Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ08-009622
RUVOLO, P. J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Sam S. appeals the juvenile court’s findings that he both drove a stolen car (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). Appellant was already a ward of the court when this subsequent petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was sustained. He contends that the juvenile court committed reversible error because it is “reasonably possible” that appellant was still in the act of car theft when he was apprehended and, therefore, he could not have committed either offense. We affirm.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Simona Fino parked her black two-door Honda Civic car across from her residence in East Oakland on the evening of September 29, 2008, between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. When she woke up the next morning and left for work around 8:50 a.m., she discovered the Civic was gone. Ms. Fino called the police and made a report. Less than an hour later, Officer Vallimont of the Oakland Police Department was flagged down by a man pointing toward a black Honda Civic that was traveling eastbound ahead of the police car. The officer followed the Civic and radioed in the license plate number, which was reported back as stolen. As the Civic pulled into an apartment complex driveway, Officer Vallimont lost sight of it for less than 10 seconds. When the officer saw the car next, two juveniles were outside the passenger side of the car and appellant was exiting the driver’s side door. All three ran when the officer approached, and appellant was apprehended. After the officer discovered the car had been hotwired, appellant was arrested.
At a contested jurisdictional hearing, appellant testified that he was walking to school with a friend when an acquaintance asked if they wanted a ride to school. They accepted the ride, and appellant testified that he did not drive or steal the car, but was sitting in the front passenger seat, exiting on that side when the officer approached. Appellant testified that when he first got in the vehicle, it circled the block a few times. Appellant also stated that he did not know it was stolen until the acquaintance started it with a “sharp object” instead of a key.
The court sustained the petition at the close of the jurisdictional hearing, finding that appellant “committed a violation of [Vehicle Code section] 10851 felony, driving a stolen vehicle knowing it to be stolen, also that he committed the [Penal Code section] 496 felony, possession of a stolen car.” At the dispositional hearing, the court continued appellant as a ward of the court and gave in-home orders. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum confinement of four years four months.
III.
DISCUSSION
Appellant appeals both findings that he drove and received a stolen vehicle. Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) criminalizes two separate acts; theft by taking a vehicle from the owner, or by driving a stolen vehicle. In appellant’s case, the court found “the minor is described by [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 602 in that he committed a violation of [Vehicle Code section] 10851 felony, driving a stolen vehicle knowing it to be stolen....” Generally, under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), defining receipt of stolen property, a person who is convicted of stealing property cannot be convicted of receiving that same property. However, when a “[Vehicle Code] section 10851[, subdivision] (a) conviction is based on posttheft driving, a separate conviction under [Penal Code] section 496[, subdivision] (a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property is not precluded. [Citations.]” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.) This much is conceded by appellant.
The juvenile court made the specific finding that appellant committed the driving prong of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The court emphasized its holding by explaining that the “[d]riving doesn’t merge with being in possession.”
But, appellant claims that because it is “reasonably possible” that he was still in the process of stealing the vehicle when he was apprehended, the Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) finding must be reversed. We review the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings applying the same standard as applied in criminal cases. (In re Samuel C. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 351, 354.) The critical inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) “When an appellant asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment, our review is circumscribed. [Citation.] We review the whole record most favorably to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. [Citations.] The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.)
Appellant claims there is insufficient evidence that he drove a stolen vehicle because there was no evidence that the theft of Ms. Fino’s Honda Civic was complete as of the time appellant was apprehended. He reminds us that “[t]he theft is not completed if the vehicle is still being driven on a ‘continuous journey away from the locus of the theft.’ (People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366.)” (Italics omitted.) Thus, he argues that the evidence “was at least equally plausible” that appellant took the car the morning he was apprehended, and that he was not engaged in “posttheft” driving, but rather was still in the act of “taking” it.
Of course, what appellant misunderstands is that in order to reverse, we must conclude that his hypothesis is not just “equally plausible” with one suggesting that he was driving a stolen vehicle, but that the only reasonable scenario is that the taking had not been completed as of the time he was arrested. It is not. Indulging reasonable inferences in favor of the court’s finding, which we must, it certainly is reasonable to conclude that appellant and his friends took the vehicle much earlier, since the vehicle was left unattended since the preceding evening. Supporting this conclusion is the reasonable inference that the vehicle likely was hotwired and driven away under cover of darkness, rather than the following morning during the height of the commute traffic.
Given this record, when viewed in light of the standard of review we must apply, we conclude there was substantial evidence supporting an implied finding that the theft of the vehicle was complete as of the time appellant was apprehended. Therefore, the findings that he was driving and in possession of a stolen vehicle are supported by the evidence.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: REARDON, J., RIVERA, J.