Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV119631
ROBIE, J.
Roman S., a minor, appeals from a probation condition restricting him from traveling outside a 10-mile radius (except in specific circumstances) which was imposed following a finding that he resisted arrest. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the probation condition or alternatively, that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of the condition. We shall affirm.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 21, 2005, a Welfare & Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed, alleging defendant had possessed and brought a weapon onto school grounds. Defendant admitted the charge, was adjudged a ward of the court, and was granted probation. One of the general conditions of probation was that he “Not go beyond 10 miles from home until age 18 except (1) for purposes of employment that has been approved by the Probation Officer in advance or (2) if accompanied by a responsible adult who is approved by the parent, group home official, probation or school official.” There was no objection to this condition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
In November 2005, defendant admitted he had violated probation by being suspended from school for misconduct. He was reinstated on probation, and the general condition restricting his travel was reimposed. There was no objection to the reimposition of this condition.
In January 2006, a subsequent petition was filed charging defendant with driving without a license and speeding. Defendant lost control of a car and crashed into a tree. The juvenile intake report noted defendant had repeatedly been told not to loiter at the Albertsons’s shopping center in Natomas, but continued to do so. It also noted he was associating with a group called the “Hot Boys,” a “reported up and coming gang in the Natomas area.”
While that matter was pending, defendant was arrested for resisting arrest when officers tried to detain him for a suspected burglary. Accordingly, in February 2006, an additional subsequent petition was filed. The probation officer also noted a concern with defendant’s “emergent involvement in gang activity.”
Defendant admitted driving without a license and admitted resisting arrest. He was continued as a ward of the court and committed to his mother’s custody. He was granted probation and the condition restricting his travel to within a 10-mile radius of his home was reimposed. There was no objection to this condition.
On December 22, 2006, a violation of probation petition was filed, alleging defendant had been absent from school and tardy without an excuse, that he had been suspended twice for misconduct, and had used marijuana. The social study report noted the family had moved from the Natomas area to the Elk Grove area and defendant had changed schools.
While the probation violation was pending, a subsequent petition was filed on January 19, 2007. This petition alleged defendant had committed a battery on another student on school property and resisted arrest. The battery charge was subsequently dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion. Following a court trial, the court found defendant had resisted arrest and sustained the subsequent petition. The violation of probation petition was dismissed.
Defendant was continued as a ward of the court and was committed to the youth center. As for probation, the court noted, “He’s been on probation. Got all the terms and conditions.” Defense counsel argued against the imposition of a condition requiring defendant to stay away from one of the people involved in the fight. The court imposed the stay away condition, and continued, “[t]he rest of these are all conditions of probation he’s already on, correct [defense counsel]?” Defense counsel responded that they were. This included the general condition that defendant not go beyond 10 miles from his home until age 18, except for purposes of employment approved by the probation officer or if accompanied by a responsible approved adult. No objection was made to any of the other probation conditions, including the travel limitation.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in imposing the probation condition prohibiting him from traveling more than 10 miles from his home without permission from the probation department or the accompaniment of an approved adult. Defendant also contends this probation condition impinges on his constitutional right to travel. Defendant has forfeited these claims by failing to object to the probation condition below.
Defendant contends this claim is not forfeited, relying on In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 886-887, claiming the case presents a pure question of law. We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the claim. In finding that a probation condition that defendant “not associate with anyone disapproved of by probation” was overbroad, the Supreme Court in Sheena K. found that defendant could object for the first time on appeal because the objection was based on a constitutional challenge which presented a pure question of law. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 875, 887-888.) That is, the challenge was to a “facial constitutional defect in the relevant probation condition” and was “capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 887.)
The court went on, however, to “caution, . . . our conclusion does not apply in every case in which a probation condition is challenged on a constitutional ground. As stated by the court in [In re] Justin S. [(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811], we do not conclude that ‘all constitutional defects in conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on appeal, since there may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” [Citation.] In those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection and waiver principles encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the trial court.” [Citation.]’ (Justin S., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 815, fn. 2.) We also emphasize that generally, given a meaningful opportunity, the probationer should object to a perceived facial constitutional flaw at the time a probation condition is initially imposed in order to permit the trial court to consider, and if appropriate in the exercise of its informed judgment, to effect a correction.” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
The probation condition imposed in this case does not present a pure question of law which can be resolved without reference to the record developed in the trial court. (See, e.g., In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1373; In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941-942; In re Daniel R. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1, 7-8.) Defendant’s argument itself demonstrates this point. Defendant argues the condition was invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, in that it “‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’” (Lent,at p. 486.) This is a challenge to the reasonableness of the probation condition, not its facial constitutionality. (In re Justin S., supra,93 Cal.App.4th at p. 813 & fn. 1.) Challenges to the reasonableness of a probation condition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-235; In re Justin S., at pp. 814-815.) Defendant appears to concede this point in his reply brief.
Defendant, however, continues to contend the condition improperly impinges on his fundamental right to travel. We are not persuaded. “[J]uvenile [probation] conditions may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders. This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed. The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents. And a parent may ‘curtail a child’s exercise of the constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent’s own constitutionally protected “liberty” includes the right to “bring up children” [citation,] and to “direct the upbringing and education of children.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)
In this case, defendant had a history of offenses which included driving without a license, loitering at a particular shopping center in Natomas, and emergent involvement in gang activity in the Natomas area. Shortly before his latest offense, his family had moved to the Elk Grove area. Given defendant’s willingness to make himself mobile by driving without a license, restricting his travel to within a 10-mile radius of his home in Elk Grove was not an unreasonable circumscription of defendant’s rights.
In this case, the probation condition means defendant “may not travel ‘extra-locally’ without his parents’ cooperation or his probation officer’s assent. This does no more than reaffirm the traditional parental prerogative. The condition is thus consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of probation and constitutional parental authority. [Defendant]’s constitutional rights have not been impermissibly burdened.” (In re Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 942.)
Because we find the probation condition did not impermissibly impinge on defendant’s constitutional rights, counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to this condition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P.J., NICHOLSON, J.