Opinion
D041346.
7-25-2003
In re SANDRA H., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LISA R., Defendant and Appellant.
Lisa R., mother of Sandra H., Jasmine H., Whitney H. and Michael H., Jr., appeals the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Lisa contends the juvenile court should have granted an evidentiary hearing on her petition to modify (§ 388) the courts earlier order terminating reunification services. Lisa contends the court erred by failing to apply the beneficial relationship ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) and/or the sibling relationship (id., subd. (c)(1)(E)) exceptions to adoption. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 22, 2000, a bank in Vista was robbed. On December 1, during a surveillance traffic stop, law enforcement officers arrested Lisa and her boyfriend, Chris B., for robbery and kidnapping the bank manager. Also in the car were eight-year-old Sandra, five-year-old Jasmine, three-year-old Whitney, and one-year-old Michael, Jr., all of whom were detained at Polinsky Childrens Center.
Sandra was only days shy of her ninth birthday.
Lisa, who admitted she was aware of Chris B.s criminal history, including a bank robbery conviction, told a social worker that although Chris informed her about the Vista robbery, she was not involved in any way with the crime. Lisa also admitted lying to the law enforcement authorities to protect Chris, but said she did so because he had treated her children well. Lisa said the childrens father was Michael H., Sr., whom she characterized as an alcoholic living in a motel in Georgia and incapable of caring for the children.
The father, whose parental rights also were terminated, is not a party to this appeal.
On December 5, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed petitions on behalf of each child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (g), alleging Lisa was incarcerated and unable to arrange care for the children and the fathers whereabouts were unknown. The juvenile court ordered contact visits with Lisa as long as they did not cause the children any undue fear or anxiety. Later that month, Sandra and Jasmine were detained with their maternal grandmother, and Whitney and Michael, Jr. were detained in an emergency shelter foster home.
On January 24, 2001, Lisa submitted on the section 300, subdivision (g) petitions and the juvenile court sustained the petitions by clear and convincing evidence.
On February 7, Agency filed amended section 342 petitions on behalf of each child, alleging failure to protect under section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged (1) Michael, Sr. had abused alcohol since 1990 and Lisa had failed to protect the children; and (2) the children had been exposed to violent, physical confrontations between their parents. On March 12, the court sustained the section 342 petition, making true findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), a substantial danger to the physical health of the children existed unless they were removed from the physical custody of the parents.
In April, the maternal grandmother decided she could no longer care for Sandra and Jasmine and had them placed in foster care. In June, the two older children were placed in the same foster home as the two younger children.
In anticipation of the six-month review hearing, Agency reported that Lisa was housed in an area of the jail that did not allow her to participate in parenting classes. Each of the children was in therapy. Lisa was telephoning the children on a regular basis. Although Lisas case plan called for monthly in-person visits with the children at the jail, no arrangements had been made for such visits. On July 18, the social worker sent Lisa a prison parenting packet and reviewed the case plan with her.
In August, Agency recommended termination of services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing because of the uncertainty of Lisas future as she awaited trial on kidnapping and bank [* 5] robbery charges, and the unlikelihood she would be able to reunify with the children within the mandated time limits. Agency noted the four children were extremely bonded to one another and no longer asked if they were going to see their mother.
At the six-month review hearing on September 18, the court found Lisa had made some progress on her case plan and ordered six more months of services.
On November 6, the children visited Lisa at the jail. Whitney and Michael, Jr. had bad reactions and their therapist recommended they not attend future visits at the jail. On November 27, Sandra and Jasmine again visited Lisa at the jail and had a good time. Lisa continued to telephone the children on a weekly basis. She also sent hand drawn pictures and letters to the children. Because of her housing at the jail, Lisa was only eligible to participate in the Pregnant Infant Program, which consists of 24 classes. Lisa completed the program three times and completed two parenting prison packets.
Sandra and Jasmine also visited Lisa at the jail in January 2002 and enjoyed this visit as well. However, afterward the children experienced problems such as nightmares, and the jail visits were discontinued.
In January 2002, Agency again recommended termination of services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. The foster parents, who were in their late 50s, were willing to care for Sandra and Jasmine on a long-term basis, but not all four children. Agency began looking for a permanent home for Whitney and Michael, Jr. that would maintain ongoing contact between the two sets of siblings.
At the conclusion of the contested 12-month review hearing on April 5, the court found that while Lisa had made substantial progress toward alleviating the causes of her childrens removal, it was unlikely she would reunify with them by the 18-month date. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for August 1.
Lisa was released from custody on July 2 after a jury acquitted her of all charges. A social worker supervised a visit between Lisa and the children on July 19 at a local park. None of the children appeared to recognize Lisa when she arrived. Lisa brought cookies and gifts and photographed the children. Lisa repeatedly hugged the children and told them she loved them. Sandra and Whitney interacted the most with Lisa. Michael, Jr. seemed not to recognize Lisa and was shy in the beginning of the visit. Jasmine had the least interaction, but tried to get her share of Lisas attention.
After the visit, Jasmine became aggressive with her siblings. A few days later, Michael, Jr. became more aggressive, whiny and demanding; Whitney became more withdrawn and clinging, and she wet her bed every night. The childrens therapist opined the visit had a negative impact on Michael, Jr. and Whitney.
The children had significant bonds to the foster parents and called them "Momma" and "Papa." When asked to draw a family picture, each drew himself or herself and the foster family; none of the children included Lisa or Michael, Sr.
The court granted Lisas request for bonding studies between her and the older two children but denied the request as to Whitney and Michael, Jr. In assessing the relationship between Lisa and Sandra, psychologist Thomas Barnes opined an emotional attachment existed, but not the strong, primary bond expected of a child who had been in a biological parents care for so long. Barnes further opined that Sandra would suffer some distress if Lisas parental relationship was terminated but "it might not be devastating or enduring in nature." Barnes found an emotional attachment between Lisa and Jasmine, but it was not as strong or solidified as one would expect. Barnes opined terminating the relationship could result in Jasmine feeling guilt and loss, leading to depression. Alternatively, it could resolve Jasmines ambivalence and reduce stress and pressure. Barnes concluded, "Overall, the loss would likely have some effect upon the child but not be as devastating as one would expect in the dissolution of a primary emotional attachment."
In September, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding a visitation schedule for Lisa. By November 13, there had been four more visits between Lisa and the children. Lisa telephoned the children twice in the three weeks up to then. The social worker opined Lisa did not demonstrate adequate follow-through and sought emotional support primarily for herself from her children.
The adoption assessment worker opined it was very likely Sandra and Jasmine would be adopted by the foster parents with whom they had lived for the past 14 months. Agency had previously approved the foster parents for adoption and had made arrangements to have their home study updated. The worker opined it was likely that Whitney and Michael, Jr. would be adopted. Agency had approved between five and seven families who were interested in adopting children like Whitney and Michael, Jr., and would maintain contact between them and Sandra and Jasmine.
The social worker reported in November that one of these approved families had been selected for Whitney and Michael, Jr. This family resided in the same neighborhood as the prospective adoptive family for Sandra and Jasmine. At the section 366.26 hearing, the parties stipulated that if the social worker was called as a witness she would testify Whitney and Michael, Jr. had been placed in the adoptive home and were doing well.
In November, Lisa filed a petition for modification under section 388, asking the court to extend reunification services beyond the 18-month date and vacate the section 366.26 hearing, now scheduled for November 22. As to changed circumstances or new evidence to support the petition, Lisa pointed to her release from custody, her participation in individual therapy and her visitation with the children.
On November 22, the court denied a hearing on the section 388 petition, noting Lisas release from custody was not a change in circumstance significant enough to outweigh the best interests of the children and their need for stability. The court proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing, which was continued to December 13 after Lisas counsel complained about the timeliness of a report filed by Agency that day. After hearing Lisas testimony on December 13, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, each child was likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated, none of the statutory exceptions to adoption ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)) applied, and adoption was in the best interests of each child. The court terminated Lisas and Michael, Sr.s parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for each child.
DISCUSSION
I
No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Section 388 Evidentiary Hearing
Lisa contends the juvenile court erred in denying her request for an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition. The contention is without merit.
Preliminarily, we address Agencys claim that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Lisas section 388 argument because she did not file a notice of appeal from the denial of her section 388 petition. Although Lisa timely filed a notice of appeal in which she challenged the judgment terminating her parental rights on December 13, 2002, by checking the appropriate box on the form, she did not specify she was also challenging the order denying her section 388 petition. Although no specific box is provided on the form for an appeal from an order denying a section 388 petition, Lisa could have checked the box for an appeal from an order made at a review hearing affecting reunification. Nonetheless, since then Lisa filed a motion for leave to modify her timely notice of appeal, which this court granted on April 17, 2003. Lisa filed the amended notice of appeal correcting the omission on May 22. Thus, Lisas challenge to the denial of her section 388 petition is properly before us. Moreover, we note that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1(a); In re Daniel Z. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017.)
Section 388 provides that a parent may petition the court for a hearing to change, modify or set aside any previously made order of the court on the grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. The statute goes on to state: "If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . ." (Id., subd.(c).)
However, if the petition fails to state a change of circumstances or new evidence that might require a change of order, the court may deny the application ex parte. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1432(b).) The parent must make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to a full hearing. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310, 851 P.2d 826; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416.) "A prima facie showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is credited." (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593; see also In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 673.) The petitioners burden includes making a prima facie showing that the requested change would promote the best interests of the child. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1450-1451.)
A juvenile court has extremely broad discretion in ruling on section 388 petitions. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319, 867 P.2d 706.) A juvenile courts ruling on a section 388 petition should not be reversed absent an ""arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination."" (In re Stephanie M. , at p. 318.)
On this record, we find no abuse of discretion. The juvenile court could quite properly conclude there was no prima facie showing of changed circumstances such that a renewed reunification effort and the resultant postponement or cancellation of the section 366.26 hearing were in the childrens best interests.
As changed circumstances, Lisa alleged she had been released from custody, was participating in individual therapy, was visiting her children and was maintaining telephone contact with them. Assuming these allegations were true and that they would have been proven at an evidentiary hearing, "a change of circumstance warranting renewed reunification efforts . . . would not have been established." (In re Edward H., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 591.) To establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances, Lisa needed to allege the circumstances that caused the removal of her children were no longer present. She failed to do this.
Although the children were initially declared dependents under section 300, subdivision (g), the subsequent section 342 petitions, which were sustained, alleged the children were dependents under section 300, subdivision (b) because of a failure to protect and domestic violence. Thereafter, the court held a dispositional hearing and removed the children from the parents physical custody under a finding of substantial danger to the childrens welfare ( § 361, subd. (c)(1)) rather than Lisas incarceration (id., subd. (c)(5)). Thus, Lisas release from custody was not by itself a sufficient change of circumstance to sustain the section 388 petition.
As to Lisas individual therapy, the letter from her therapist was less than glowing. The therapist had seen Lisa only three times in two and one-half months; Lisa rescheduled one missed appointment and failed to show for other scheduled appointments. The therapist noted Lisa "needs to comply more consistently in her therapy." The fact that Lisa had started individual therapy was not a "changed" circumstance but merely a "changing circumstance"; there was no evidence Lisa was ready or able to parent the children or even had the commitment to follow through with the individual therapy on a meaningful basis. A petition that alleges merely changing circumstances does not promote stability for the child or the childs best interests because it would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home to see if a parent might be able to reunify at some future point. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)
Lisas visitation with the children was spotty at best; it too was a changing circumstance. Maintaining telephone contact with the children was not a changed circumstance - Lisa had always consistently telephoned the children.
Even if Lisa showed changed circumstances, she did not show returning the children to her custody was in their best interests. At this point - on the eve of the section 366.26 hearing - the interest in stability and permanence for the children was now paramount. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254-256, 851 P.2d 1307; In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) The children had been dependents for two years. During this period, the three older children have known only uncertainty and anxiety about whether Lisa will return to their lives as their mother. Michael, Jr. did not identify Lisa as his mother. All of the children needed stability at this point in their lives; further delay to see if Lisa could progress to reunify with her children was not in their best interests. "Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate." (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.)
Lisas reliance on In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 and its three factors for evaluating section 388 petitions (In re Kimberly F. , at pp. 530-532) is unavailing. The premise for Lisas argument that two of these factors weigh in her favor is that her lengthy incarceration for crimes of which she ultimately was acquitted was the only reason her children were dependents of the court. However, as pointed out above, the incarceration was not the only reason; there were protective issues as well.
Lisa cannot seriously argue the remaining factor in In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at page 531 - the strength of the existing bond between parent and child - weighs in her favor. The studies exploring the bonding between her and her two oldest children showed that there no longer was a strong bond.
We realize this is an unusual case because Lisa had to wait more than one and one-half years in jail before being tried and receiving a not guilty verdict. Moreover, because of the seriousness of the charged crimes and the resulting high bail, Lisa was precluded during this period from participating in some reunification programs offered to other jailed parents. We further realize that to a laypersons sense of fairness it probably seems manifestly unjust that Lisa should lose her parental rights when she was acquitted of the criminal changes. But the "purposes and parties" of the two proceedings were not the same. (In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal. App. 3d 1464, 1469, 278 Cal. Rptr. 468 [family law, dependency proceedings].) It was the juvenile dependency court that focused exclusively on the welfare of the children. (Guardianship of Simpson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 914, 933.) Moreover, because of differing standards of proof, the result in the criminal trial was not conclusive for purposes of this dependency proceeding. The issue here was parental fitness and the fact a jury found Lisa not guilty of kidnapping and bank robbery was not necessarily determinative of Lisas fitness as a parent. After all, Lisa had willingly associated with Chris B., knowing about his criminal history and the bank robbery plans. This information had a bearing on Lisas overall fitness; for example, the fact the children experienced the trauma of being involved in the arrest was certainly a factor the court could consider.
We conclude the juvenile court acted within its discretion by denying Lisas section 388 modification petition. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)
II
Court Properly Found No Exception to Adoption
Lisa contends the juvenile court erred by not finding two of the statutory exceptions to adoption - the beneficial relationship exception ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) and the sibling relationship exception (id., subd. (c)(1)(E)). The contention is without merit.
Our standard of review is the substantial evidence test. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) We determine if there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the conclusions of the juvenile court. All conflicts are resolved in favor of the prevailing party and all legitimate inferences are drawn to uphold the lower courts ruling. (In re Brison C . (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1379.)
Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature because "it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker." (In re Celine R., supra, (July 7, 2003, S111138) __ Cal.4th ___, ___ [2003 Cal. LEXIS 4422, *11].) At the selection and implementation hearing, the court must terminate parental rights if the child is found likely to be adopted. ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
The parent bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an exception to the statutory preference for adoption applies. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345; Welf & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); Evid. Code, § 115.)
Beneficial Relationship Exception
The beneficial relationship exception is codified at section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), which provides that once the court finds the child is likely to be adopted, the court shall not terminate parental rights if it finds termination would be detrimental to the child because "the parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." The exception applies only if both prongs are met.
The court found the first prong of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) - regular visitation or contact - was met by Lisa. Contrary to the Agencys position, substantial evidence supported this finding. Throughout her incarceration, Lisa telephoned the children and sought to have visits. After arrangements were made, the children visited Lisa in jail, but the visits were stopped because the children had adverse reactions. Visits resumed after Lisa was released from custody; although some problems arose, Lisa and the foster mother addressed them, which allowed the visitation to continue.
The court, however, found the benefit to the children from continuing the child-parent relationship with Lisa would not outweigh the benefit they would gain from the permanence of an adoptive home. Substantial evidence supports this finding as well.
As to Michael, Jr., there was no parent-child relationship.
Each of the three older children did have a child-parent relationship with Lisa. Each had lived a significant part of her life with Lisa, knew Lisa as her biological parent and felt varying degrees of love and affection toward Lisa. However, the existence of such relationships does not by itself satisfy the second prong of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).
In discussing the beneficial relationship exception to adoption in In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575, this court explained that to come within this exception, a parent must show the "relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (Italics added.) The court must balance "the strength and quality of the . . . parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer." (Ibid.) In balancing these interests, relevant factors include "the age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between parent and child, and the childs particular needs . . . ." (Id . at p. 576.) Further, the parent must show the benefit arises from a parental rather than caretaker or friendly visitor relationship. We reaffirmed this balancing test, explaining the standard "reflects the legislative intent that adoption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist." (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51, italics added; see also In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1420 [exception does not apply when a parent "has frequent contact with [dependent child] but does not stand in a parental role to the child"]; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324 [frequently visiting mother occupied pleasant place in minors life, but did not have parental role].)
The three older children suffered greatly from a lack of security and permanence in their lives. They were removed from Lisas custody after they witnessed her arrest. When they finally were allowed to visit Lisa in jail, they had adverse emotional and physical reactions. These harmful reactions continued to some extent when visits resumed after Lisas release from jail. Lisa did not have a beneficial parental relationship with them, but rather was more like a friendly visitor to them. The children did not look to Lisa to meet their needs. Furthermore, the wishes of the child are relevant at this stage of the proceedings. ( § 366.26, subd. (h).) The older children who understood the concept of adoption indicated they wanted to be adopted by the foster parents who had provided constancy in their lives for almost one and one-half years.
The juvenile court applied the correct balancing analysis to conclude whatever benefit the children would gain from continuing their relationship with Lisa would be outweighed by the stability, security and sense of belonging that would be conveyed to them by a permanent adoptive home.
Sibling Relationship Exception
Because the childrens long-time foster family wanted to adopt only Sandra and Jasmine, Agency sought a separate adoptive home for Whitney and Michael, Jr. Asserting that the children had a strong emotional bond with one another and ongoing contact was in their best interests, Lisa contends the court should have rejected Agencys proposal to divide the children into two sets or groups and seek two adoptive homes. Lisa argues the sibling relationship exception to adoption ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)) applied to compel a permanent plan other than adoption. We disagree.
Subdivision (c)(1)(E) was added to section 366.26 effective January 2002 to include a fifth enumerated exception to adoption relating to sibling relations. "Thus, adoption shall now be ordered unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child because there would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship . . . . ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).)" (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 811; see also In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947-948.) Factors to be considered include the nature and extent of the relationship, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, and whether the child has strong bonds with a sibling. ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) The court must also consider whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interests, including the childs long-term emotional interests, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. (Ibid.)
The purpose of this exception is to preserve long-standing sibling relationships that serve as "anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil." (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.) The sibling relationship exception contains "strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption." (In re Daniel H., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 813.) It focuses exclusively on the benefits and burdens to the child being considered for adoption, not the other siblings. (Ibid.; see also In re Celine R., supra, __ Cal.4th ___ .)
The threshold showing for the exception is that, with termination of parental rights, "there would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship . . . ." ( § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E); see also In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-952.) The evidence in the record showed that the foster family who was going to adopt Sandra and Jasmine was committed to continued contact with the two younger children. As to the potential adoptive families for the younger children, there were five approved families who wanted to adopt a pair of children like Whitney and Michael, Jr. and indicated a willingness to continue contact with the older children. At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, one of these five families had been selected and this family lived in the same neighborhood as Sandras and Jasmines prospective adoptive family. (See fn. 5, ante.) Thus, the adoption of the four children by these two families would not substantially impair the maintenance or further development of the sibling relationship between Sandra and Jasmine on one hand and Whitney and Michael, Jr. on the other. It was reasonable for the court to take Agency on its word to place Whitney and Michael, Jr. in an adoptive home that was willing to maintain contact with the older siblings. As to the commitment by an adoptive family to facilitate sibling contact between the two groups of children, we acknowledge that an informal promise does not possess the force of a binding legal contract. However, evidence showing that all of the interested parties are willing to protect this sibling relationship carries weight in determining whether a substantial interference will result within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E). Lisa did not meet her initial burden to demonstrate the sibling relationship between the younger children and the older children was threatened by the adoption order. (In re L. Y. L., at p. 952.)
Lisa also did not meet her burden to show the sibling relationship between the two groups was so strong that its severance would be detrimental to either group. (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952.; see also In re Celine R., supra, __ Cal.4th at p. ___ [2003 Cal. LEXIS 4422, *16] ["the ultimate question is whether adoption will be detrimental to the adoptive child"].) Once these two requirements are met, the court must undertake a balancing analysis and decide whether the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship outweighs the benefit of adoption. (In re L._Y._L. , at pp. 952-953.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, J., OROURKE, J.