Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court No. DP013340 of Orange County, Carolyn Kirkwood, Judge.
Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, J.
Jaime S., the alleged father of Roberto S., age three, appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. Father contends the evidence supported application of the parent-child benefit exception. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); all further statutory references are to this code.) Since substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s rejection of the exception, we affirm the order.
FACTS
After the child’s parents, who each have unresolved substance abuse problems, left both him and his two older half-siblings in the care of their maternal grandmother, she contacted the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). A social worker spoke to father twice before the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Father admitted he had not visited the child since his first contact with the social worker, but claimed before that time he had picked up the child for a day or two about four times a month. The maternal grandmother told the social worker that father took the child for weekend visits “about every three weeks.”
The juvenile court declared all three children dependents of the court and established a family reunification plan for mother. Neither parent appeared at the hearing. At the six-month review hearing, the court terminated services and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 due to the parents’ failure to regularly contact or visit with the child and to participate in or make substantive progress on reunification services. The social worker’s reports for this hearing reflect she met with father once during an unannounced visit at the maternal grandmother’s home. He declined to provide her with any means of contacting him. The maternal grandmother informed the social worker that father visited the child “sporadically.”
Before the selection and implementation hearing, SSA located father in state prison serving time for a criminal offense. The matter was continued to provide father with the opportunity to appear.
During that proceeding, the court received into evidence without objection four reports prepared by the social worker. The reports stated father had not visited with the child since Halloween 2006, and the maternal grandmother had not had any contact with his family. Father testified at the hearing, claiming he saw the child twice a week before his March 2007 incarceration. He asserted the child enjoyed seeing him and called him “Papa.” He stated that he kept the child overnight. The paternal grandmother brought the child to visit father once after his incarceration, but since they could only see each other through a window, the child began crying. Father asked his mother not to bring the child until they could have contact visits.
The juvenile court rejected father’s reliance on the parent-child benefit exception, finding “there has not been regular and consistent visitation,” and that “father [had not] occupie[d] a parental role” with the child.
DISCUSSION
Father contends the juvenile court erred in rejecting the parent-child benefit exception, claiming he demonstrated that he “maintained regular visitation,” and that the child “would benefit from a continuing relationship with him.” This argument lacks merit. The question before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding, not whether father presented sufficient evidence to establish a contrary conclusion.
Once the court determines under section 366.26 a child is likely to be adopted, “the court shall terminate parental rights” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)) and order the child placed for adoption unless it “finds a compelling reason for determining that termination will be detrimental to the child” because of one of the statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One exception is where a “parent[] ha[s] maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); see also In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) “A beneficial relationship is one that ‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206; see also In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) “[T]he parent must show that he or she occupies a ‘parental role’ in the child’s life. [Citations.]” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) Merely “demonstrat[ing] ‘frequent and loving contact[,]’ [citation] an emotional bond with the child, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant [citation]” will not suffice. (Ibid.)
On appeal, “We review the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Thus, we begin with a presumption in favor of the trial court’s decision, “‘considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’ [Citation.]” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206.) “We [also] do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]” (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) Where a judgment is supported by evidence “of ponderable legal significance,” “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value [citation]” (ibid.), it will be upheld “even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
SSA introduced reports at the selection and implementation hearing which reflected father had only sporadic contact with his son. These reports, plus the information contained in the social worker’s earlier reports concerning father’s contact and interaction with child, support the juvenile court’s rejection of the parent-child benefit exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1011-1013.) The mere fact father presented other evidence that would have supported a contrary result cannot suffice to nullify the juvenile court’s findings.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., FYBEL, J.