Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert M. Padia, Temporary Judge. Super.Ct.No. RIJ114731 (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant V.R.
Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.R.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor, Sab.R.
Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors, San.R., Sam.R., and C.R.
OPINION
Gaut, Acting P.J.
1. Introduction
Mother and father appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional findings of the dependency court for Los Angeles and Riverside Counties. Four children are the subject of the appeal: three daughters, Sab.R., born in June 1992; San.R., born in January 1996; Sam.R., born in September 1998; and one son, C.R., born in December 2003.
The oldest daughter, Sab.R., has a different biological father who has never been identified.
Both parents make arguments based on choice of venue and substitution of counsel. Father argues additionally there was not substantial evidence for removal of the children from the parents’ custody because the case was “stale” by the time of the dispositional hearing. We reject these claims and affirm the judgment.
2. Factual and Procedural Background
The dependency case was initiated in June 2006 in Los Angeles County after mother had called the paternal aunt, Merry, and asked if the children could spend the night with Merry and her partner, Laura, at their home in Long Beach because the family was being evicted. The children had reported to Merry and Laura that the parents were engaging in domestic violence with one another and physical abuse against the children and that father was using drugs. Merry and Laura contacted protective services first in Orange County and then in Los Angeles County.
The name “Merry” is alternately spelled Mary, Mery, and Meery.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed an original juvenile dependency petition on June 1, 2006, alleging serious physical harm, failure to protect, cruelty, and abuse of sibling. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (a), (b), (i), (j).) The petition included factual allegations of domestic violence, child abuse, and substance abuse, including that father had physically abused mother and C.R. and mother had abused San.R.. The family had been the subject of previous referrals in 1996 and 2001.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
Initially, the three younger children were detained and placed with Merry in Long Beach. Sab.R. could not be located. The social worker interviewed the two younger daughters. San.R. reported her mother had slapped her, her father had taken her to buy drugs, and she had smelled marijuana in the bathroom. San.R. had also seen father tackle mother, throw her against a wall, and shake C.R. violently. Sam.R. stated that her parents spanked her, father used drugs, and father had shaken C.R.. Sam.R. expressed fear about living at home and preferred to stay with her aunt Merry. C.R. was too young to be interviewed.
When the social worker visited the parents in Buena Park in Orange County, mother denied the allegations. After both the parents and the social worker returned to the paternal aunt’s house, the Los Angeles social worker decided to detain the children with the paternal aunt rather than wait 10 days for a response from protective services for Orange County.
At the detention hearing, the court granted temporary restraining orders against the parents for the protection of the children, the paternal aunt, and Laura, her partner.
The jurisdiction and disposition report included a statement by Sab.R., the oldest child, that father did not hit mother and that the parents treated the children well. Once, when C.R. wrote on the wall with markers, mother had pulled San.R.’s hair, and father had pushed mother against a wall. When father spanked C.R. and shook his leg hard, mother became angry with father. Father told mother he had smoked marijuana. San.R. also described mother becoming angry about the markers and pushing her. Father pushed and scratched mother. San.R. said mother hit her with a belt and a vacuum hose. Father had used drugs, including a needle, pills from Mexico, and marijuana. Mother told both Merry and the paternal grandmother that father had struck and bruised her. Both Merry and the paternal grandmother doubted mother’s credibility. The paternal grandmother said father had used drugs 25 years earlier and he had begun again. Father was a “functional addict.” Between June and September 2006, there were ongoing difficulties with the parents’ visitation.
At the jurisdictional hearing on September 7, 2006, mother testified she had been married to father for 12 years. He had a problem with marijuana in the past and as recently as May 2006. Mother denied ever striking or hitting her children or engaging in domestic violence with father. She also denied father ever physically abused C.R.
Sam.R., then seven years old, testified her father used drugs with her mother’s knowledge. He also employed the daughters to smuggle drugs in their clothing from Mexico into the United States. Mother hit Sam.R. with a vacuum attachment, a stick, and a belt. Sam.R. saw and heard her parents fighting. On another occasion, she saw father shake C.R., throw him on the bed, and lock him screaming in his room. Merry took C.R. to the hospital. The court continued the jurisdictional hearing to September 26, 2006.
In September 2006, the parents sought a change of venue from Los Angeles County to Orange County because the family was living in Anaheim. The court denied the request without prejudice.
At the continued jurisdictional hearing on September 26, 2006, the parents filed an attorney substitution, requesting to be represented by Ben E. Lofstedt of the Christian Law Center of Fullerton. The court expressed concern about Lofstedt’s limited experience, the conflict arising from jointly representing the parents, and Lofstedt’s lack of preparation for trial. Ultimately, the court granted the substitution and continued the hearing again.
At the continued hearing on November 7, 2006, Lofsetdt represented the parents. San.R. testified that, on trips to Mexico, father smuggled drugs across the border using her person and clothing. The parents argued about father’s drug use. Mother sometimes disciplined the children using “her hand or a vacuum . . . attachment or a belt or a leather shoe or a hair brush.” Father would shake C.R. and throw him inside a darkened bedroom. Her aunt once took C.R. to a doctor after an episode of shaking. In the incident involving C.R. drawing on a wall using San.R.’s marker, mother grabbed San.R. by the head and shook her. Father thought mother had pushed San.R. He “flipped” mother across a room, causing scratches on her face and legs. Mother was limping and hurt. Mother directed Sab.R. to call the police and father told Sab.R., “If you call the police you’re nuts.”
Laura testified that she lived with Merry and the children called her “aunt.” Mother had described to Laura the incident in which father “flipped” her and she displayed her bruises and injuries. Mother had also told Laura about father’s drug use. The paternal grandmother testified about father’s drug problem and mother’s knowledge of father’s drug use. The paternal grandmother received constant phone calls from the parents when they were fighting. The hearing was continued again.
In January 2007, the social worker submitted a report describing ongoing problems with visitation with mother during Christmas and afterwards. At the continued hearing on January 30, 2007, Sab.R. testified about father assaulting mother after she reacted to the marker incident and about father using drugs in the bathroom. She also testified about father smuggling drugs from Mexico in the children’s clothes and buying drugs. Sab.R. confirmed mother used a vacuum and a hair brush to spank the children, that C.R. would be locked in his room, and father had shaken C.R. Sab.R. accused San.R. of being untruthful.
A number of witnesses—friends, school personnel, and acquaintances—testified favorably about the parents. The court declined to reconsider the issue of venue in Orange County and the hearing was continued again for closing argument.
In the meantime, mother asked to have monitored visitation with the children when she was hospitalized. Her request was rejected by the social worker, who recommended a 730 evaluation for mother.
On April 24, 2007, parents filed a motion to disqualify (Evid. Code, § 170.1) the assigned judge based on a lawsuit filed against Los Angeles County because it pays additional benefits to Los Angeles County judges. The dependency court filed an order striking the challenge.
At the continued jurisdictional hearing on April 25, 2007, the dependency court made a finding the parents were living in Downey in Los Angeles County when the dependency petition was filed. The children were also located in Los Angeles County some of the time. The court sustained the allegations involving domestic violence, father’s drug use, father’s abuse of C.R., and mother’s abuse of the children. The court ordered the parents to submit to a psychological evaluation before setting a further hearing.
The Department concedes the family was not living in Los Angeles County when the petition was filed.
The psychological evaluation could not be performed before June 6, 2007. On that date, the court ordered the parents’ educational rights restricted because mother refused to authorize speech therapy for C.R. The court also transferred the case to Riverside County because the parents had moved to Corona.
After the case was transferred to Riverside County, a disposition hearing was finally commenced in October 2007. The disposition report dated October 10, 2007, recited a history of the case. It concluded the children should not be placed with their parents and the children should remain in out-of-home placements, Sab.R. in a separate foster home and the other children with their Aunt Merry.
Sab.R., then 15 years old, testified that she wanted to return to the parents. San.R. and Sam.R. also wanted to return to the parents. Mother testified she would abide by court orders if the children were returned. She accused everyone else in the case of lying about what had occurred. Father also wanted the children returned. Father had three clean drug tests in September and October 2006.
On October 30, 2007, the court made the dispositional orders, finding the minors came within section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), and reasonable services had been provided but parents had not made satisfactory progress. The court ordered reunification services but denied the parents’ request to place the children in Riverside County. The parents appealed.
This court has already denied a writ petition filed by parents concerning events occurring after October 2007. (In re C.R. et al., E045960, filed 9/22/08.)
3. Substitution of Counsel
Both parents challenge the substitution of counsel effected at their request during the ongoing jurisdictional hearing. When the dependency court inquired about the parents’ understanding about a conflict of interest from joint representation, the parents assured the court they understood and waived any such conflict. Eventually, they executed a written waiver. For that reason, we affirm the court’s order permitting the substitution: “A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as ‘waiver,’ applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings. [Citations.]” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.)
We also reject the parents’ related contention they did not receive effective assistance of counsel from Lofstedt. Even if they had not waived that claim by their vociferous and continued insistence on Lofstedt, they have made no showing on appeal that a different outcome was reasonably probable except for his ineffective representation. (In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1711.) Lofstedt’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Instead, the parents’ conduct from the inception of the case almost guaranteed the outcome. The parents never acknowledged the allegations against them or accepted responsibility. They refused to participate in reunification services ordered by the court in June 2008. They objected to venue in Los Angeles and they accused their children and others of lying but they never addressed the merits of the case. On appeal, they complain about a failure to investigate but make no offer of proof describing their claim of prejudice. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) In the absence of a record of error, we assume Lofstedt discharged his duty to the parents. (In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 915, citing Evid. Code, § 664.)
4. Venue
Both parents also object to Los Angeles County as the original venue for the case. Although the family was living in Orange County when the case was filed, the children were found at their aunt Merry’s residence in Long Beach when they were first detained, making Los Angeles a proper venue.
Section 327 provides for alternate venues: “Either the juvenile court in the county in which a minor resides or in the county where the minor is found or in the county in which the acts take place or the circumstances exist which are alleged to bring such minor within the provisions of Section 300, is the proper court to commence proceedings under this chapter.”
As section 327 was interpreted in In re Hadley B. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1048, “General principles underlying dependency proceedings compel our conclusion that the juvenile court adjudicating dependency jurisdiction must consider all the circumstances affecting the child, wherever they occur. The focus of dependency proceedings is on the child, not the parent or political boundaries. ‘[T]he purpose of the provisions of this chapter relating to dependent children is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’ (§ 300.2.) The juvenile court ‘stands in loco parentis to the minor in a proceeding whose primary consideration is the minor’s welfare.’ (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1235.)”
In the present case, the children were staying with their aunt in Long Beach when they revealed to her the parents’ abuse and neglect. Under the circumstances, in which Orange County was less responsive and the children were in Long Beach, venue in Los Angeles County was proper.
Furthermore, on appeal, the parents have again failed to demonstrate prejudice caused to them by the Los Angeles venue. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 407.) As already discussed, it was the parents’ misconduct and failure to cooperate that lost them custody of their children, not the selection of venue in Los Angeles instead of Orange County.
5. Sufficiency of Evidence for Removal
The children were detained on May 29, 2006, and the dispositional hearing was not concluded until October 30, 2007. The allegations against the parents were based on events occurring between September 2005 and May 2006. Father argues the allegations were too stale to justify the dispositional orders. We review using the substantial evidence test and a heightened burden of proof. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.)
The children were removed because of the parents’ domestic violence, physical abuse of the children, and father’s drug use. After the dependency court ordered reunification services in June 2006, the parents refused to participate. Although the parents later expressed some willingness to follow court’s orders, they conditioned their cooperation on the children being returned to them first. The case dragged on mostly because of the parents’ recalcitrance. Under these circumstances, the evidence fully supports the dependency court’s dispositional orders.
As noted in our previous opinion denying the parents’ writ petition, parents’ behavior and conduct has continued in the same vein from November 2007 until June 2008. (E045690, pp. 3-7.)
6. Disposition
We affirm the judgment of the dependency court.
We concur: King, J., Miller, J.