In re Sara M.

40 Citing cases

  1. People v. Bowker

    203 Cal.App.3d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 426 times
    Finding error harmless under Watson

    (4a) Relying on Bledsoe, numerous Court of Appeal decisions have held that Kelly-Frye similarly precludes an expert from testifying based on the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) that a particular victim's report of alleged abuse is credible because the victim manifests certain defined characteristics which are generally exhibited by abused children. (See In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 593 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 605]; Seering v. Dept. of Social Services (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 298, 310-311, 313 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 422]; People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1099 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 45]; People v. Willoughby (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1054, 1069 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 880].) (5) (See fn. 7.)

  2. Flanagan v. State

    586 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 39 times
    In Flanagan, however, the First District Court of Appeal relied on a line of federal cases construing a similar medical diagnosis or treatment exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence to find that statements of identity by child victims of sexual abuse to medical personnel can be reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, particularly when the perpetrator is a member of the victim's family.

    CSAAS as a means of predicting sexual abuse has been the subject of considerable criticism because the syndrome assumes the existence of abuse, and was not developed as a method of detecting abuse. See In re Sara M., 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 593, 239 Cal.Rptr. 605, 611 (Ct.App. 1987); People v. Gray, 187 Cal.App.3d 213, 217-18, 231 Cal.Rptr. 658, 660-61 (Ct.App. 1987). Similarly, in Glendening v. State, 536 So.2d 212, 220 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907, 109 S.Ct. 3219, 106 L.Ed.2d 569 (1989), the Florida Supreme Court held, without any discussion of the Frye standard, that one who qualifies as an expert in the area of interviewing children concerning sexual abuse could give an opinion during the prosecution's case-in-chief that the child victim had been sexually abused, but that the witness could not testify that it was the child's father who had committed the offense.

  3. People v. Archer

    215 Cal.App.3d 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 46 times

    ( Id. at p. 394.) Archer contends his trial counsel should have anticipated Bowker on the basis of In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 592 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 605], which held that child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome testimony does not meet the Kelly-Frye standards and which was filed August 28, 1987, well before the trial occurred here. Archer relies upon People v. McCary (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 114] in which the Court of Appeal found ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to object to an ex post facto application of Proposition 8 even though People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149], the California Supreme Court's opinion barring such ex post facto application of Proposition 8, had not been filed until after the defendant in McCary had pled guilty.

  4. In re Autumn I.

    No. F065578 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2013)

    (Ibid., italics omitted.) In support of her argument that the juvenile court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding false memory syndrome, Angelina relies heavily on In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585 (Sara M.). In Sara M., the court held that under the Kelly-Frye test, expert testimony regarding "child molest syndrome" was not admissible to prove that a child was molested.

  5. People v. Nugent

    No. E042347 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 3, 2008)

    For over 20 years, California courts have allowed expert testimony regarding CSAAS for a limited purpose. (See People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 391 (Bowker), citing In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585; Seeing v. Dept. of Social Services (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 298, 310-311, 313; People v. Roscoe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1099 (Roscoe).) To the extent our Supreme Court has recognized that CSAAS evidence may be relevant, useful, and admissible in a given case, our role as an intermediate appellate court does not allow us to rule otherwise.

  6. In re S.C.

    138 Cal.App.4th 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 1,370 times
    Holding appellant's failure to present legal analysis for a claim of error forfeits the issue

    According to her, "CSAAS is inadmissible altogether in dependency hearings." Appellant's counsel cites " Sara M. [sic] (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 594 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 605]," for this proposition. However, she misstates the holding of this court in that case.

  7. People v. Erickson

    57 Cal.App.4th 1391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that the legislature did not intend to permit the use of IPB evidence to predict the actual state of mind of a defendant

    Thus, such syndrome evidence has been admitted solely to disabuse jurors of "common sense" misconceptions about the behavior of persons in the affected groups, such as rape victims and abused children, and not to prove a fact in issue. (See People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 249-250 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291]; In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 589-591 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 605] ; see also People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1088.) The difficulty of establishing a scientific basis to use syndrome testimony to establish a fact in evidence has been noted.

  8. Ramona v. Superior Court

    57 Cal.App.4th 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 18 times

    ( People v. Cegers, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) Although child molestation syndrome evidence has been held inadmissible under Kelly to prove that a child is a dependent minor ( In re Sarah M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 605]), and rape trauma syndrome evidence has been excluded as irrelevant to prove that a rape occurred ( People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291]), the confusional arousal syndrome evidence was not based on the compilation of a profile of characteristics common to persons who unconsciously commit assault upon being suddenly awakened. As the Cegers court explained: "The doctor was not engaged in assembling a set of behavioral characteristics for the purpose of showing that Cegers's unusual conduct could in some way be explained.

  9. People v. Cegers

    7 Cal.App.4th 988 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 26 times
    In Cegers, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in precluding a defense psychologist from testifying that the defendant suffered from “confusional arousal syndrome” on Evidence Code section 352 and Kelly-Frye grounds; in Cegers, there was no question regarding the expert’s qualifications to testify on the issue.

    The court concluded that the strictures of Kelly-Frye should be utilized in determining the admissibility of testimony concerning the syndrome and also the related question whether the evidence should be excluded on the basis of Evidence Code section 352 The court concluded that it was "dealing with a new and emerging scientific theory or method of diagnosis and not mere expert testimony. . . ." It found the analysis of the confusional arousal syndrome to be a scientific theory similar to the rape reaction syndrome, or the child molest syndrome, and hence subject to restrictions in use in a jury trial, citing In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 605] and People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291]. After reviewing and analyzing the Kelly-Frye rule and finding it applicable to this case, the court concluded: "To sum up, I find that the evidence of the syndrome is inadmissible due to lack of foundational proof that the syndrome or syndromes have been generally accepted by the scientific psychological/psychiatric community."

  10. People v. Harlan

    222 Cal.App.3d 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 225 times
    Holding that the Frye standard does not apply to an expert's opinion on children's reaction to molestation when her opinion was based on her clinical experience with child sexual abuse victims and her familiarity with professional literature in the area

    . . ." ( In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 585, 593 [ 239 Cal.Rptr. 605].) In turn, the court in Sara M. relied on People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291] as authority for the proposition that the expert's testimony should be excluded under the Kelly/Frye rule.