In re Romansky

17 Citing cases

  1. In re Romansky

    938 A.2d 733 (D.C. 2007)   Cited 8 times

    KRAMER, Associate Judge: This case returns to the Court of Appeals from the Board on Professional Responsibility ("Board") after a remand in In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311 (D.C. 2003) ( "Romansky I"). In its first Report and Recommendation, the Board found that the respondent had committed three distinct violations of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(C), which provides, "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .

  2. In re Schuman

    251 A.3d 1044 (D.C. 2021)   Cited 5 times
    Evaluating charges of "commingling and intentional misappropriation of client funds" and "failure to keep proper records" brought under Rule 1.15

    To begin, fraudulent inducement is not necessary to establish dishonest intent. In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) ("[D]ishonesty does not always depend on a finding of intent to defraud or deceive.") (quoting In re Estate of Corriea , 719 A.2d 1234, 1242 (D.C. 1998) ). The fact that Schuman was a passive recipient of refunds that he wrongly retained, as opposed to actively soliciting the money through fraud, does not preclude the Board from determining he acted dishonestly.

  3. Mero v. City Segway Tours of Washington DC, LLC

    962 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2013)   Cited 7 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that liability waiver signed by plaintiff who paid for Segway tour in advance was supported by consideration in form of defendant's provision of Segway and guided tour where confirmation email warned that he would have to sign liability waiver prior to tour

    Similarly, recklessness is misconduct requiring “ ‘a conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts that would disclose this danger to any reasonable person.’ ” In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 316 (D.C.2003), quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 302 (1989). District of Columbia law does not generally recognize varying degrees of negligence. Hernandez v. District of Columbia, 845 F.Supp.2d 112, 116 (D.D.C.2012).

  4. In re Dobbie

    305 A.3d 780 (D.C. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    "[D]ishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation are four different violations, that may require different quantums of proof." In re Romansky ("Romansky I"), 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003). Dishonesty is the most capacious of the four, id., and the only violation relevant here.

  5. In re Midlen

    885 A.2d 1280 (D.C. 2005)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that disbarment is "almost invariably" required if the attorney acts intentionally or recklessly in misappropriating client funds

    He has not done so in this case. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (7th ed. 1999) (recklessness is a "state of mind in which a person does not care about the consequences of his or her action") (quoted in In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 316 (D.C. 2003)). To begin with, since the twin Haar decisions, this is only the first case to reach the court in which misappropriation arose from a dispute about ownership of entrusted funds and failure to segregate them under Rule 1.15(c).

  6. In re Bailey

    283 A.3d 1199 (D.C. 2022)   Cited 5 times
    Imposing sanction of one-year suspension and fitness requirement for violation of Rules 1.4 and (b), 1.5, 1.5(e), and 8.4(c) and (d) after respondent failed to keep his client reasonably informed, charged an unreasonable fee, was dishonest with his client, and "downplayed and refused to accept responsibility for the ways in which he failed [his client]"

    Even if an attorney's conduct does not fall within legal definitions of fraud or misrepresentation, it can still be considered dishonest for the purposes of Rule 8.4(c). In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) ("[W]hat may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty." (quoting In re Shorter , 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990) )).

  7. In re Johnson

    275 A.3d 268 (D.C. 2022)   Cited 6 times
    Treating an argument as waived because it consisted of only "vague one-line conclusory assertions" and "failed to cite authority in this jurisdiction or any other support"

    Thus, what may not legally be characterized as an act of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation may still evince dishonesty. In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). The Board's findings of fact regarding Rule 8.

  8. In re Johnson

    No. 19-BG-240 (D.C. May. 26, 2022)

    In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).

  9. In re Ekekwe-Kauffman

    210 A.3d 775 (D.C. 2019)   Cited 20 times
    Explaining that in disciplinary proceedings, an "[u]ndue delay may result in a due process violation" when "the respondent demonstrates actual prejudice—that is, that the delay in prosecution impaired [his] defense"

    Fraud "embraces all the multifarious means ... resorted to by one individual to gain advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of the truth," In re Austin , 858 A.2d 969, 976 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Shorter , 570 A.2d at 767 n.12 ), and, unlike dishonesty, requires a showing of intent to defraud or deceive. In re Romansky , 825 A.2d 311, 315 (D.C. 2003). Misrepresentation, finally, is an untrue or incorrect representation, statement, or account.

  10. Lynch v. Masters Sec.

    126 A.3d 1125 (D.C. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    It requires a “ ‘choice of a course of action.’ ” In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311, 316 (D.C.2003) (quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 302). To “disregard” is to “ignore or treat as unimportant.”