In re SA.C.

6 Citing cases

  1. Dist. of Columbia v. R.H. (In re J.B.S.)

    No. 16-FS-1244 (D.C. Sep. 10, 2020)   Cited 1 times
    Stating that "parental 'fitness,'" though not statutorily defined, "refers to the parent's intention and ability over time to provide for a child's wellbeing and meet the child's needs"

    Thus, we mean our holding to encompass not only typical cases of parental unfitness or abandonment, but also cases of unwed biological parents who have failed to grasp their opportunity interests in parenting their children, see supra note 41. See In re Sa.C., 178 A.3d 460, 461-62 (D.C. 2018). -------- We reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand for further proceedings.

  2. In re J.B.S.

    237 A.3d 131 (D.C. 2020)   Cited 4 times
    Considering two competing adoption petitions when the child resided in the home of only one of the petitioners

    Thus, we mean our holding to encompass not only typical cases of parental unfitness or abandonment, but also cases of unwed biological parents who have failed to grasp their opportunity interests in parenting their children, see supra note 41.See In re Sa.C. , 178 A.3d 460, 461-62 (D.C. 2018). We reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand for further proceedings.

  3. In re D.T.

    222 A.3d 593 (D.C. 2019)

    Cf.In re G.K. , 993 A.2d 558, 560 (D.C. 2010) ("At the permanency review hearing ... the trial judge set aside G.K.'s permanency goal of guardianship and changed his ... permanency goal[ ] to reunification with [his] mother ... who apparently had been ‘making substantial steps toward reunification.’ "); see alsoIn re Sa.C. , 178 A.3d 460, 462 (D.C. 2018) (acknowledging that "[a]n order changing a permanency goal may become law of the case," but explaining that the "discretionary" law of the case doctrine "merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided" and "is not a limit to [the trial court's] power" (internal quotation marks omitted)).Reviewing Associate Judge Dalton identified the motion before her as a "Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order Changing the Respondent's Permanency Goal from Reunification to Adoption[.]"

  4. In re Z.W.

    214 A.3d 1023 (D.C. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    While this case was opened before Ta.L. was decided in December 2016, we have held that Ta.L. applies retroactively. In re Sa.C. , 178 A.3d 460, 461-62 (D.C. 2018) ; see alsoIn re J.M. , 193 A.3d 773, 780 (D.C. 2018) ; In re K.C. , 200 A.3d 1216, 1236 n.12 (D.C. 2019).

  5. In re K.C.

    200 A.3d 1216 (D.C. 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that, because parent "refused to participate in the case-planning process and hampered the [a]gency's efforts to work with her on the plan," "[s]he cannot now argue, well after the fact, that the [a]gency should have done even more than it already did to overcome her uncooperativeness"

    We find no error in Magistrate Judge Albert holding a "retroactive" permanency goal change hearing in 2017 and issuing an opinion following that hearing, nor do we find error in Judge Becker reviewing that opinion and issuing a decision – which decision was timely appealed to this court, making our review timely and proper – because, contrary to the contentions of the government, we have held that Ta.L. applies retroactively. In re Sa.C. , 178 A.3d 460 (D.C. 2018) ; see alsoIn re J.M. , 193 A.3d at 780.

  6. In re J.M.

    193 A.3d 773 (D.C. 2018)   Cited 6 times
    Finding that "the case plan mirrored what the magistrate judge had ordered"

    First, the District and the GAL argue that the magistrate judge had no authority to reconsider a change in permanency goal it made many months before the Mother's request for an evidentiary hearing, and before this court's decision in Ta.L. We must reject that argument because a division of this court decided otherwise in In re Sa.C. , 178 A.3d 460 (D.C. 2018). Seeid. at 461 (applying the "firm rule of retroactivity" and holding that because "the initial adverse change in the [child's] permanency goal from reunification to adoption [had] not become final" when Ta.L. was issued (in that the child's "neglect case was still being litigated in the trial court" at the time), "the trial court properly sought to follow In re Ta.L. " (internal quotation marks omitted) ).