Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0647-12T3
04-02-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF R.S.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Sara B. Liebman, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Koblitz and O'Connor.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket No. FJ-20-1111-12.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Sara B. Liebman, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
R.S. and J.N.L., both juveniles, were charged with offenses which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a). Before trial, J.N.L. pled guilty to the charge and agreed to testify truthfully against R.S. Following a bench trial, the court acquitted R.S. of receiving stolen property, but adjudicated him delinquent of the lesser-included offense of unlawful taking of means of conveyance, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(d). On appeal, R.S. claims the court's conclusions of law were erroneous, requiring that the adjudication be vacated. We disagree and affirm.
I.
We briefly summarize the trial court's factual findings, which R.S. does not challenge. J.N.L. and R.S., both sixteen years of age, were friends and attended the same school. On December 13, 2011, R.S. and J.N.L. were walking to a school bus stop when they passed a 1997 Toyota Corolla parked on the side of the road. The car was unoccupied and the engine was idling. The juveniles continued walking a few more feet, but J.N.L. then decided to go back and get into the car. R.S. proceeded to walk toward the bus stop, when J.N.L. drove up alongside of him and asked if he wanted a ride. R.S. got into the car and they drove toward their school.
Within minutes, two police officers noticed the car and, realizing it fit the description of a vehicle recently reported stolen, activated the lights on their vehicle and began pursuing the juveniles. Although initially J.N.L. accelerated when he realized the police were following them, he eventually pulled over, and both juveniles exited the car and were taken into custody.
At trial, R.S. disavowed having any knowledge J.N.L. had stolen the car when R.S. entered the vehicle. R.S. testified he and J.N.L. were not friends, suggesting he did not know J.N.L. well enough to appreciate he did not own or have permission to use another's car. By contrast, J.N.L. testified he and R.S. were friends and socialized daily. They walked to the school bus together each morning; during and after school they played sports and pursued girls together. J.N.L. testified R.S. was aware he did not have a car.
The trial court found J.N.L.'s testimony "highly credible," and rejected R.S.' claim he was insufficiently familiar with J.N.L. to know he did not own a car or did not have permission to use another's car. Concluding R.S. knew the car had been stolen when he entered the vehicle, the court found R.S. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(d). Under this statute, a person commits the crime of unlawful taking of means of conveyance if one enters and rides in a vehicle knowing the vehicle has been taken or is being operated without the owner's consent.
On appeal, R.S. contends the court erroneously concluded he had to have been aware the car had been stolen because he knew J.N.L. was only sixteen years of age and thus too young to have a driver's license. R.S. argues the court's reasoning was not logical, as one can drive a car with the owner's permission even if unlicensed. We do not disagree with the latter premise, but we disagree the court concluded R.S. violated the statute on this basis alone. The trial judge wrote a comprehensive opinion in which he provided a number of reasons why he found R.S. "simply not credible." One reason was that R.S. was aware J.N.L. was an unlicensed driver; thus, R.S. knew it was unlikely J.N.L. would bother to own a car, or that another would authorize J.N.L. to use his car.
When reviewing a decision resulting from a bench trial, "[t]he general rule is that [factual] findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We do not disturb the factual findings of the trial judge unless we are "convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Id. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J. at 484) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981). Here, the trial court's factual findings are amply supported by the evidence.
It is also well-established our review of a judge's conclusions of law is plenary. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, (1995) ("A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."). In this matter, the trial judge's conclusion R.S. violated the subject statute was based upon an accurate interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-10(d). We thus affirm substantially for the reason set forth in Judge Kirsch's thoughtful written opinion.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION