Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J35725
Swager, J.
Ryan B., appellant, appeals the termination of his non-wardship probation and the juvenile court’s order of wardship. He claims that the court failed to provide proper notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to changing his status. We agree and reverse.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 23, 2006, the juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that appellant had committed first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.)
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise designated.
At the dispositional hearing, held on April 12, 2006, the juvenile court declined to declare appellant a ward, instead placing him on six months’ informal probation under section 725, subdivision (a). The court also ordered him to return on September 12, 2006, for a five-month review hearing.
Section 725, subdivision (a), provides, in part: “If the court has found that the minor is a person described by Section 601 or 602, by reason of the commission of an offense . . . it may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court, place the minor on probation, under the supervision of the probation officer, for a period not to exceed six months. . . . If the minor fails to comply with the conditions of probation imposed, the court may order and adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court.”
Appellant did not appear at the review hearing, but his counsel was present. The juvenile court followed the probation officer’s recommendation and terminated the non-wardship probation, converting it to a wardship. The probation report indicated that appellant was not in compliance with the terms of his probation as he had not provided proof of grades at school, had 77 outstanding hours of community service to complete, and had been cited on June 5, 2005, for trespassing on school grounds and violating curfew. The court informed appellant’s trial counsel that appellant would have the opportunity to put the matter back on calendar within 10 days “if there is something additional that the minor wishes to offer.” The matter was not put back on calendar. This appeal followed.
There is nothing in the record before us to establish that appellant was aware of this report prior to the hearing.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s sole claim on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in revoking his non-wardship probation and declaring him a ward without first providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. He claims that the court’s verbal notice to appear at the September 12 review hearing “was inadequate because it did not inform appellant that he might be made a ward at the review hearing.” We agree.
When a person under the age of 18 commits a crime, a section 602 petition seeks to bring him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge him a ward of the court. Under section 725, the court has the option to impose up to six months’ probation on a minor who falls within section 602 and then to impose wardship “if the minor fails to comply with the conditions of probation imposed.” A section 725 proceeding is normally bifurcated into an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the minor violated probation and a disposition hearing to determine a suitable placement. (In re Deon W. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 143, 147.)
The federal due process clause requires written notice of alleged probation violations. (Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 611; People v. Self (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 414, 419.) Minors subject to section 725 proceedings are entitled to written notice of all of the allegations and are entitled to the same notice as adult probationers facing a revocation. (In re Deon W., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 143, 147.)
In the present case, both parties agree that a minor is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a juvenile court finds that he has violated the terms of his probation under section 725, subdivision (a). (In re Deon W., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 143, 146–147; In re Shannon B. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1246–1247; In re Mikkelsen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 467, 471.)
The Attorney General asserts the record shows that appellant was provided adequate notice when, at the April 12 hearing, the court ordered him to return for the five-month review hearing. The Attorney General also argues that we must presume appellant’s counsel informed him that his non-wardship probation was subject to revocation at the September 12 review hearing if he was not “on track” and in compliance with the conditions of probation. The Attorney General also observes that appellant’s trial counsel did not object to proceeding in appellant’s absence at the review hearing, did not request an evidentiary hearing on the alleged violation, and did not attempt to recalendar the matter.
We question whether verbal notice to appear at a five-month review hearing is the equivalent of written notice that appellant’s non-wardship probation would be revoked. At the hearing on April 12, the court simply set September 12 as the “five-month review date.” The court told appellant “what I’m going to ask you to do is appear in court on that date and time, because it’s my opportunity to see you, make sure you are on track, and this will work to your advantage.”
We fail to see how this statement can be deemed sufficient to inform appellant that he was at risk of being placed in a wardship at the September 12 hearing. Moreover, at the conclusion of the April 12 hearing the court specifically stated: “This is informal probation. It’s without wardship. That’s a great benefit to you, and I trust you will follow the court’s orders.” A reasonable person would not be on notice that a wardship could potentially be established at the next hearing.
We believe the lack of written notice in this case constituted a violation of appellant’s statutory and constitutional due process rights. Appellant is correct that the due process requirement of written notice of alleged probation violations does not include a loophole for actual notice. (See People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 461 [“The violation of a condition of probation is often a matter of degree or quality of conduct, and the point when a violation occurs often is a matter of technical judgment. [Citation.] A violation may be of such little consequence that a probationer may not even be aware of his transgression.”])
The juvenile court did offer appellant’s counsel 10 days within which to recalendar the hearing to raise any objections. We must presume that counsel notified appellant of this offer. We do not believe, however, that his failure to request another hearing is dispositive. He should have been offered the opportunity to challenge the revocation of his informal probation in the first instance.
After reviewing the entire proceedings held in this case, we conclude the court erred by failing to provide appellant with proper notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to declaring him a ward of the court. The order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Margulies, J.