KRAMER, Associate Judge: This case returns to the Court of Appeals from the Board on Professional Responsibility ("Board") after a remand in In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311 (D.C. 2003) ( "Romansky I"). In its first Report and Recommendation, the Board found that the respondent had committed three distinct violations of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(C), which provides, "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .
To begin, fraudulent inducement is not necessary to establish dishonest intent. In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) ("[D]ishonesty does not always depend on a finding of intent to defraud or deceive.") (quoting In re Estate of Corriea , 719 A.2d 1234, 1242 (D.C. 1998) ). The fact that Schuman was a passive recipient of refunds that he wrongly retained, as opposed to actively soliciting the money through fraud, does not preclude the Board from determining he acted dishonestly.
Similarly, recklessness is misconduct requiring “ ‘a conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts that would disclose this danger to any reasonable person.’ ” In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 316 (D.C.2003), quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 302 (1989). District of Columbia law does not generally recognize varying degrees of negligence. Hernandez v. District of Columbia, 845 F.Supp.2d 112, 116 (D.D.C.2012).
"[D]ishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation are four different violations, that may require different quantums of proof." In re Romansky ("Romansky I"), 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003). Dishonesty is the most capacious of the four, id., and the only violation relevant here.
He has not done so in this case. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (7th ed. 1999) (recklessness is a "state of mind in which a person does not care about the consequences of his or her action") (quoted in In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 316 (D.C. 2003)). To begin with, since the twin Haar decisions, this is only the first case to reach the court in which misappropriation arose from a dispute about ownership of entrusted funds and failure to segregate them under Rule 1.15(c).
Even if an attorney's conduct does not fall within legal definitions of fraud or misrepresentation, it can still be considered dishonest for the purposes of Rule 8.4(c). In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) ("[W]hat may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty." (quoting In re Shorter , 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990) )).
Thus, what may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty. In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). The Board's findings of fact regarding Rule 8.
In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).
Fraud "embraces all the multifarious means ... resorted to by one individual to gain advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of the truth," In re Austin , 858 A.2d 969, 976 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Shorter , 570 A.2d at 767 n.12 ), and, unlike dishonesty, requires a showing of intent to defraud or deceive. In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003). Misrepresentation, finally, is an untrue or incorrect representation, statement, or account.
It requires a “ ‘choice of a course of action.’ ” In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 316 (D.C.2003) (quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 302). To “disregard” is to “ignore or treat as unimportant.”