Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. Nos. 2655DEP, 2656DEP
SIMONS, J.
Santos Z. (father) and Sierrah Z. (mother) are the parents of Savannah and Simon Z. (children), who were declared dependents of the court under section 300, subdivision (c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Father appeals from an order adopted by the juvenile court following the 18-month review hearing that, among other things, placed the children with mother and denied father visitation with the children. He contends the juvenile court failed to comply with this court’s remand instructions in a previous appeal. We conclude the remand issue is moot because the children have been returned to mother’s custody, thus rendering inapplicable the code section referenced in this court’s remand instructions. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.
All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Mother is not a party to this appeal and is mentioned only where relevant to the issues raised in father’s appeal. (In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 966, fn. 2.)
BACKGROUND
This is the fourth appeal by father in this juvenile dependency case. In June 2007, the children were removed from mother’s custody. Following a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court concluded the children came within section 300, subdivision (c). The court also determined the children should be removed from “ ‘their parents’ physical custody.’ ” Father appealed. In the decision in the first appeal, this court discussed in detail the facts and proceedings culminating in the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (In re Savannah Z. et al. (July 28, 2008, A119217) [nonpub. opn.].) We affirmed the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction, but reversed the dispositional order. We concluded father was a noncustodial parent and, thus, the juvenile court should have proceeded under section 361.2, subdivision (a). This court’s disposition was as follows: “The jurisdictional order is affirmed. The dispositional order is reversed and the case is remanded. The juvenile court is directed to hold a hearing to consider and make findings under section 361.2, subdivision (a) in writing or on the record.”
Section 361.2, subdivision (a), provides: “When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
In early 2008, during the pendency of the first appeal, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) filed two section 388 petitions asking the juvenile court to terminate father’s visitation with the children. Father filed his own section 388 petition requesting visitation. The juvenile court granted the Department’s petitions, denied father’s petitions, and terminated visitation. This court affirmed the order, rejecting father’s contention that the court violated his due process rights at the section 388 hearing by declining to appoint an additional therapist “ ‘to evaluate whether visits should take place.’ ” (In re Savannah Z. et al. (Dec. 19, 2008, A120966) [nonpub. opn.].)
In April 2008, the juvenile court terminated father’s reunification services at the six-month contested review hearing, resulting in father’s third appeal. In October, father’s counsel filed a letter indicating there were no arguable issues for appeal, and in December this court dismissed the appeal. (In re Savannah Z. et al. (Dec. 4, 2008, A121551 [nonpub. order dismissing appeal].)
In its 18-month status review report, the Department recommended the placement of the children with mother under a plan of family maintenance. On December 4, 2008, the 18-month review hearing took place. Despite having received notice of the hearing, father did not attend. The juvenile court discussed this court’s remand in the first appeal and found that placement with father would be detrimental to the children. The court placed the children with mother under a plan of family maintenance. Father’s counsel did not object to placement of the children with mother.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Father challenges, on various grounds, the juvenile court’s findings under section 361.2, subdivision (a). Among other things, he contends he did not receive adequate notice that the section 361.2, subdivision (a) issue would be considered at the 18-month review hearing and inadequate evidence supports the court’s findings. However, as the Department points out, section 361.2, subdivision (a), is only applicable where a dependent minor is removed from the care of the custodial parent. (See, e.g., R.S. v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 [“ ‘section 361.2 deals specifically with the removal of a child from a custodial parent when there also exists a noncustodial parent’ ”].) Thus, the Department argues, the section 361.2, subdivision (a) issue is moot because the children have been returned to the custody of mother. That is, even if this court were to reverse, the juvenile court could not place the children with father under section 361.2, subdivision (a). (See Nicolopulos v. City of Lawndale (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1226-1227 [“An appeal is moot when as a result of changed circumstances the trial court on remand would be unable to grant the relief sought by the appellant.”].)
Father does not contend that the juvenile court’s decision to place the children with mother was lacking in evidentiary support or dispute that subdivision (a) of section 361.2 is, as a general matter, inapplicable where the dependent minors are placed with a parent. Nevertheless, he argues the juvenile court’s order is invalid because, following remand, the court was obligated to vacate the dispositional order at issue in the first appeal, as well as all subsequent orders. (See In re Alexandria Y. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1487; see also People v. Murphy (1963) 59 Cal.2d 818, 833; Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655.)
Father’s argument is unavailing. First, the argument has been forfeited because father failed to object to the order placing the children with mother on this or any other ground. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406.) Accordingly, that order is valid and renders moot the section 361.2 issue. Second, although the decision in the first appeal was final before the second and third appeals were decided, father failed to argue in those appeals that the challenged orders should be reversed due to the disposition in the first appeal. The orders terminating visitation (the second appeal) and terminating reunification services (the third appeal) were affirmed on appeal, and this court cannot return matters to the state of affairs before entry of the juvenile court’s original dispositional order, as father requests in this appeal. Third, the disposition in the first appeal did not have the effect of reversing the juvenile court’s dispositional order as to mother. The disposition in the first appeal does lack limiting language reversing the order, for example, only “to the extent” of the findings as to father’s custody. (See, e.g., In re Troy Z. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1170, 1179.) However, this court’s decision in the first appeal provides no basis to reverse the order as to mother, who was not even a party to the appeal. The most reasonable interpretation of the disposition is that it had the effect of reversing the order as to father’s right to custody, but not as to mother’s custody. (See In re Justin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1435 [“Where the directions to the trial court are ambiguous, they are interpreted in accordance with the views, reasoning, and holdings expressed in the opinion as a whole.”].) Thus, the juvenile court was not required to vacate subsequent orders as to mother and there is no basis to invalidate the order placing the children with mother.
In conclusion, although we do not condone the juvenile court’s failure to promptly follow this court’s instructions on remand from the first appeal, the existence of a valid order placing the children with mother renders moot this fourth appeal seeking a determination of father’s custodial rights under section 361.2, subdivision (a).
Father also contends the court was required to consider anew his right to visitation at the 18-month review hearing and denial of visitation at that point was not supported by substantial evidence. However, the only authority he cites is section 366.22, subdivision (a), which provides in relevant part that “[t]he court shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” That section is inapplicable on its face, because there was no visitation with father that could be continued. The juvenile court found in February 2008 that visitation with father was detrimental to the children. As the court pointed out to father, the proper avenue to obtain reconsideration of that finding was a section 388 petition. (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 34-36.) Father presents no authority that the court was obligated to reconsider its visitation order at the 18-month review hearing in the absence of such a petition.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur. JONES, P.J., BRUINIERS, J.