Opinion
No. 347906
10-17-2019
In re J. A. I. SATCHELL-VENTA, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Oakland Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 09-760330-NA Before: METER, P.J., and O'BRIEN and SWARTZLE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court's opinion and order terminating her parental rights to her child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a neglect petition seeking termination of respondent's parental rights in the initial petition. The petition alleged that respondent's nine-year-old child was removed from her care twice before: once in 2009 when the child was born positive for marijuana and cocaine, and again in 2017 after respondent was arrested for operating while under the influence (OWI) with the child in the vehicle. Respondent completed a parent-agency treatment plan (PATP) in both cases, and the child was returned to her care. Only 13 days after the child was returned to her care after the second removal, respondent was again arrested for OWI with the child in the car. This repeat drunk-driving incident led to the most current removal.
Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the DHHS proved a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's determination that a statutory ground for termination of parental rights has been established. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). "We give deference to the trial court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witness." Id.
The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which provides:
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:This Court has made clear that "harm" under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) includes physical as well as emotional harm. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011).
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
The trial court had earlier removed the child from respondent's care twice for incidents involving substance abuse. The first incident involved respondent's abuse of marijuana and cocaine while pregnant with the child. The second incident involved respondent's commission of OWI with the child in the vehicle. After the second removal in 2017, respondent successfully completed a PATP, which included substance-abuse services. Only 13 days after the child was returned to her care, she was again arrested for the same behavior—OWI with the child in the vehicle. At the time of her arrest, respondent's blood-alcohol content was .14, almost twice the legal limit. The trial court concluded that respondent failed to recognize that it was not appropriate to drive after she had been drinking, especially with the child in the vehicle. The trial court also observed that the child must be "surrounded by angels or whatever good force of life there is on this planet to protect him" because he was not physically injured when respondent twice drove while intoxicated with him in the car.
On the facts of this case, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459, regarding the trial court's finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was proven by clear and convincing evidence. Because only one statutory ground need be proven to terminate a respondent's parental rights, In re Laster, 303 Mich App 485, 495; 845 NW2d 540 (2013), we decline to address the trial court's determination that statutory grounds also existed to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that it was in the child's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child's best interests, In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013), and this Court reviews for clear error the trial court's findings of fact, In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459. "If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). In determining a child's best interests, the trial court may consider the child's bond to the parent; the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality; and the suitability of alternative homes. See In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court may also consider the child's well-being while in care, the possibility of adoption, In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014), the parent's history of substance abuse, see In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90, and the testimony and opinion of experts, see In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 44; 549 NW2d 353 (1996).
The evidence in this case indicated that respondent and her child shared a strong bond. Yet, the child was removed from and returned to respondent's care twice before the removal at issue here. These successive removals demonstrate a lack of permanency and stability with respondent. Moreover, respondent's history of substance abuse dated back to 2009. Her substance abuse caused the three removals, two of which were for OWI while the child was in the vehicle. Respondent did not benefit from her participation in substance-abuse treatment. The foster-care caseworker and the expert witness testified that it was in the child's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. The evidence also demonstrated that the child had a strong bond with his foster family, with whom the child had lived for about four of his nine years of life. The foster family was willing to adopt him and he did not mind being adopted, although it was not his first choice. On these facts, we conclude that the trial court considered the proper factors in determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle