In re Rowe

21 Citing cases

  1. Pakulski v. Hickey

    731 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1984)   Cited 4 times
    Discussing a hearing that included "the testimony of thirty or more witnesses and a number of affidavits"

    The extradition has been delayed for a protracted period of time by a writ of habeas corpus improvidently granted by the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, on October 2, 1979. The decision of the Common Pleas Court was reversed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in a well-reasoned opinion, In re Rowe, 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 423 N.E.2d 167 (1981). The appellants also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division.

  2. McGee v. Simmons

    Case No. 98-G-2154 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1998)

    The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that when interstate extradition is sought based upon an allegation that an individual committed a felony in the demanding state and has fled to an asylum state, federal law, both constitutional and statutory, is controlling. In re Rowe (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 117. See, also, Michigan v. Doran (1978), 439 U.S. 282, 288.

  3. In re Complaint for Habeas Corpus of Beverly

    75 Ohio App. 3d 540 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 2 times
    Stating that other states have statutes of limitations which prevent prosecution if too much time has elapsed

    Thus, the original dictum in Johnson, supra, appears to have persisted in Terry. The Supreme Court of Ohio has addressed the issue of who is a "fugitive" for purposes of extradition, in In re Rowe (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 21 O.O.3d 73, 423 N.E.2d 167. As in the Johnson and Terry cases, there does not appear to have been an issue in Rowe as to whether the jurisdiction seeking extradition had had ample time to prosecute the individual before his departure from that jurisdiction.

  4. Carpenter v. Jamerson

    69 Ohio St. 2d 308 (Ohio 1982)   Cited 18 times
    Rejecting hyper-technical reading of extradition papers

    We disagree. As most recently stated in In re Rowe (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 115, paragraph two of the syllabus, " * * * a warrant issued by the Governor of Ohio pursuant to R.C. 2963.07, for extradition to the demanding state, * * * is prima facie evidence that constitutional and statutory requirements have been met." This court further stated in paragraph three of the syllabus, " * * * the burden is upon the petitioner to rebut the presumption that petitioner is prima facie in lawful custody by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

  5. State v. Adkins

    80 Ohio App. 3d 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 7 times

    (Citation omitted.) In re Rowe (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 117, 21 O.O.3d 73, 74, 423 N.E.2d 167, 169. A fugitive from justice is a person who (1) is suspected of or has been convicted of a crime, (2) is sought by the jurisdiction so that it may subject the person to its criminal justice system, and (3) has left the jurisdiction and is found within the boundaries of another.

  6. State, ex Rel. Gilpin, v. Stokes

    19 Ohio App. 3d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 7 times
    Finding extradition paperwork in order when it complied with state statute outlining requirements for demand paperwork

    Ohio has two additional considerations: (1) "fifth issue" to be considered by the court in the asylum state is whether the extradition is sought to enforce a civil liability; and (2) Ohio requires that the fugitive, if he or she asserts some invalidity of arrest under the governor's warrant, rebut its presumed validity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Carpenter v. Jamerson, 69 Ohio St.2d 308 [23 O.O.3d 290], and In re Rowe, 67 Ohio St.2d 115 [21 O.O.3d 73], followed.) APPEALS: Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.

  7. Chamberlain v. Celeste

    729 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984)   Cited 10 times
    In Chamberlain, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a timely habeas challenge to extradition, finding that an inmate who had been convicted of a crime in Arizona was properly returned to that state to serve his sentence, even though he had previously been extradited from Arizona to Ohio with the full knowledge and consent of Arizona authorities, and had been approved for release on parole in Ohio based on his exemplary conduct as a prisoner there.

    Further, where there is contradictory evidence upon the issue of fugitivity and there is substantial and credible evidence supporting a finding of fugitivity, petitioner has not met his burden. In re Rowe (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 423 N.E.2d 167. Finally, in Carpenter, [ Carpenter v. Jamerson, 69 Ohio St.2d 308, 432 N.E.2d 177 (1982)] the Supreme Court of Ohio held that an individual "charged with a crime" who has not satisfied the judgment against him is a fugitive from justice where he is unable to rebut by proof beyond a reasonable doubt the presumption of fugitivity attached to the governor's warrant. In the habeas proceeding sub judice, the extradition request asserts that the petitioner is "obligated to serve the remainder of his sentence in the State of Arizona."

  8. Koenig v. Poskochil

    238 Neb. 118 (Neb. 1991)   Cited 2 times

    Because petitioner challenges his alleged status as a fugitive, a court of the asylum state has jurisdiction to consider the issue. See, State v. Smith, 232 Kan. 128, 652 P.2d 703 (1982); In re Rowe, 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 423 N.E.2d 167 (1981). We therefore consider whether identifying petitioner as a fugitive affects his rights.

  9. State v. Pakulski

    326 N.C. 434 (N.C. 1990)   Cited 41 times
    Noting the general rule that an arrest of judgment vacates the verdict while recognizing the exception for arrests of judgment necessary "to avoid a double jeopardy problem"

    Although a Haywood County Grand Jury returned true bills of indictment against the defendants charging them with murder in the first degree on 17 September 1978, extradition litigation in Ohio delayed trial until May of 1984. See Pakulski v. Hickey, 731 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Rowe, 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 423 N.E.2d 167 (1981). In the meantime, a Haywood County Grand Jury had returned additional indictments charging the defendants with robbery with a dangerous weapon, larceny of a motor vehicle, felonious breaking or entering, larceny, and conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to break or enter.

  10. State v. Pakulski

    319 N.C. 562 (N.C. 1987)   Cited 72 times
    Holding new trial required where trial court instructed jury on alternative theory unsupported by the evidence

    On 29 January 1979, a Haywood County grand jury returned true bills of indictment against defendants Mitchell John Pakulski and Elliott Clifford Rowe, charging them with first-degree murder of Willard Setzer. Because of extradition litigation in Ohio and later in the federal court (see Pakulski v. Hickey, 731 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Rowe, 67 Ohio St.2d 115, 423 N.E.2d 167 (1981)), the defendants were not transported to North Carolina until 9 March 1984. On 5 April 1984, the Haywood County grand jury returned additional indictments charging defendants with robbery of Setzer with a dangerous weapon, larceny of Setzer's automobile, felonious breaking or entering of Dr. Guy Abbate's office, felonious larceny and possession of property belonging to Dr. Abbate, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to break or enter.