In re Ryan

22 Citing cases

  1. In re Roberts

    98 B.R. 664 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1989)   Cited 18 times
    Instructing that time limit set forth in Rule 3002(c) for filing proofs of claim is the equivalent of a statute of limitations

    In re Nohle, supra; In re Kragness, 82 B.R. 553, 556 (Bkrtcy.D.Or. 1988). See, In re Owens, 67 B.R. 418, 423 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1986); In re Whitten, 49 B.R. 220, 222-23, 13 BCD 42 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ala. 1985); In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 106 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1985); In re Markey, 33 B.R. 332, 333-34 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1983). We make clear that Owen does not formally move to enlarge, or to extend, the bar date, and rightly so โ€” such a motion, here, would clearly fail under Rules 9006(b) and 3002(c).

  2. In re R.E. Lee Sons, Inc.

    95 B.R. 316 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1989)   Cited 11 times
    Limiting debtor's burden to reasonable diligence in completing schedules

    Initially, we note the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that bankruptcy courts do not have the power nor authority to extend the bar date for the filing of proofs of claim even in situations where there are compelling equitable reasons to do so. Third Circuit precedent is as follows: In re Supernit, Inc., 186 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1950); In re Pigott, 684 F.2d 239 (3rd Cir. 1982); In re Owens, 67 B.R. 418, 423 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1986); In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985); In re Fleming Construction Corp., 53 B.R. 406 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985), aff'd, 63 B.R. 392 (E.D.Pa. 1986); In re Telephone Communications of America, Inc., 49 B.R. 959 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985); accord, Hoos Co. v. Dynamics Corp., 570 F.2d 433, 439 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Crouthamel Potato Chip Co., 786 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1986); In re Valley Forge Corp., 27 B.R. 121 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1983); In re Stern, 70 B.R. 472 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1987). With this precedent as a guide we now turn to Agway's argument which directs our attention to Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a)(1) which provides as follows: "The debtor shall file with the petition a list containing the name and address of each creditor."

  3. In re Fleet

    103 B.R. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1989)   Cited 7 times

    While we appreciate that it is possible that one missive reached its intended destination while another did not, we also are obliged to acknowledge the rebuttable presumption that any letter mailed in the ordinary course will reach its destination. See, e.g., Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 418, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); In re DSC Industries, Inc., 79 B.R. 244, 249 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1987), aff'd on this issue, 94 B.R. 42, 45-46 (E.D.Pa. 1988); and In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 106-07 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985). The presumption was, in this case, not rebutted, because we disbelieve the accuracy of Mr. Barnes' assertion that he did not receive the initial mailing.

  4. In re Middlebrooks

    Case No. 03-71937-MHM (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2006)

    Thus, ยง 502(b)(9), Rule 9006(b)(3), and Rule 3002(c) prohibit late-filed claims unless they are filed under ยง 726(a) or otherwise permitted under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Jensen, 2005 WL 3144064, at *2. The bankruptcy court does not have the equitable power to allow a late-filed claim as timely filed where it does not fall under one of the exceptions provided in Rule 3002 or ยง 726. See, Gardenhire v. IRS ( In re Gardenhire), 209 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Coastal Alaska Lines, 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Husman, 276 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2002); In re Valerino Constr., Inc., 275 B.R. 684, 687 (Bankr. W.D.Tex. 2002); In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1985); In re Sullivan, 36 B.R. 771 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); Matter of Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). Rule 3002(c) permits claims to be timely filed beyond the 90 day requirement as follows:

  5. In re Rex

    217 B.R. 57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998)   Cited 5 times

    The Debtor testified that he did not recall receiving this notice but we must assume that he did. See Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 418-19, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); In re Ferrell, 1998 WL 10367, at *3 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. January 6, 1998); and In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 106-07 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1985). The Debtor testified that, at some point in 1996 or 1997, he began receiving bills from certain creditors listed on his Schedules. He stated that he sent these to his counsel.

  6. In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown

    186 B.R. 891 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995)   Cited 25 times
    Referring to cases in which "courts declined attempts to extend bar dates after the respective claimants were found to have made conscious, tactical decisions not to file . . . timely claims"

    However, the presumption that mail properly sent and addressed and not returned has reached its intended destination causes us to conclude that the Return was received by the MTB and misrouted by its mailroom or administrative employees. See Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 418-19, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); In re Lewis, 157 B.R. 555, 561 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1993); and In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 106-07 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985). On the other hand, Wieand was not called to testify.

  7. In re Friel

    162 B.R. 645 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    In a case on similar facts, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Emil F. Goldhaber for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the motion for the allowance of a late filed proof of claim by a creditor that was improperly listed. In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 107 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985). The Court held that the creditor received actual notice of the bar date for filing proofs of claim, based on the presumption of receipt of properly addressed mail, since in that case the creditor had actually received the Section 341 meeting notice and receipt of that notice imposed on them the duty to inform the Clerk of Court that they were misnamed in the mailing list.

  8. In re Lewis

    157 B.R. 555 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)   Cited 4 times

    One response to HNB's first argument is that the Certification of Service unequivocally states that HNB was served with notice of the motion requesting this court to approve the Settlement. There is a presumption that mail notice sent to a party has been received by it. See Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 418-19, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); and In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 106-07 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985). However, another response is that HNB, standing as it must in the shoes of the Debtors under 11 U.S.C. ยง 544, is bound by their post-petition actions in any event, irrespective of whether it had notice of the Settlement.

  9. In re Geiger

    137 B.R. 586 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992)   Cited 2 times

    There is a presumption that a properly-directed letter placed in the mails has reached its destination. See, e.g., Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430, 52 S.Ct. 417, 418, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Schneiderman, 940 F.2d 911, 913, 915 (3d Cir. 1991); and In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 106-07 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985). Employing this presumption, we conclude that the Plaintiff did comply with the second requirement for restoration of her license, and we are prepared to enter, as part of our Order, a finding that this criterion has been satisfied, which should suffice for PENNDOT's purposes.

  10. In re Harper, (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 1991)

    138 B.R. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991)   Cited 18 times

    3See Matter of Brown, 73 B.R. 740, 742 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wis. 1987); In re Stern, 70 B.R. 472, 474 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1987); In re Owens, 67 B.R. 418, 423 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1987); In re Key, 64 B.R. 786, 788 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Tenn. 1986); In re Street, 55 B.R. 763, 766 (Bkrtcy.App. 9th Cir. 1985); In re Ryan, 54 B.R. 105, 106 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1985).Id. at 121-122 (Only footnotes 2 and 3 included).