Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. JJ14699, S. Robert Ambrose, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TURNER, P. J.
The minor, Roger A., appeals from the January 11, 2007 wardship order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) He was placed home on probation. The juvenile court sustained the allegation of a delinquency petition filed December 19, 2006, charging the minor with carjacking. (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a).) The juvenile court declared the offense a felony and set the minor’s maximum confinement time at nine years. The minor argues: there was insufficient evidence to sustain the petition; the juvenile court improperly imposed a maximum period of confinement; and probation condition No. 15 was unconstitutionally vague. We affirm the wardship order with a modification to the challenged probation condition.
We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909; see also In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089 [standard of proof is the same in juvenile proceedings as that required in adult criminal trials]; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275 [same].) At approximately 6:30 p.m. on December 17, 2006, Santiago Garcia went to a gas station in his 1999 Dodge automobile. As Mr. Garcia was pumping gas, he was approached by two Latinos. Accompanying the two Latinos was one Black male. The older Latino said that he had a gun. The man had his hand under his jacket. Mr. Garcia was ordered to turn over his car keys. Mr. Garcia was afraid and complied with the demand to turn over his keys. The other Latino individual was young. All three individuals then got into Mr. Garcia’s car and drove away. Mr. Garcia called the sheriff’s department. Mr. Garcia described the three males to the deputies who arrived at the gas station. Mr. Garcia’s car was returned to him two days later. Mr. Garcia could not identify the minor at the adjudication hearing. Mr. Garcia did not give the minor permission to take the Dodge. Mr. Garcia was afraid to testify and feared retaliation.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Robert Lavoie arrived at the gas station on December 17, 2006, and spoke to Mr. Garcia. Mr. Garcia gave a description of both his car and the individuals who took it. Mr. Garcia described: one male Latino, age 25 to 30, who was approximately 5 feet 10 inches tall and weighed about 190 pounds; a male Latino, age 16 to 18, approximately 5 feet, 4 inches tall, who weighed about 160 pounds, and wore a white shirt; and, an 18 to 20-year-old Black male, wearing a dark colored sweatshirt. Mr. Garcia said the one African-American and one of the Latinos simulated that they had handguns. The Latino who was simulating handgun possession was not the one who demanded Mr. Garcia’s keys. Deputy Lavoie placed those descriptions and the license plate number into the sheriff’s system. A short time later, two deputies sent a radio broadcast indicating they had located the car. Deputy Lavoie requested an airship and became the second sheriff’s unit to follow Mr. Garcia’s car. The car pulled into a location on Florence Avenue. Deputy Lavoie pulled in behind Mr. Garcia’s car and initiated a traffic stop. A Black male and the minor were removed from the car and separated. The minor was questioned. The minor said he was in the eighth grade at Vista Middle School. When asked if he knew it was wrong to take someone else’s car, the minor answered, “‘Yes.’” Thereafter, the minor was advised of his constitutional rights. The minor admitted taking the car, “‘Alameda and Nadeau, we got the car from the gas station, took it from the people.’” While en route to the sheriff’s station, the deputy passed the gas station on Alameda and Nadeau Streets. The minor spontaneously stated, “‘That is where they took the car from, man[.]’” The minor pointed toward the gas station.
First, the minor argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s carjacking finding. In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of review: “[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, fn. omitted; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303; Taylor v. Stainer, supra, 31 F.3d at pp. 908-909.) The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) The California Supreme Court has held, “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.)
Penal Code Section 215, subdivision (a) provides, “‘Carjacking’ is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (See also People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034; People v. Marquez (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1067-1068.) The California Supreme Court has held: “It is settled that if a defendant’s liability for an offense is predicated upon the theory that he or she aided and abetted the perpetrator, the defendant’s intent to encourage or facilitate the actions of the perpetrator ‘must be formed prior to or during “commission” of that offense.’ [Citation.]” People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027,1039, original italics, quoting People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164; see also People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 851; In re Malcolm M. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 157, 170.) In People v. Booth (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1255, the court held: “‘“‘[T]he test is whether the accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words or gestures.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation, original italics]” (People v. Booth, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255, quoting People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 411.) In Campbell, our colleagues in the Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District held, “‘[A]mong the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 409, quoting In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.)
Here, the minor was present when the older Latino man approached Mr. Garcia at the gas station. Mr. Garcia was aware that three individuals were present when the demand for his car keys was made. Mr. Garcia described them later to the deputies as an older Latino male, a Black male, and a young Latino male, aged 16 to 18, approximately 5 feet, 4 inches tall, who weighed about 160 pounds and wore a white shirt. The minor fit the description of the younger male Latino. In addition, Mr. Garcia told Deputy Lavoie that the young Latino and Black males simulated that they had handguns. This occurred while the other Latino male demanded the keys. The two individuals who were acting as though they were armed, were “‘a couple of steps’” from Mr. Garcia. The three individuals immediately got into Mr. Garcia’s car and drove away. There is substantial evidence the minor was involved in either the planning or execution of the carjacking, or at the least, aided and abetted the crime. Moreover, the minor was in the car with a Black male at the time it was stopped about an hour later. The minor fit the description of the younger Latino involved in the carjacking. The minor admitted that he was standing a “couple of steps away” from the individual who took the keys from the victim. The minor acknowledged that he got into the car while at the gas station and drove away with the two other males. The minor told Deputy Lavoie, “‘Alameda and Nadeau, we got the car from the gas station, took it from the people.’” As the deputies drove the minor to the sheriff’s station, they passed the gas station where the crime occurred. The minor spontaneously stated, “‘That is where they took the car from, man[.]’” Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings.
Second, the minor argues the juvenile court improperly imposed a maximum term of confinement at nine years because he was placed at home on probation. We agree. In the case of In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 572-574, our colleagues in the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District held that where a minor is placed home on probation, the juvenile court is not required to include a maximum term of confinement in its dispositional order. The Ali A. court reasoned: “In the event the minor violates the terms of his probation, a further noticed hearing will have to be held before he is subjected to a modified disposition removing him from his parents’ custody. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777.) If that happens, then at that time the juvenile court will have to comply with [Welfare & Institutions Code] section 726(c) and, if applicable, [Welfare & Institutions Code] section 731(b) in setting and/or declaring the maximum term of physical confinement. In the meantime, the maximum term of confinement contained in the current dispositional order is of no legal effect. Because the minor is not prejudiced by the presence of this term, there is no basis for reversal or remand in this case.” (Id. at pp. 573-574, original italics, footnote omitted.) We agree that no remand or reversal is necessary in this case. The maximum term of confinement in the juvenile court’s order has no legal effect. (In re Ali A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 574, fn. 2; see also In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1744 [“Only when a court orders a minor removed from the physical custody of his parent or guardian is the court required to specify the maximum term the minor can be held in physical confinement”].)
Finally, we agree with the minor that the juvenile court’s imposition of probation condition No. 15 forbidding his association with “anyone disapproved of by parents [or] Probation Officer” was unconstitutionally vague. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889-891.) We therefore modify the probation condition No. 15 to provide, “Do not associate with anyone known to you to be disapproved of by either your parents or your probation officer.” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 892; see also In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816; People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624, fn. 5.)
The wardship order is modified to include a knowledge requirement as to probation condition No. 15. The wardship order is affirmed in all other respects.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, J., MOSK, J.