Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JV36849
Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.
The minor, Ryan B., appeals from a restitution order entered after the juvenile court granted deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790 et seq.) On appeal, the minor contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion as to a portion of the restitution award because the victims were not entitled to restitution and/or there was insufficient evidence to support the award of restitution.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
For reasons that we will explain, the restitution order is not appealable and, therefore, we will dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Section 602 Petition and Grant of DEJ
In March 2010, a petition was filed under section 602 alleging that the minor, then age 18, committed felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a) & (b)(1)) on or about June 22, 2009, by damaging a 1985 Porsche 911 in an amount greater than $10,000. According to a probation officer’s memorandum, which was based on a police report, the minor and three others allegedly vandalized the car by using a “BB gun and their own physical force.”
In May 2010, the minor admitted the allegations of the section 602 petition, and the juvenile court granted DEJ. As a condition of probation while participating in the DEJ program, the minor was required to make restitution to the victims.
Restitution Hearing
On September 1, 2010, a contested restitution hearing was held. The evidence consisted of testimony from the probation officer and documents submitted by the victims. The victims included the individual whose Porsche 911 had been damaged and his mother. The mother indicated in a written statement that the car was a gift from her brother to her son for his 18th birthday. A bill from the “body shop” that repaired the car shows a “Deductible” of $100 and an “Insurance Total” of $10,011.35. A credit card receipt reflects that the victim(s) paid $2,427.50 to the body shop. At least a portion of the payment was apparently for paint not covered by insurance. A rental car invoice to the mother reflects the amount of $734. A written statement by the mother lists the dates and amount of time she spent “away from work to attend the court dates, ” the amount of wages she was apparently entitled to during that time, and the parking charges she incurred, for a total of $713.82. The mother also provided copies of a pay stub and parking garage receipts. The juvenile court ultimately ordered restitution in the amount of $13,885.82, and ruled that the amount was the “joint and several responsibility” of each of the four minors who were “coparticipants[.]”
On September 17, 2010, the minor filed a notice of appeal from the September 1, 2010 restitution order.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the minor contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion as to a portion of the restitution award. He argues that the mother was not entitled to restitution for lost wages, and that there was insufficient evidence to support an award for lost wages, parking expenses, and the full amount of the credit card payment to the body shop. Assuming this court finds merit in his arguments, the minor contends that the restitution award should be reduced by $1,141.32.
The People contend that the minor fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court and the restitution order should be affirmed.
We requested simultaneous supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the appealability of the September 1, 2010 restitution order and whether there is otherwise a legal basis for this court to review the restitution order. The minor contends the restitution order is appealable, whereas the People contend that it is not.
The minor filed a petition for writ of mandate simultaneously with his letter brief. We have disposed of the petition by separate order.
Before setting forth the general principles of appealability, we first consider the nature of DEJ. The DEJ provisions (§ 790 et seq.) establish that “in lieu of jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, a minor may admit the allegations contained in a section 602 petition and waive time for the pronouncement of judgment. Entry of judgment is deferred. After the successful completion of a term of probation, on the motion of the prosecution and with a positive recommendation from the probation department, the court is required to dismiss the charges. The arrest upon which judgment was deferred is deemed never to have occurred, and any records of the juvenile court proceeding are sealed. (§§ 791, subd. (a)(3), 793, subd. (c).)” (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556, 558.) With respect to the terms and conditions of DEJ, section 794 states: “When a minor is permitted to participate in a deferred entry of judgment procedure, the judge shall impose, as a condition of probation, the requirement that the minor be subject to warrantless searches of his or her person, residence, or property under his or her control, upon the request of a probation officer or peace officer. The court shall also consider whether imposing random drug or alcohol testing, or both, including urinalysis, would be an appropriate condition of probation. The judge shall also, when appropriate, require the minor to periodically establish compliance with curfew and school attendance requirements. The court may, in consultation with the probation department, impose any other term of probation authorized by this code that the judge believes would assist in the education, treatment, and rehabilitation of the minor and the prevention of criminal activity. The minor may also be required to pay restitution to the victim or victims pursuant to the provisions of this code.” (Italics added.)
Turning to the issue of appealability, “ ‘the right of appeal is statutory and... a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 792.) Relevant here, section 800, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] judgment in a proceeding under Section... 602 may be appealed from, by the minor, in the same manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from, by the minor, as from an order after judgment.” “[T]he ‘judgment’ in a juvenile court proceeding is the order made after the trial court has found facts establishing juvenile court jurisdiction and has conducted a hearing into the proper disposition to be made. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 725 [‘After receiving and considering the evidence on the proper disposition of the case, the court may enter judgment as follows....’], 706 [contemplating that, after jurisdictional finding, court shall consider relevant evidence and render ‘judgment and order of disposition’];... In re Melvin S. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 898, 900.)” (In re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307-1308.) An order granting deferred entry of judgment is not a judgment. (Id. at p. 1308.) “[T]he order does not enter judgment but ‘defer[s]’ such entry indefinitely, perhaps permanently.” (Ibid.; see §§ 790, subd. (b), 791, 793, 794; In re Mario C., supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1308, fn. 1.)
In his opening brief on appeal, the minor asserts that he is appealing from an “order after judgment, ” and he contends that his appeal is authorized by section 800, subdivision (a). In supplemental briefing, the minor acknowledges that there is no judgment in this case, but he nevertheless urges this court to determine that the restitution order is appealable. In the absence of a statute authorizing this court to review the order by way of an appeal, we are without jurisdiction to do so. (In re Mario C., supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.)
In support of his argument that this court should determine the restitution order is appealable, the minor cites in In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, in which the Court of Appeal affirmed a restitution order that followed the deferred entry of judgment. The minor acknowledges, however, that In re Johnny M. did not address the issue of whether the restitution order was appealable. “An opinion is not authority for a point not raised, considered, or resolved therein. [Citations.]” (Styne v. Stevens (2001) 26 Cal.4th 42, 57-58.) The minor also cites In re Do Kyung K. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 583, in which this court determined that a minor’s appeal from an order placing the minor on probation without wardship pursuant to section 725, subdivision (a), was “not barred by Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, subdivision (c).” (In re Do Kyung K., supra, at p. 590.) The minor fails to explain how this case supports his contention that an order of restitution following a grant of DEJ is appealable. Lastly, the minor contends that if the restitution order, which is “unconditional and effective immediately, ” is not presently appealable, “the order might never be subject to review.” We find this argument unpersuasive. Review of the restitution order may be available if, for example, the minor fails to successfully complete probation, DEJ is lifted, and judgment is eventually entered. (See § 793, subds. (a) & (b); In re Mario C., supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1310; see also G.C. v. Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 371 [providing writ relief where the minor only raised an issue of statutory interpretation, a question of law, concerning whether the juvenile court erroneously believed it was not required to consider the minor’s ability to pay pursuant to section 742.16 when ordering the minor to pay restitution for graffiti abatement while in the DEJ program].)
DISPOSITION
The appeal from the September 1, 2010 restitution order is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: MIHARA, J., LUCAS, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.