The burden of proof to establish each of these elements rests with the trustee (or debtor in possession), In re Philadelphia Light Supply Co., 33 B.R. 734 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1983); this burden is met by a showing of preponderance of evidence. In re Allegheny, Inc., 86 B.R. 466 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1988); In re Sbraga, 27 B.R. 199 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 1982). Upon review, I must conclude that the payment made to the defendants from the garnished bank account cannot be avoided as a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547.
Pursuant to § 547(g), the trustee has the burden of proving the five elements of a preference action under § 547(b). See, In re Jefferson Mortgage Company, 25 B.R. 963 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1982); In re Philadelphia Light Supply Company, 33 B.R. 734 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1983); In re Sbraga, 27 B.R. 199 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 1982). This includes the requirement that the payment in question be a "transfer of an interest of the debtor in property."
11 U.S.C. § 547(g). See In re Jefferson Mortgage Co., 25 B.R. 963 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1982); In re Philadelphia Light Supply Co., 33 B.R. 734 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1983); and In re Sbraga, 27 B.R. 199 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 1982). Once a prima facie case of preference is established, the defendant, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(g), has the burden of proving that the transfer is excepted from the preference rule.
" 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (Supp. 1988); see also, In re Sbraga, 27 B.R. 199, 200 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 1982). The trustee or debtor-in-possession has the burden of proving that the money transferred constituted "an interest of the debtor in property."
It is well established that under this section the burden of proof remains on the trustee to prove each and every element of a preference by a preponderance of the evidence. Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act); First Nat'l Bank of Clinton v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329, 333 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act); AAB v. Wesco Corp., (In re Casco Electric Corp.), 28 B.R. 191, 195 (Bktcy.E.D.N.Y. 1983); Sbraga v. Iacovelli, (In re Sbraga), 27 B.R. 199, 200-201 (Bktcy.M.D.Penn. 1982); Young v. Scandore Paper Box Corp., (Matter of Lucasa Int'l Ltd.), 13 B.R. 596, 598 (Bktcy.S.D.N.Y. 1981); Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (Supp.II 1984) (1984 amendment allocating to trustee burden of proof under section 547(b)). Section 547(a) was recently enacted as section 462(g) of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
Considering the claim of voidable preference first, it is well to state at the outset that the burden to establish all operating elements of a voidable preference under § 547 is on the Trustee. Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2nd Cir. 1979); Gruner v. Abbott Cobb, Inc. (In re P Z Island Farms, Inc.), 478 F.Supp. 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Casco Electric Corp., 28 B.R. 191, 195 (Bankr.E.D.N. Y. 1983) aff'd 35 B.R. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Sbraga, 27 B.R. 199 (Bankr.M.D. Penn. 1982). Applying this test to the proof presented, there is hardly any doubt that the Trustee discharged his burden. First, it is without dispute that the transfers itemized earlier all occurred either within 90 days preceding the commencement of the case of Craft Plumbing or at least within a year preceding the case.
81 payment to Sears will be denied. See Sbraga v. Iacovelli (In re Sbraga), 27 B.R. 199, 201 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Pa. 1982).