Opinion
NO. 03-18-00163-CV
05-09-2018
In re Lena Elizabeth Rusch
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM BURNET COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator Lena Elizabeth Rusch has filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking this Court to compel the trial court to order the transfer of the underlying case to Brazos County and to vacate its temporary orders in the underlying suit affecting the parent-child relationship. See Tex. Gov't Code § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52.1. We granted Rusch's motion for temporary relief and stayed all proceedings in the trial court and enforcement of the temporary orders during the pendency of this mandamus proceeding. We will conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus because we conclude that the trial court (1) failed to perform its ministerial duty to transfer the case and (2) abused its discretion by rendering temporary orders that changed the divorce decree's designation of Rusch as the parent with the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the children. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c); see also Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201(mandatory transfer), 166.006(b) (temporary orders).
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this section are undisputed and derived from the pleadings and the testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing on temporary orders.
This mandamus proceeding arises out of a petition to modify the parent-child relationship filed by real party in interest Michael Brasuel on December 1, 2017. Brasuel sought to modify the parties' final decree of divorce, which was signed October 13, 2010, by the County Court at Law of Burnet County. The decree named Rusch and Brasuel as joint managing conservators of their sons, CDB and TWB. The decree gave Rusch the exclusive right to designate the children's primary residence "within 160 miles of Marble Falls, Texas." In the petition to modify, filed on December 1, 2017, Brasuel requested that the trial court appoint him to be the person who has the right to designate the primary residence of the children.
Motion to transfer
On December 4, 2017, Rusch filed a motion to transfer venue based on Section 155.201 of the Family Code. See generally Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201-.297 (concerning transfer of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in suits affecting parent-child relationship); see also id. § 155.201(b) (providing that on party's timely motion court must transfer modification proceeding to county of child's residence if child has resided in other county for six months or longer). In her affidavit attached to the motion, Rusch attested that she was pregnant with TWB when she moved to Brazos County in December 2008 with CDB, who was then 15 months old, and that they have resided there since that time.
Later on December 4, Rusch filed "Respondent's Original Answer Subject to and Without Waiving Respondent's Motion to Transfer Venue" and "Respondent's Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order Subject to and Without Waiving Respondent's Motion to Transfer Venue." On December 5, the trial court signed an emergency ex parte temporary restraining order and also set a hearing for temporary orders on December 13.
Brasuel filed a response in opposition to the motion to transfer venue on December 13, the day that the hearing on temporary orders was set. Brasuel attached an affidavit to the response that in substance stated only, "The facts and allegations contained in the Response in Opposition to Motion to Transfer Venue are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct." The response to the motion did not allege any facts controverting Rusch's averment in her affidavit that the children had resided in Brazos County for over six months.
On December 13, the trial court conducted a hearing on temporary orders and on Rusch's motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. Both parties appeared with their attorneys, taking issue with whether the trial court should, or indeed could, reach Rusch's motion to transfer venue on that day. Rusch had noticed the hearing on December 4, the day she filed the motion to transfer, scheduling the hearing for December 13. Brasuel argued that the trial court should reset the hearing on the motion to transfer because he was entitled to ten days' notice. See id. § 155.204(e).
After the court heard evidence related to the temporary restraining order and the petition to modify, Rusch's attorney again urged during closing arguments that "this is not the proper county to dispose of this case in" and made one final request to the court:
Of all of the requests that petitioner is making, the attorney -- the guardian ad litem and the counseling, we would just ask that the court hold off on ruling on any of those issues until after the court has had a chance to rule on the motion to transfer venue.The court, in addition to making its temporary orders concerning residency and visitation, stated:
I'm going to order that you all go to mediation. I will not consider a transfer at any point in time , so just letting you know that , because I do -- I don't know -- I am also going to order that counseling continue with the counselor that the children are seeing in Austin, if that's still the choice that you want.(Emphasis added.) On February 8, 2018, the trial court signed the temporary orders, memorializing the orders made at the hearing, including that "[t]he Court, after examining the record and hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, finds that all necessary prerequisites of the law have been legally satisfied and that the Court has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties."
We note that when a transfer is made under Family Code Chapter 155, Subchapter C, the effect of the transfer is that "[a] court to which a transfer is made becomes the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and all proceedings in the suit are continued as if it were brought there originally." Tex. Fam. Code § 155.206.
Temporary orders
In his petition to modify, Brasuel requested that the trial court appoint him as the person with the right to designate the primary residence of the children instead of Rusch. He asserted in the petition that Rusch had engaged in a history or pattern of child neglect, making specific allegations supported by an affidavit. In his petition, he requested that Rusch's visitation with the children be supervised, or alternatively, that Rusch have the same possession order that Brasuel then had, but that CDB and TWB not be allowed to be in the same location as her other child or her husband's other children.
During the hearing, the trial court heard extensive testimony concerning Brasuel's allegations. A substantial amount of the evidence related to events from years earlier involving CDB and TWB. Some of the testimony related to events involving other children in Rusch's household, including an incident of inappropriate touching between two step-siblings that Rusch and her husband reported to CPS. The CPS caseworker testified at length about CPS's investigation. She testified that CPS did not have any concerns about the Rusches and that CPS was in the process of closing the case and had ruled out the conduct allegation. The trial court also heard conflicting testimony related to the children's present circumstances, including their hygiene and dental care, Rusch's supervision of the children, Rusch's relatively recent marriage (October 2017) and the addition of four new step-siblings to the home, the behavior of other children in the home, and the size of the home.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court ruled without referring to the Section 156.006 standard for temporary orders, stating as follows:
[There] are a lot of things that disturb me about this case. We have two parents who are actually good parents and love their children and, unfortunately, when you get a divorce and you have children, we can't split the baby. So somebody ends up, generally speaking, with more time than the other party does.
I -- I do find that, since the last order was issued by this court in this case, that there has been a material and substantial change in the lives of these children. The fact that they're on their -- their mother is on her fourth marriage and there have been kids and people involved along through their lives and the fact that these children are confused about what their last name even is is disturbing to me.
I'm going to order that the children remain with their father and he have the -- you all have joint managing conservatorship with the father having the right to determine the residence. I'm going to order standard and -- standard visitation for mom. The child [a stepsister] cannot be present at any of these visitations. They cannot play together. If she's down the street, which is -- makes it more complicated, there cannot be any contact with her.(Emphasis added.) The trial court signed the temporary orders on February 8, 2018.
Rusch filed her petition for writ of mandamus with this Court on March 15, 2018. In two issues, she complains that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) refusing to transfer the case to Brazos County and (2) issuing temporary orders that changed the divorce decree's designation of Rusch as the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children in violation of Texas Family Code Section 156.006(b).
Brasuel asserts in his response that Rusch waived her right to seek mandamus relief by unjustified delay that caused harm to him and the children. Rusch explains in her response that the court reporter did not provide her with the transcript from the hearing until January 19. As noted above, the temporary orders were not signed until February 8. On this record, we do not agree that Rusch's filing of her mandamus petition approximately two months after receiving the record shows a lack of diligence.
ANALYSIS
Standard of review
A writ of mandamus will issue to compel the performance of a ministerial act or duty. In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). "An officer's duty is ministerial when the 'law clearly spells out the duty to be performed by the official with sufficient certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion.' A mandamus action is a proper remedy to redress a failure to perform such a duty." In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d at 774 (quoting Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1991)). "Transfer of a case to a county where the child has resided for more than six months is a mandatory ministerial duty . . . ." Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief under predecessor statute to Family Code Section 155.201). Remedy by appeal is generally inadequate to protect the parties' rights to a trial in a particular venue. Id.; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(h) (establishing that order transferring or refusing to transfer proceeding is not subject to interlocutory appeal). Therefore, mandamus relief is available to compel mandatory transfer of a case to a county where the child has resided for more than six months. See Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 672-73.
A writ of mandamus will also issue to correct a clear abuse of a trial court's discretion when the party has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 226 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)); In re Serio, No. 03-14-00786-CV, 2014 WL 7458735, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's temporary orders because these orders are not appealable. See In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Coker, No. 03-17-00862-CV, 2018 WL 700033, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 23, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Mandatory venue transfer under Section 155.201
We first consider whether the trial court failed to perform its mandatory ministerial duty when it did not transfer the case to Brazos County after Rusch timely filed her motion to transfer under Section 155.201(b). Brasuel argues in his mandamus response that Rusch waived her right to mandamus relief by failing to give the trial court the opportunity to act on the requested relief because she never requested a hearing in writing or set the motion to transfer for argument before the trial court. We disagree. As explained above, Rusch noticed a hearing on the motion to transfer for the day of the hearing on temporary orders, but Brasuel argued that it was inappropriate to have the hearing that day. Rusch brought the motion to transfer to the trial court's attention several times over the course of the hearing, and at the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled, "I will not consider a transfer at any point in time." We conclude that Rusch did not waive her right to mandamus relief.
Turning to the substantive question, Section 155.201(b) provides for the mandatory transfer of venue for a modification case upon the timely motion of a party. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201(b) (requiring transfer to another county in Texas if child has resided in other county for six months or longer), .204(b) (providing that motion is timely if made on or before first Monday after 20th day after service of citation or notice of suit or before commencement of hearing, whichever is sooner). "The plain language of Section 155.201(b) demonstrates the legislature's desire that matters affecting the parent-child relationship be heard in the county of the child's residence." In re Yancey, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 12-17-00235-CV, 2017 WL 4020664, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 13, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam); see also Cassidy v. Fuller, 568 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that it is easier to prove current circumstances affecting children in county of residence).
When a timely motion to transfer is filed, "a party desiring to contest the motion must file a controverting affidavit denying that grounds for the transfer exist." Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(d) (emphasis added). If a timely motion to transfer has been filed and no controverting affidavit is timely filed, then "the proceeding shall, not later than the 21st day after the final date of the period allowed for the filing of a controverting affidavit, be transferred without a hearing to the proper court." Id. § 155.204(c). A hearing is required only if a controverting affidavit is timely filed, and each party is entitled to ten days' notice of the hearing, at which only evidence pertaining to the transfer may be taken. Id. § 155.204(e), (f).
In this case, although Brasuel filed a document titled "Petitioner's Controverting Affidavit" with his response, neither the affidavit nor the response contain any factual allegations "denying that the grounds for transfer exist," i.e., denying that the children had resided in Brazos County for six months or longer. Instead, Brasuel presented legal argument in his response advocating a different interpretation of Section 155.201(b) and the applicability of Section 155.201(c). See id. § 155.201(b), (c); see also McManus v. Wilborn, 932 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief when father had conceded child's residency and "[t]he conflict in the allegations does not arise from a factual dispute, but from differing statutory interpretations"). In fact, Brasuel acknowledged in his response that the children's residence was not in Burnet County, explaining that because he requested in his petition to modify that he be allowed to designate the primary residence of the child, and he lives in Burnet County, that "would put the children's residence back in this Court, the Court of Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction." We conclude that because no affidavit controverting the children's residency was filed and the trial court did not transfer the proceeding to Brazos County without a hearing, the trial court failed to perform its ministerial duty under Section 155.204(c). See In re Yancey, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2017 WL 4020664, at *3 (holding transfer required when no controverting affidavit was filed with respect to children and father acknowledged at hearing that they had resided in transferee county for at least six months); In re Wheeler, 177 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding) (holding trial court had ministerial duty to sever and transfer all proceedings pertaining to child who had been living with mother in Brazos County for seven years when transfer to Brazos County was sought for two children but father only controverted current residence of one child who had been living with him in Harris County for past eight months); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(c) (requiring trial court to transfer proceeding to proper court without hearing no later than 21st day after final date of period allowed for filing controverting affidavit when no controverting affidavit is filed).
Brasuel argued in the response that venue is proper in Burnet County because Rusch had waived her venue transfer because the final decree of divorce had been entered in Burnet County in October 2010 and a child-support review order had been entered in Burnet County in February 2016 without a motion to transfer venue by Rusch. But see Tex. Fam. Code § 155.201(b) (allowing filing of motion to transfer venue when suit to modify or motion to enforce order is filed in court having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of suit). Further, Brasuel argued that because Rusch filed a counterpetition to modify the parent-child relationship, Section 155.201(c) makes transfer of the suit discretionary. But see id. § 155.201(c) (providing that if suit to modify or motion to enforce order is pending when subsequent suit to modify or motion to enforce is filed, court may transfer proceeding as provided by Subsection (b) only if court could have transferred proceeding when first motion or suit was filed). Brasuel does not urge either of these arguments in his mandamus response.
In his mandamus response, Brasuel does not contend that the requested transfer is not mandatory based on the children's residence. He contends only that the trial court could not hear the motion to transfer at the December 13 hearing because he filed his "controverting affidavit" that day, requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing with ten days' notice. Accordingly, he asserts, the trial court properly refused to consider the venue transfer at the hearing because Brasuel had not had ten days' notice of a hearing on the motion to transfer. However, as we have explained, Brasuel's affidavit was not a true controverting affidavit because it did not controvert the children's residency, and without a controverting affidavit, no hearing is required. See Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(c), (d) (requiring controverting affidavit to deny that grounds for transfer exist). Brasuel further argues that because his affidavit was timely filed, even if it was insufficient, the trial court was required to hold a hearing, and Rusch should have subsequently set the motion to transfer for hearing. We disagree. Although some courts have held hearings when the controverting affidavit fails to allege grounds denying the children's residency in the requested county, the plain language of the statute requires the controverting affidavit to deny that grounds for transfer exist, and in the absence of such an affidavit, the trial court must transfer the case without a hearing. Id. In this case, the record shows that the trial court instead denied the motion to transfer without a hearing, stating, "I will not consider a transfer at any point in time, so just letting you know that . . . ." See In re Wheeler, 177 S.W.3d at 354 (holding formal written order not essential to obtaining mandamus relief when court's order is adequately reflected in reporter's record). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court failed to perform its ministerial duty to transfer the proceedings to Brazos County.
Temporary orders changing conservator with exclusive right to designate residence
In her second issue, Rusch contends that the trial court abused its discretion by entering temporary orders that changed the decree's designation of the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the children's residence from her to Brasuel. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.006(b). Rusch asserts that the trial court (1) applied an incorrect standard for changing the designation, (2) failed to make the required findings of fact before changing the designation, and (3) rendered orders that are not supported by the record. Brasuel does not dispute that the trial court did not make an explicit finding that the children's present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development, but he asserts that the record contains evidence from which this Court may imply the necessary findings that the children's present circumstances would significantly impair their emotional development.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial court retained jurisdiction to render temporary orders. Family Code Section 155.005 governs the court's jurisdiction pending the transfer of a case from a court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Silverman v. Johnson, 317 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (explaining that "particularly when mandatory venue lies in a different court—the transferring court's actions should be limited to temporary matters so that the court with continuing jurisdiction can make the permanent decisions"). Section 155.005 provides that "[d]uring the transfer of a suit from a court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the transferring court retains jurisdiction to render temporary orders." Tex. Fam. Code § 155.005(a). Accordingly, we will consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by rendering temporary orders that changed the decree's designation of Rusch as the conservator with the exclusive right to determine the children's residence.
Under Section 156.006, the trial court "may not render a temporary order" that changes which parent has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child unless the temporary order is in the child's best interest, and relevant here, "the order is necessary because the child's present circumstances would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development." Id. § 156.006(b) (emphasis added). The trial court's temporary orders do not refer to Section 156.006(b), and the trial court made no explicit findings that the children's present circumstances would significantly impair the children's physical health or emotional development. The orders state only that they "are for the safety and welfare and in the best interest of [CDB and TWB]," and that the court "finds that since the prior orders, there has been a substantial and material change in the circumstances of the parents and/or children." Furthermore, at the close of the hearing, the trial court also indicated a reliance on the incorrect standard, stating as follows: "I -- I do find that, since the last order was issued by this court in this case, that there has been a material and substantial change in the lives of these children." (Emphasis added.)
Rusch does not challenge the trial court's finding that the temporary orders are in the best interest of the children.
"Texas courts have recognized that the 'significant impairment' standard in [S]ection 156.006(b)(1) is a high one." In re Serio, 2014 WL 7458735, at *1 (citing In re Payne, No. 10-11-00402-CV, 2011 WL 6091265, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 2, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)). The standard requires "evidence of bad acts that are more grave than violation of a divorce decree or alienation of a child from a parent." Id. (citing In re C.S., 264 S.W.3d 864, 874-75 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.), for its conclusion that allegations indicating pattern of parental alienation were insufficient to support finding that child's present circumstances might significantly impair child's emotional development); see also, e.g., In re Coker, 2018 WL 700033, at *4 (citing several cases concluding that evidence presented at hearing was insufficient to establish significant impairment). Moreover, the Section 156.006(b) standard requires specific allegations as to how a child's emotional development will be significantly impaired. In re Coker, 2018 WL 700033, at *5.
This Court has addressed the Section 156.006(b) standard in a few recent cases. In In re Serio, the Court found that although the trial court ruled that Serio had engaged in behavior designed to alienate the children from the father and prevent them from having an ongoing relationship with him, the record did not contain evidence of serious acts or omissions sufficient to imply findings that the children's emotional development, in their present circumstances, would be significantly impaired. 2014 WL 7458735, at *1-2. Similarly, in In re Charles, we determined that the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the mother's interference with the father's visitation and communications with the child, the child's hygiene, and a "bad case of scabies," which allegedly occurred about eight months before the modification petition was filed, did not rise to the level of showing "significant impairment. No. 03-17-00731-CV, 2017 WL 5985524, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 1, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Most recently, in In re Coker, we concluded that the allegations of limiting communications and an inconsistent schedule for the children "at best support[ed] implied findings that Coker sought to alienate the children from their father or that she occasionally did not properly supervise the children, which would not be sufficient to satisfy the standard." 2018 WL 700033, at *5. Likewise, the children's desire not to move, the distance of the new home from the father, and an adult sibling's testimony that it was important for the children to be near their siblings did not rise to the level of evidence of bad acts more grave than a violation of the divorce decree or alienation of the children from their parents. Id. at *6.
In this case, much of the evidence before the trial court related to events from years earlier involving CDB and TWB, and in some instances, to events involving other children in Rusch's household, rather than to these children's present circumstances. As for the evidence related to Brasuel's allegations involving the children's present circumstances, the trial court heard testimony from Brasuel, Rusch, Rusch's ex-husband, the CPS caseworker, and Rusch's nanny about the children's hygiene and dental care, Rusch's supervision of the children, Rusch's recent marriage and the addition of four new step-siblings to the home, the behavior of other children in the home, and the size of the home. In particular, we note that the CPS caseworker who had assessed the home and the children's interactions testified that she had no concerns about the children's hygiene or the children's interactions and that the home was adequate and a safe environment for the children. She concluded that "the home was very cohesive, everybody loved each other and everybody was happy," and in particular, CDB and TWB "were very happy, very settled. They made -- made me feel very comfortable that they were happy at the home where they were." We conclude that the evidence on the issues of hygiene, dental care, Rusch's supervision of the children, and the size of the home does not rise to the level of serious acts or omissions from which we may imply the necessary findings that the children's present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. See In re Charles, 2017 WL 5985524, at *4 (concluding evidence related to hygiene did not meet significant-impairment standard); In re Kyburz, No. 05-15-01163-CV, 2015 WL 6935912, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 10, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same); In re Rather, No. 14-11-00924-CV, 2011 WL 6141677, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 8, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (concluding evidence related to hygiene and supervision did not meet standard); In re Escamilla, No. 04-02-00258-CV, 2002 WL 1022945, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 22, 2002, orig. proceeding) (concluding evidence related to hygiene and size of home did not meet standard).
As for the concern expressed by Brasuel and the trial court about the impact of Rusch's recent marriage and the addition of four new step-siblings on the children's emotional development, general concern is not enough to show significant impairment. "Because each child's circumstances are different, conditions that could significantly impair the emotional development of one child may not affect another child as strongly." In re Strickland, 358 S.W.3d 818, 822-23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding); see also In re Clayborn, No. 02-12-00299-CV, 2012 WL 3631243, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 24, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (concluding that father's testimony that he believed daughter needs counseling to deal with divorce and custody proceedings, absent evidence of any specific harm, was evidence of emotional distress but not significant impairment by current circumstances). There are no allegations or evidence in the record about the specific impact of these events on either child's emotional development.
As for the behavior of other children in the home, the most significant event is the incident of alleged inappropriate touching between two of the other children in Rusch's household. Again, however, there is no evidence of any serious acts or omissions related to this incident from which we may imply the necessary findings that the children's present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. Brasuel testified that he was not concerned about his children having been inappropriately touched or their safety. CPS investigated the incident, which the Rusches themselves reported, and ruled out the conduct allegation.
On this record, we conclude that the trial court lacked evidentiary support for an implied finding of significant impairment. Therefore, it abused its discretion by rendering temporary orders designating Brasuel as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the children's primary residence. See Tex. Fam. Code § 156.006(b); see also, e.g., In re Coker, 2018 WL 700033, at *6.
CONCLUSION
Having determined that the trial court failed to perform its ministerial duty to transfer the case and that it abused its discretion by rendering the temporary orders, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. We lift the temporary stay of the trial-court proceedings. We direct the trial court to vacate the temporary orders signed January 28, 2018. We further direct the trial court to immediately transfer the case to Brazos County. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(c). The writ will issue only if the court does not comply with this opinion.
/s/_________
Melissa Goodwin, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Field Filed: May 9, 2018