Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. JD08-3186
Richman, J.
Nicole W. appeals from the dispositional order of the San Francisco Juvenile Court declaring her son Ronnie H. a dependent child and removing him from her custody. She contends: (1) the court’s jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence; (2) her son’s situation was incorrectly handled as a dependency proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, when it should have been treated as a delinquency proceeding under section 600; and (3) Ronnie should not have been removed from her custody. We reject these contentions and affirm.
Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND
By the summer of 2008, appellant had apparently come to the end of her tether in dealing with Ronnie. Four times that year she had already temporarily entrusted him to Huckleberry House, a San Francisco shelter for teens. The staff found Ronnie unmanageable, and declined appellant’s request to take him for an extended placement. Appellant declined the shelter’s recommendation to seek the help of child protective services, sending him instead to his father in Fresno. This was also unsuccessful: in June Ronnie was declared a ward of the Fresno Juvenile Court.
On July 2, 2008, appellant accepted the recommendation of Huckleberry House staff and left Ronnie at the child protection center operated by respondent San Francisco Human Services Agency. Treating this as “abandonment,” respondent filed a petition seeking to have Ronnie made a dependent child. The petition had ten allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), as to why Ronnie qualified as a dependent child. On July 9, the court granted respondent’s motion to have Ronnie detained.
Respondent has had periodic dealings with Ronnie and appellant going back to his birth as “a cocaine and marijuana addicted infant.” This is Ronnie’s third dependency proceeding. The details were stated in the petition as follows: “Petition 511162 was dismissed on or about 10/26/95, dependency on petition JD04-3036 was declared on or about 2/20/04 and dismissed on or about 7/15/05, and dependency on petition JD06-3107 was declared on or about 6/7/06 and dismissed on or about 11/29/07.”
The jurisdictional hearing was originally set for later in July, but was repeatedly continued to November 17. During this period Ronnie continued to have behavioral problems with criminal manifestations. Initial placement with a relative did not work, leading respondent to ask for Ronnie to be placed in foster care.
One of the reasons for continuing the jurisdictional hearing was that Ronnie had run away from his placement, and for a week there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.
On October 16, 2008, respondent filed an amended petition that had eight allegations under subdivision (b), one under subdivision (c), and one—involving Ronnie’s father—under subdivision (g). On October 21, appellant demurred to the amended petition on the ground that “the allegations in the petition are not sufficient to state a cause of action, and are vague and ambiguous under section 300.”
On November 17, the court conducted a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The first witness at the hearing was Jay Boronski, the case manager at Huckleberry House, which he described as “a crisis shelter in San Francisco. It works with kids between 11 and 17 that are having short-term crisis. It is a shelter where kids come and stay, and we will work with them and their families and try to rectify the situation and get them back home.” Ronnie stayed at Huckleberry House “probably six or seven times over the three years” that Boronski worked there during 2005 to April 2008.
Boronski further testified that Ronnie “had come [in] three times over a month, and each time that he had come, we did not have the family reunification session. He would either... run away from the program or we were unable to schedule the family reunification session with his mom. So he was, basically, coming and staying and going, which is not what we identified as sort of our program. [¶] So I think the last time that I had contact with the family was on the 29th of [May 2008]. What happened was I got a call from his mom saying that she was gonna drop him off at Huckleberry House.... She said that she couldn’t handle him anymore, he was beyond her control, and she intended to not take him back. [¶] So I directed her at that point to call child protective services... because we had made a decision as a team that we were no longer [a] help to the family, we were unable to control him while he was at Huckleberry House, and the family wasn’t participating in the program.” Boronski characterized “the gist of the conversation was, I don’t know what to do with him anymore. I can’t take him. You have to take him. We’re done. I’m done.”
Philip Zaragoza, an employee of respondent, testified to the circumstances of appellant leaving Ronnie at the child protective center on July 3, 2008. “I asked her if there were relatives or family members that would be considered for placement, or any other alternatives, and she said no.... [¶]... [¶] In the course of our conversation... we....discussed pursuing services. I asked her if she would consider being involved and participating in therapy with him. [¶]... [¶] Mother responded, quotes, ‘No, we tried it. It didn’t work.’ I asked her if she would be considering visiting Ronnie while he was in shelter. She said, ‘Yes.’ Then I asked her if she would be willing to meet with the social worker, and she said, ‘If I had to.’ ”
Colleen Sevigne, a case worker with respondent, testified that appellant did bring Ronnie “to the child protection center due to his behavior, lying, stealing, running away and being truant from school, and she just said she had had it with him, that she was abandoning him. She just... couldn’t deal with him right at the moment.”
Ms. Sevigne further testified that she prepared the detention report, which was received in evidence, and in which she recommended that Ronnie be placed in foster care. When asked if she tried “to give services to Ronnie’s mother in this case?” she replied: “I first talked to her, mother, on the third.... She said he was recently brought up to her from his father, the dad and the girlfriend sent him up without the mother’s knowledge. She said she had been through three family counselors, and they finished counseling in November... of the prior year, because she felt she could do it on her own at that time. Then she said she either felt like she had to take him to CPC or kick him out to the streets, and she didn’t want to—she was... concerned about his safety. So she didn’t want to just kick him out on the street. [¶]... [¶]... She said that she would take him back at some point but she did not want counseling. Then I have this in quotes, that, ‘I don’t need it.’ She said she had finished parenting classes two times. Then she said she needed higher help. So she was a bit ambivalent about... wanting help or what kind of help that she wanted.”
Debra Culwell testified that she is the current case worker, having taken over from Ms. Sevigne near the end of July. Ms. Culwell prepared the disposition report, and an addendum, in which she recommended that Ronnie—who is currently placed in a residential program in Turlock—be declared a dependent and remain placed in respondent’s custody. Appellant had made two trips there to visit Ronnie, although she is allowed weekly visitation. According to Ms. Culwell, Ronnie is doing well in his placement, but appellant declined to participate in a parenting class: “She informed me that she had participated in parenting in the past and didn’t see a reason to do it again.” In light of Ronnie’s problems, Ms. Culwell believed he should remain at the Turlock facility—“[T]his is the most stable I have seen Ronnie... in this very structured setting, and I continue to believe that [it] is the most appropriate place for him at this time.”
On cross-examination by appellant’s counsel, Ms. Culwell admitted that Ronnie had no physical injuries when he was admitted to the child protective center, and that “He has stated that he loves his mother.” Appellant recently expressed her desire to resume having custody of Ronnie, that “she was ready to handle Ronnie now.” Due to recent acts of criminality, and a pending delinquency in which Ronnie “had already failed home detention and was back in custody,” Ms. Culwell unsuccessfully recommended that his situation should be not be treated as a dependency, but as a delinquency where Ronnie could get “probation officer supervision in order to modify his behavior.” After Ms. Culwell gave Ronnie a stern talking-to, explaining to him “how to make changes that could improve his situation and lead to a less restrictive environment,” his behavior at Turlock did improve.
Ms. Culwell testified that her recommendation was made in the context of “a discussion during a 241.” This is apparently a reference to section 241.1, which is discussed post.
Ms. Culwell further testified that Ronnie had five unsuccessful placements—one with a relative—after arriving at CPC until he was placed at the Turlock facility. Ronnie is the subject of pending delinquency proceeding, but he has not yet been formally adjudged a delinquent by the San Francisco Juvenile Court.
Ms. Culwell testified that Ronnie needs a structured environment. In October, appellant agreed that Ronnie would benefit from a more structured setting than she could provide. At the Turlock facility, Ronnie is getting anger management, substance abuse, and individual therapy.
Appellant testified that she was pregnant when she dropped Ronnie off at the child protective center. She did so because “I didn’t know what else to do.” Appellant thought Ronnie’s stay would only be temporary. She believed Ronnie should come back to her because “him having probation over his head... we can do this by oursel[ves]. I know we can do this. By him having that over his head, I know we could... be a nice family.” Asked why she thought returning Ronnie to her would be better for him than having him continue in the Turlock program, appellant replied: “He is my son. I love him. I mean, he will do right. I mean, he will do right. I know he will. It was just a little phase he was going through and I agreed with it, but I know it would be right.” If Ronnie were returned to her, and if it was made a condition of his probation, appellant was willing to participate in family therapy with him.
After hearing argument, the court amended allegations B1 and B7 of the petition, sustained them as amended, and sustained allegations B2, B3, B5, and B8, and G1. The court’s dispositional order was as follows:
“Proceeding, then to disposition, the court does find by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial risk that this child will continue to suffer emotional harm unless he is removed from the custody of his parents at this time.
“I want to make clear what my thinking is on this case. I think Ronnie is doing well and he needs to successfully complete this program and gain the skills to help him control his own behavior. I think mom is well meaning and very loving, but disciplining is not structure. They are different. I think she minimizes, unfortunately, the emotional ramifications of his history and... the documentation of neglect, abuse and domestic violence and substance abuse have left some lasting marks on him. He needs to be able to work through some of that. I know mom wants to be helpful, but discipline isn’t the only approach to this.
“So I think our goal here is successful reunification, and that will take some work on Ronnie’s part but also work on mom’s part. So that is the basis of my thinking and my findings on the allegations of the petition, I believe, also support a finding that the minor is a dependent of the court, and at this time is removed from the custody of his mom and placed out of home under the supervision of the Human Services Agency. The court approves placement in a level 12 facility [i.e., such as the current Turlock placement] that seems to be addressing his needs. The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts have been offered or provided in an attempt to prevent or eliminate the need for continued removal from the home.”
The court did not rule on appellant’s demurrer.
The only mention of the demurrer was at the start of the hearing, when appellant’s counsel and the court made these remarks:
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant purports to appeal from the underlying jurisdictional findings as well as the dispositional order. However, as even the authorities cited in her brief hold, only the order is appealable. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196 [“had the court found the allegations of the petition true, the jurisdictional finding would have been nonappealable”]; In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 950 [“A jurisdictional finding, while not appealable, may be reviewed in an appeal from the dispositional order.”].)
DISCUSSION
The Jurisdictional Findings Are Supported By Substantial Evidence
Appellant first contends, to quote the caption of her brief, that “the allegations of the petition, as amended, and sustained by the court, are insufficient to establish juvenile court jurisdiction.” She would probably be entitled to raise the issue of the validity of the petition because she did try to attack it in the juvenile court. (Compare In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 328 [demurrer required to preserve issue], with In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [demurrer not required.) However, the apparent suggestion in her caption notwithstanding, appellant is challenging only the evidentiary sufficiency of the allegations in the petition that were sustained by the juvenile court, and which furnished the basis for the court to declare Ronnie a dependent child. This contention is without merit.
Appellant’s contention is governed by well-established rules: “The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence in dependency cases is governed by the same rules that apply to all appeals. If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. [Citation.] We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. [Citation.] The appellant has the burden of showing the finding or order is not supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 250-251.)
The scope of the task appellant presents appears daunting. The allegations of the petition that the juvenile court sustained—some of which were amended—read as follows:
“B1—The mother left the child at the child protection center on 7/02/08 when she left the child there stating she was no longer able to care for him.
“B2—The mother has a history of failing to protect the child as he has been a dependent of the court on three previous occasions due to mother’s inability to care for the minor’s special needs, mother’s inability to protect the child from domestic violence, and the minor being born with a positive toxicology screen.
“B3—The mother has previously failed to comply with offered services including missing arranged meetings with the child welfare worker on August 11, 13, and 14, 2008, and refusing to participate in therapy with the child on July 3 and 7, 2008.
“B5—The mother failed to protect the child from the physical abuse of her boyfriend in that on or about 9/02/08, when mother was present, mother’s boyfriend, Elgin Rose, slammed the child against a vehicle.
“B7—The mother was arrested for the sale of rock cocaine on or about 7/24/08. Further, on 9/04/08 the child welfare worker smelled an odor consistent with marijuana in the mother’s home.
“B8—The family has an extensive child welfare history including documentation of neglect, physical abuse, caretaker incapacity, domestic violence, and substance abuse.
“G1—The father is unable to care for the child and has expressed no interest in reunification.”
We need not march through each and every one of these allegations because only one is sufficient to establish jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Where one basis for jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence, we need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support other bases for jurisdiction. (E.g., In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72; In re Dirk S. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1045; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875.) And we recall that the juvenile court uses only the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine if the minor is a person described in section 300. (E.g., In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)
Section 300 provides in pertinent part: “Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [¶]... [¶] (b) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent....” The general thrust of appellant’s arguments is that, read literally, all of the allegations look to past acts or omissions that do not have the predictive value to satisfy subdivision (b). For example, with respect to allegation B1, appellant argues that there is nothing to show that dropping Ronnie off at the child protective center “in any way created a substantial risk that [he] would suffer any serious physical harm or illness as a result of her placing him at the shelter.” And with respect to allegation B2, “The prior dependencies do not demonstrate a current substantial risk of physical harm or illness” to Ronnie.
The petition is not to be subjected to examination that partakes of hair-splitting. Even as a pleading matter, the petition would be subject to the rules governing demurrers (e.g., In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 480), and foremost among those rules is that the petition would have to be given a common sense reading from the entirety of its allegations, and reasonable inferences. (E.g., Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6; see In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1038, fn. 8 [“Given that lay social workers are usually lumbered with the task of writing petitions, they must be given a certain amount of slack.”].) From that perspective, the allegations have an almost Dickensian tinge that cannot be stripped of pertinency to Ronnie’s future development. Ronnie was virtually born a dependent, and has been one periodically thereafter. He has been a recent victim of physical abuse by appellant’s boyfriend, which she did not prevent. The difficulties of his life so far was characterized by the case worker who drafted the petition as “an extensive child welfare history” that included “neglect, physical abuse, caretaker incapacity, domestic violence and substance abuse.” The natural father is no longer in the picture. Things had reached the point that appellant had in effect thrown up her hands in despair and voluntarily surrendered him to child protective services. An entirely reasonable inference deducible from the allegations is that, for whatever reason, appellant is not able, by herself and in the circumstances currently prevailing, to raise a troubled teenager. Even now, as will be seen with her next contention, appellant continues to view her son as uncontrollable by her.
In making jurisdictional findings, the question before the juvenile court is whether the current circumstances subject the child to the risk of harm specified in section 300. Although proof of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, past conduct, standing alone, is not enough to support jurisdictional findings. The court must have some reason to believe such conduct is likely to continue in the future. (E.g., In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.)
In her disposition report, social worker Culwell succinctly summarized why she recommended placement of Ronnie outside appellant’s custody: “The family history is very alarming in this case. Ronnie has been involved with this court on 3 different occasions. Each time, his issues appear to increase or become more worrisome. Unfortunately, his problems have now crossed over into the criminal court system. It appears that his unstable upbringing by his mother and father, which included domestic violence and substance abuse have impacted Ronnie in a very significant way. [¶]... [¶] There is a need for court intervention and placement, and return of the child would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or emotional or physical well being of the child because the mother and father lack the parenting skills to keep the minor safe in her home.” In her addendum to that report, Ms. Culwell noted that even after Ronnie had been detained, appellant was still exposing him to physical abuse at the hands of her boyfriend. Culwell recommended that appellant (1) successfully complete a parenting education program focusing on teen behavior”; (2) develop and agree to a reunification case plan; and (3) “participate in family therapy with the child and follow through with treatment recommendations.”
The domestic violence between appellant and her boyfriend would arguably be enough by itself to confer jurisdiction. Children are “[o]bviously... put in a position of physical danger from [such] violence.” (In re Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.) While juvenile court jurisdiction may not be justified by isolated instances of domestic violence which do not involve the children (see In re Alysha S., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 398), that is not the situation here. Here, there is a pattern of violence directed against Ronnie that appellant was unable to prevent, particularly because she did not seem even to recognize its impact. The juvenile court was not required to accept appellant’s assurance that “I don’t think it is a problem” if Ronnie again came into contact with her boyfriend, whom appellant showed no indication of giving up. All of this could be interpreted as showing the distinct possibility that Ronnie would be at substantial risk if he was returned to appellant’s unsupervised care. (See In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169.)
Asked “is it safe to say that some of the problems that occurred with Ronnie had to do with your relationship with Mr. Rose,” appellant replied, “I don’t think so.” When asked, “And when Mr. Rose is around, Ronnie’s behavior is negative, isn’t that true?” she answered “No.”
There was also substantial reason to doubt appellant’s professions of maternal purpose. Her desire to have the probation officer enlisted to help keep Ronnie in line seems a clear indication that she recognized she could not do the job by herself. Appellant’s past history gave scant cause for assurance that she was now able to handle Ronnie, particularly in light of the fact that she had just given birth, and the new member of the family would naturally absorb a considerable amount of appellant’s time and attention. Appellant showed no indication that she was willing to acquire the parenting tools that would prevent a recurrence of Ronnie again getting out of her control (“we can do this by ourself”). She was dismissive of respondent’s past efforts to assist her and Ronnie (“we... decided we didn’t need therapy,” And, “We didn’t gain nothing from it,” and the extent of her son’s problems (“It was just a little phase he was going through”). Appellant seemed unconcerned with Ronnie’s improvement at the Turlock facility (“he has his ups and downs,” and “he will do much better because he will be home with me”), while conceding “he do do well when he is in a structured environment.”
The fact that there was not a substantial period of time between the second and third of Ronnie’s past dependencies and this one (see fn. 2, ante), could also be treated as indicative of the potential of future harm. (See In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439-1440.) Appellant’s refusal to avail herself of any of the services offered by Huckleberry House, and respondent, plus—in the juvenile court’s words—appellant’s “minimiz[ing]... the emotional ramifications of [Ronnie’s] history,” was also probative on her ability to change her behavior to help her son. And, as pointed out by social worker Culwell, past events have had future consequences for Ronnie. (See In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision”].) Moreover, the juvenile court could take into account appellant’s admission to social worker Culwell—which appellant made only one month before the hearing—that Ronnie needed more structure in his life than she could provide.
In light of these circumstances, the juvenile court was within its authority as the trier of fact to make a realistic evaluation of the likelihood of her anticipated success in the light of her history of disappointing such hopes. (See In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824; In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1460.) We conclude there is substantial evidence to support allegations B1, B2, B3, B5, and B8 of the petition. It follows that the juvenile court did not err in finding jurisdiction over Ronnie as a dependent child.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err By Treating Ronnie As A Dependant, Not As A Delinquent
Describing her son as “a classic example of a teen described under section 601 or 602,” that is, “a child who is involved in delinquent behavior and is beyond parental control,”... not section 300, subdivision (b),” appellant contends in effect that Ronnie should be treated as a delinquent, not a dependent.
The governing statute is section 241.1 (see fn. 4 and accompanying text, ante), which provides:
“Whenever a minor appears to come within the description of both Section 300 and Section 601 or 602, the county probation department and the child welfare department shall, pursuant to a jointly developed written protocol... initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The recommendations of both departments shall be presented to the juvenile court in which the petition is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate for the minor....” (§ 241.1, subd. (a).).
“Whenever a minor who is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court of a county pursuant to Section 300, 601, or 602 is alleged to come within the description of Section 300, 601, or 602 by another county, the county probation department or child welfare services department in the county that has jurisdiction under Section 300, 601, 602 and the county probation department or child welfare services department of the county alleging the minor to be within one of those sections shall initially determine which status will serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society. The recommendations of both departments shall be presented to the juvenile court with the petition that is filed on behalf of the minor, and the court shall determine which status is appropriate for the minor....” (§ 241.1, subd. (c).)
It would appear that Ronnie’s situation could fit within either of these subdivisions. He was the subject of both dependency and delinquency petitions in San Francisco. He was also the subject of the dependency in San Francisco and the delinquency in Fresno. However, appellant cannot establish that authorities did not comply with the statute. We would not presume noncompliance (Evid. Code, § 664), and appellant points to nothing in the record showing otherwise. Indeed, appellant’s counsel at the hearing stated that “Under ordinary circumstances, if [section] 601 were still a viable option, that [placement at Huckleberry House] would be the remedy for this particular case.” The language we have italicized can be read as inferential proof that the responsible authorities did comply with section 241.1, and the court had decided to have the matter treated as a dependency; that would explain why counsel characterized delinquency section 601 as no longer “a viable option.” We therefore conclude that appellant has not met her burden of showing from the record that the error claimed actually occurred. (E.g., In re Kathy P. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 91, 102; In re L.B. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1424; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 628, p. 704.)
The Juvenile Court’s Placement Order Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
“A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents...with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s... physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
Section 361 allows removal of the minor from the parent’s custody at the dispositional hearing where “ ‘return of the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being,’ [Citation.]” (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 720.) “A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and proof of a potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citation.]” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on other grounds in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 6.) A parent’s level of denial is an appropriate factor to consider when determining the risk to the child if placed with the parent. (See In re Esmeralda B., supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044.)
Although the juvenile court is required to observe the clear and convincing standard, on appeal the reviewing court checks only whether the juvenile court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 440 441; In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 693-694.) Appellant’s final contention is the decision not to return Ronnie to her custody does not have that support. She is wrong.
We need not prolong this opinion beyond noting that the same reasons discussed above for finding substantial evidence to sustain the petition’s allegations are equally valid in establishing a sound basis for the juvenile court’s decision not to return Ronnie to appellant’s custody. Only one additional point warrants mention here. Ronnie has a demonstrated history of past escapes from Huckleberry House and from a less restrictive placement (see fn. 3, ante). The court might assign this factor particular significance in deciding that appellant could not maintain unassisted control of her son, because an unsupervised teenager on the streets is a situation sufficiently fraught with harm that a court would obviously try to avoid. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re H.E., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 720; In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136.)
DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Haerle, J.
“MR. GONZALEZ: Your Honor, if I may. I had filed a demurrer with the court, and it was in Department 425 and there was no ruling on it. We were simply caught up with the fact that we couldn’t get enough time in that trial court. So it was sent over here, and I made a note of that to myself to bring that to the court’s attention.
“THE COURT: That should have been taken care of over there.
“MR. GONZALEZ: I know. Well, for whatever reason, it was not.
“THE COURT: It is not on my radar. I haven’t read the papers. Well, we are proceeding.
“MR. GONZALEZ: All right.
“THE COURT: I will look at it over lunch. That is the best I can do.”