"* * * The mere fact that a judgment has been rendered does not prevent the court from looking into the proceedings with a view of determining the nature of the liability which has been reduced to judgment." See, also: Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 21 S.Ct. 735, 45 L.Ed. 1009; Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 23 S.Ct. 757, 47 L.Ed. 1084; Blackstock v. Blackstock, 8 Cir., 265 F. 249, 251; In re Runge, D.C.E.D.N.Y., 15 F. Supp. 31; In re Ridder, 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 524, 103 A.L.R. 719, certiorari denied Ridder v. Ridder, 297 U.S. 721, 56 S.Ct. 599, 80 L.Ed. 1005; Hylek v. Hylek, 7 Cir., 148 F.2d 300. Our conclusion is that the state court judgment debt, which was based upon the bankrupt's contractual obligation to make payments on the trust deed encumbering the home occupied by his divorced wife and children, was not dischargeable in bankruptcy and was not affected by the bankrupt's discharge.
In determining whether an agreement is one which comes within the provisions of this exemption, the Court must look to the nature of the contract itself and ascertain whether the agreement is one which merely provides for the division of property between the parties, and as such is in lieu of alimony and a bona fide property settlement agreement, or whether the contract, although denominated "property settlement agreement," is one which embodies within its terms the common law or statutory duty and, consequently, is essentially a contract for maintenance and support. In re Hollister, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1942, 47 F. Supp. 154, affirmed 2 Cir., 1943, 132 F.2d 861; Blair v. Blair, 44 Cal.App.2d 140, 112 P.2d 39; In re Adams, 2 Cir., 1928, 25 F.2d 640; In re Ridder, 2 Cir., 1935, 79 F.2d 524, certiorari denied Ridder v. Ridder, 297 U.S. 721, 56 S.Ct. 599, 80 L.Ed. 1005; In re Dean, D.C.W.D.N.Y. 1937, 17 F. Supp. 1023; In re Runge, D.C.E.D.N Y 1936, 15 F. Supp. 31; Goggans v. Osborn, supra. Looking at the contract between the bankrupt and his wife, substance, rather than form or caption, must be the test.
The addition of the words, "and other claims and demands upon the defendant by the plaintiff" does not change the basic character of the obligation assumed by the bankrupt. See In re Runge, D.C., E.D.N.Y. 1936, 15 F. Supp. 31. In the view I have taken of the facts it is unnecessary to decide whether the enumerated judgments are themselves non-dischargeable for the reason that they arose out of the obligation to support a wife and child.