We disagree. Reviewing courts may review otherwise moot issues pursuant to the public interest exception. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004). The public interest exception applies when three criteria are present: (1) the question is of a public nature; (2) an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers is desired; and (3) the question will likely recur.

Thus, his claim satisfies the first factor, as our supreme court has held that "the procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental health patients involve matters of ‘substantial public concern.’ " In re Robert S. , 213 Ill. 2d 30, 46, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004) (quoting In re Mary Ann P. , 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002) ); see also In re Rita P. , 2014 IL 115798, ¶ 36, 381 Ill.Dec. 445, 10 N.E.3d 854 ("resolution of this issue will affect the procedures that must be followed in proceedings under the Mental Health Code, which this court has already acknowledged are ‘matters of a public nature and of substantial public concern’ " (quoting In re Mary Ann P. , 202 Ill. 2d at 402, 269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237 )); In re Nicholas L. , 407 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1071, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (2011) ("questions about compliance with the Code's procedures involve matters of substantial public concern" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We note that the language allowing for a respondent to designate “any other persons,” while clear, is also quite broad. We turn to In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004), for guidance on that point.¶ 40 In Robert S., a provision concerning involuntary-medication proceedings mandated that notice be sent to a respondent's “ ‘attorney’ ” or “ ‘any known agent.’ ”

Thus, his claim satisfies the first factor, as our supreme court has held that "the procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental health patients involve matters of 'substantial public concern.'" In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 46 (2004) (quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 402 (2002)); see also In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶ 36 ("resolution of this issue will affect the procedures that must be followed in proceedings under the Mental Health Code, which this court has already acknowledged are 'matters of a public nature and of substantial public concern'" (quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d at 402)); In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d 1061, 1071 (2011) ("questions about compliance with the Code's procedures involve matters of substantial public concern" (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 56 Regarding the second factor, "the need for an authoritative determination of the question, we consider the state of the law as it relates to the moot question." In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798,

We first address whether the issue is moot. The issue the respondent advances on appeal could be considered moot, as an order authorizing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication shall not be effective for more than 90 days, the 90 days have long since past, and, thus, the trial court's order granting the petition no longer has any force or effect. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004). Nevertheless, we choose to consider the issue pursuant to the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.

In this case, respondent argues that the trial court's involuntary-treatment order failed to comply with the Code ( 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2006)) because his criminal defense attorney was not notified of the petition. Given that (1) strict compliance with statutory procedures is required based on the important liberty interests involved in involuntary-treatment cases ( In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill. App. 3d 586, 590, 871 N.E.2d 794, 799 (2007)) and (2) our supreme court has stated that "the procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental[-]health patients involve matters of `substantial public concern'" ( In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 46, 820 N.E.2d 424, 434 (2004), quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402, 781 N.E.2d 237, 243 (2002)), respondent's arguments regarding the involuntary-treatment order's compliance with the Code constitute questions of public importance. In addition, answers to respondent's arguments will provide an authoritative determination to guide public officers in the performance of their duties in mental-health cases.

Here, the trial court's order granting the petition for involuntary treatment was entered on January 28, 2005. Since the 90 days have passed and the court's order no longer has any force or effect, it is impossible for this court to grant any effectual relief to any party. Thus, any decision rendered would merely be advisory, and "[g]enerally a court of review will not consider moot or abstract questions or render advisory decisions." In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45, 820 N.E.2d 424, 433 (2004). Moot issues may be reviewed, however, under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.

In general, this court will not consider moot issues. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45 (2004). Respondent's fifth amendment claim is not moot.

Therefore, we cannot grant respondent any effectual relief and her appeal is moot. See In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 45, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004) (holding that after the 90–day period for the administration of involuntary treatment has passed, the circuit court's order no longer has any force or effect, the reviewing court cannot grant any meaningful relief and, therefore, the case is moot and any decision would be advisory in nature). See also In re Nicholas L., 407 Ill.App.3d at 1070, 348 Ill.Dec. 431, 944 N.E.2d 384 (“An appeal is moot when no actual controversy is presented or when the issues raised in the trial court have ceased to exist, rendering it impossible for the court of review to grant effectual relief to the appellant.

Unlike sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, this issue has broad implications for the administration of justice" touching upon both proceedings for involuntary commitment and the rights of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity in our criminal justice system. See In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 46, 820 N.E.2d 424, 434 (2004); In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 357, 910 N.E.2d 74, 80 (2009). The record in this case bears witness to the other criteria of the public-interest exception.