"In general, for this statute, where a taxpayer resides is where [she] dwells for a significant amount of time and where creditors would be most likely to look for [her]." In re Saunders , 240 B.R. 636, 641 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff'd sub nom.Saunders v. Tolz , 275 F.3d 51 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Corwin , 512 F.2d at 610 ); 26 U.S.C. Β§ 6323(f)(2)(B). In Corwin Consultants , the court noted that the drafters of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 ( Pub. L. No. 89-719 ) added Β§ 6323(f)(2)(B) "to clarify βexisting law by providing specific rules with respect to the place of filing a notice of a Federal tax lien....β 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1966, at p. 3732 (S. Rep. No. 1708)."
" F.R.B.P. 9001(7). "Therefore, any appealable order becomes effective once entered on the Court's official docket." In re Saunders, 240 B.R. 636, 643 (S.D.Fla.1999).ΒΆ 15. There does not appear to be a case that squarely addresses the issue in the present action.
" Noli, 860 F.2d at 1525. In In re Saunders, 240 B.R. 636 (S.D.Fla. 1999), the court dealt with this same situation, and we believe its clear reasoning is instructional and should be followed. The Saunders court wrote: "Rather, common sense dictates that a court's order is effective when a court enters such an order. If a court orders a case dismissed, then the case is dismissed.
Other courts have treated the significance of docket entries similarly. See, e.g., Noli v. Commissioner, 860 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding an oral order binding and effective despite the court's failure to enter it on the docket); In re Saunders, 240 B.R. 636, 644 (S.D.Fla. 1999) ("[p]arties should be able to reasonably rely on a written order, signed by a Judge, that the party has actually received, even if this Order does not get docketed"); see also United States v. F. M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 235-36, 78 S.Ct. 674, 2 L.Ed.2d 721 (1958) ("a formal judgment . . . signed by the judge . . . is prima facie the decision or judgment rather than a statement in an opinion or a docket entry.") (quoting United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534-35, 64 S.Ct. 359, 88 L.Ed. 290 (1944)); Zachary, supra, at 434-40, 442-50 (concluding that the docket entry requirement is not jurisdictional with respect to judgments).
Therefore, we concluded that the three-year priority period of section 507(a)(8)(A)(i) is suspended by 11 U.S.C. Β§ 108(c) and 26 U.S.C. Β§ 6503(b) and (h), for the time that the automatic stay prevents the IRS from collecting outstanding tax debts.Id. at 493; see also Saunders v. United States, 240 B.R. 636 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999) (adopting the holding in Waugh); Lichter v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Lichter), 1999 Bankr. Lexis 1904, *12 (Bankr. D. Md. 1999) ("This court agrees with the majority conclusion as expressed in Waugh."). See, e.g.
C.I.T Financial Service states "[t]wo requirements must be met before an adjudication becomes an effective judgment: (1) the judgment must be set forth in writing on a separate document . . . and (2) the judgment so set forth must be entered in the civil docket as provided by [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 79(a)." 710 F.2d at 417 (internal quotes omitted); see alsoIn re Schraiber, 141 B.R. 1008, 1014 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (recognizing that "separate document rule" requirement that judgments be docketed before they are effective applies to any appealable order); but seeStandard Federal Bank for Savings v. Hanno, 323 Ill.App.3d 521, 524, 752 N.E.2d 601, 603, 256 Ill.Dec. 721 (App.Ct. 2001) and In re Sanders, 240 B.R. 636, 644 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (both cases holding dismissal orders were effective when signed or announced in court prior to entry on docket). There is also an issue as to the proper service of the Citation on the Trustee, and thus whether the Trustee was on clear notice of the prohibition against transfer.
Although there is a split of authority regarding exactly when a bankruptcy case is "dismissed," so as to result in the termination of the automatic stay, the latest event that any of the cases cited by the parties have held to be the effective date of the dismissal is the docketing of the dismissal order by the clerk. See In re Saunders, 240 B.R. 636, 643 (S.D.Fla. 1999) and cases cited therein. The dismissal order in this case was docketed by the clerk on March 15, 2005 (the date when it was signed) 6 days prior to the repossession of the truck on March 21, 2005.
[Id.] See also Urban Indus., Inc. of Ky. v. Thevis [82-1 USTC ΒΆ 9268], 670 F.2d 981, 986 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Saunders, 240 Bankr. 636, 641 (S.D. Fla. 1999). In assessing the credibility of petitioner's claim that he was strictly a resident of California and not a resident of Florida on July 25, 1996, we also observe that his claim was raised belatedly.
The only question is whether she is entitled to file the Petition in the Northern District of New York. No one disputes that a person can have more than one residence, but only one domicile. See In re Saunders, 240 B.R. 636, 641 (S.D.Fla. 1999) (citation omitted). It is clear that the Debtor's domicile is in the Bahamas, where she has resided since she was approximately 23 years old. Yet, Debtor has listed her parents' home as her residence, where she apparently resided until ten years ago when she relocated to the Bahamas.
A person can have only one domicile at a particular time even though he or she may have several residences. In re Leffingwell, 279 B.R. 328, 341 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 2002); In re Saunders, 240 B.R. 636, 641 (S.D.Fla. 1999); In re Ring, 144 B.R. 446, 449 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1992). Unlike residence, domicile is established by "physical presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's intent to remain there."