a group home placement.
Historically, the minor’s negative behavior could be triggered by contact with his parents and, in 1998, the court ordered appellant to have no contact with the minor. Prior to that, appellant displayed controlling and manipulative behavior in visits and family interactions and interfered with the minor’s counsel’s access to his client.
The foster parents, with whom the minor had lived prior to the group home placement, maintained contact with him during the years he was in that restricted environment. Eventually, the minor’s progress led to some renewed contact with the mother and return of the minor to the foster parents to whom he was bonded. After his return to foster care, the minor’s therapist determined he was well adjusted and no longer needed therapy. The foster parents considered adopting the minor but wanted to wait until he became 16 so he would remain eligible for certain college benefits.
In March 2006, the review report recommended a change of permanent plan to adoption because the minor was doing well and his foster family who had cared for him for many years wanted to adopt him. The minor had not had any contact with his father since the no-contact order issued and, in March 2006, expressed his desire “to continue with the no contact with my father because I do not want to see him.” The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a petition for modification to set a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to consider a permanent plan for the minor. The court granted the request.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
In August 2006, appellant petitioned to modify the no-contact order seeking the minor’s return or visitation. At the hearing, appellant requested that the court permit him to contact the minor by letter. The court reviewed the history of the case, finding that the no-contact order was primarily a result of appellant’s actions and his subsequent incarceration. The court observed that appellant was now out of custody and making some progress in services, however the minor had moved on and no longer wanted contact with appellant. The court granted the request to modify to allow letter contact between appellant and the minor.
Beginning in September 2006, appellant sent daily letters to the minor. Although the minor was initially willing to receive letters from appellant, he changed his mind. On being told this, appellant wanted written confirmation from the minor, which the minor provided.
The assessment for the section 366.26 hearing stated the minor was healthy, developmentally on target, and able to express his feelings. The minor was doing well in school and no longer displayed behavioral problems. The minor’s mother did not oppose the adoption. The report stated the minor was specifically adoptable by the current caretakers due to his age and willingness to be adopted by them.
At the section 366.26 hearing, appellant sought to have the minor testify so that the court could judge the credibility of the minor’s reported statement that he wanted to be adopted. Also, appellant believed the minor was coerced to say he wanted to be adopted and wanted to gauge the minor’s sincerity for himself. Appellant’s counsel argued testifying should not be traumatic to the minor and, although she preferred testimony in open court, acknowledged that having the minor testify in chambers would be appropriate. Appellant’s stated purpose for the minor’s testimony was to establish an exception to the preference for adoption should the court find the minor was likely to be adopted. The court denied the request due to an inadequate offer of proof but said it would reconsider after appellant’s testimony.
Appellant testified he believed the Department and the social worker were conspiring to have the minor adopted and were influencing the minor to say things he normally would not say. He believed the minor was coerced to say he did not want contact with appellant. Appellant testified he did not believe the minor wanted to be adopted and felt the minor should come to court, take the stand, and testify.
Following this testimony, the court questioned appellant’s counsel on the proposed scope of inquiry if the minor testified. Counsel stated he wanted to ask the minor whether he wanted to be adopted, when he last had contact with appellant, whether he got appellant’s letters, and if it was the minor’s wish to discontinue contact. The court limited questioning to whether the minor wanted to be adopted. The court balanced the harm to the minor in testifying against appellant’s due process rights and concluded that, with the minimal inquiry and testimony out of appellant’s presence, the minor’s testimony would be allowed.
The minor testified that he has a strong relationship with his current caretakers. He stated he wanted to be adopted. He understood that adoption would mean that his biological parents would no longer be his parents and that he would have no contact with appellant and that was what he wanted. He confirmed he had not been pressured by anyone to testify as he had.
The testimony was read to appellant who posed no further questions for the minor. Over appellant’s objections, the court adopted the recommended findings and orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption.
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence For The Court’s Findings
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding the minor is likely to be adopted. Appellant cites an inadequate assessment and the possibility that the minor’s previous behavior problems would require long-term services.
We note that the adequacy of the assessment was not raised in the juvenile court and appellant has forfeited his ability to challenge it on appeal. (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2.)
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is questioned on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (Jason L.,at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Determination of whether a child is likely to be adopted focuses first upon the characteristics of the child. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) Generally, the existence or suitability of the prospective adoptive family, if any, is not relevant to this issue. (Ibid., In re Scott M. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 839, 844.) “[T]here must be convincing evidence of the likelihood that the adoption will take place within a reasonable time.” (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.) However, the fact that a prospective adoptive family is willing to adopt the minor is evidence that the minor is likely to be adopted by that family or some other family in a reasonable time. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.)
The evidence showed that the minor was healthy, had no developmental delays and had, through years of therapy and group home intervention, overcome the disastrous emotional and behavioral responses to his traumatic early years. His therapist had released him from treatment and he was functioning well in his home and school. While older than most children considered for adoption, the minor’s caretakers wanted to adopt him. The minor felt bonded to his caretakers and wanted the permanency of adoption. The evidence was overwhelming that the minor was likely to be adopted in a reasonable time by his current caretakers if parental rights were terminated.
Appellant focuses on the minor’s past behavioral problems and suggests they could recur. While such a scenario is theoretically possible, it appears unlikely in light of the evidence that he was released from therapy and is currently doing well. In any case, the prospective adoptive family has extensive experience in dealing with the minor’s problems should they recur and has demonstrated unswerving loyalty to and support for him. It is improbable that they would abandon him at this late date.
II
Limitations On The Minor’s Testimony
Appellant further contends that limitations on the minor’s testimony and permitting the minor to testify in a closed session denied him due process.
A
Limitation Of Testimony
With certain statutory exceptions, “all relevant evidence is admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) ““Relevant evidence” means evidence, . . . including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Id., § 210.) Erroneous exclusion of evidence will not result in reversal unless there has been a miscarriage of justice. (Id., § 354.)
Here, appellant’s counsel’s stated purpose in calling the minor to testify was to test the minor’s credibility and to establish an exception to the preference for adoption as a permanent plan, specifically, the exception found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B), i.e., “A child 12 years of age or older objects to termination of parental rights.”
The court limited questions to whether the minor wanted to be adopted, however, during questioning also permitted the minor to answer questions about his relationship with the current caretakers, his understanding of what adoption meant, and whether he had been pressured by anyone to testify as he had. The only questions counsel sought to ask which were excluded were questions about whether the minor had received appellant’s letters and when he last had contact with appellant. These questions were, at best, tangential to both the issues of the minor’s credibility and of whether he objected to termination of parental rights. The court properly excluded the evidence and no miscarriage of justice appears.
B
Testimony In Chambers
We note that although appellant wanted the minor to testify in open court, appellant’s counsel acknowledged that taking the minor’s testimony in chambers would be appropriate. Assuming the issue is not waived, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the minor’s testimony would be taken in chambers.
The objective of the dependency scheme is to protect children who are at risk and provide them permanent homes if they cannot be returned to parental custody. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307; § 300.2.) “The dependency scheme, when viewed as a whole, provides the parent due process and fundamental fairness while also accommodating the child’s right to stability and permanence.” (Marilyn H., at p. 307.) Thus, while a parent is entitled to an opportunity to prepare and present his case and cross-examine witnesses, the parent’s rights must be balanced against the best interests of the child in order to avoid inflicting further harm to the child. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.682(b); In re Neal D. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048; see In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1089.) The dependency statutes offer guidelines to the trial court to accommodate both interests.
Section 350, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “The testimony of a minor may be taken in chambers and outside the presence of the minor’s parent or parents, if the minor’s parent or parents are represented by counsel, the counsel is present and any of the following circumstances exist: [¶] (1) The court determines that testimony in chambers is necessary to ensure truthful testimony.”
Here, the minor had been seriously emotionally traumatized by his parents prior to removal. The trauma was exacerbated by appellant’s controlling and manipulative nature which remained unchanged up to the date of the hearing. The minor, although stabilized by extensive therapy and group home intervention, still did not want contact with appellant and could be expected to feel pressured by appellant’s presence. Such pressure could trigger old traumatic responses and result in testimony which was not truthful. The court, after weighing appellant’s right to present evidence of an exception to termination of parental rights against the minor’s best interest, concluded that the minor could testify but that the testimony should be out of appellant’s presence. The decision accommodates both appellant’s rights and the need to protect the minor. No abuse of discretion appears.
The minor’s testimony was properly limited to that which was relevant to the issues. The court did not abuse its discretion in taking the minor’s testimony in chambers. Appellant had ample opportunity to present his case and test the credibility of the minor witness and was not denied due process.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., BUTZ, J.