The court in People v. Villagren (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 720 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 470], also held that the jury properly found that a "hunting knife" with a four and three-eighths inch-long relatively straight blade was a dirk or dagger. In In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401, 404 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354], the court, in concluding that the trial court was justified in its determination that an ice pick fell within the statutory proscription, relied upon principles set forth in People v. Grubb (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100], wherein it was observed that "The Legislature's understandable concern with the promiscuous possession of objects dangerous to the lives of members of the public finds manifestation in section 12020. . . . [¶] . . . The Legislature here sought to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents; the Legislature sought likewise to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose. [Citation.] [¶] Thus we hold that the statute embraces instruments oth
(See, e.g., In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401, 404-405 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354] [applying Grubb analysis to hold that jury could consider evidence of the defendant's subjective intent and surrounding circumstances to determine whether an icepick was a "dirk or dagger"]); People v. Ferguson (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 13, 19-20 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 383] [same with respect to butcher knife with an eight-inch blade, a point, and one cutting edge]; but cf. People v. Barrios (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 501, 504-506 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 666] [distinguishing Grubb, and holding that "dirk or dagger" refers to a stabbing instrument without regard to circumstances of use]; Bills v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 855, 861-862 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 582] [defendant's intent to use unaltered barber scissors as a weapon for his protection was immaterial, and could not convert such an instrument into a "dirk or dagger"].) As further noted in Mowatt, the application of judicially derived definitions of "dirk or dagger" was somewhat inconsistent, leading to the suggestion in appellate
( Id. at p. 712.) In In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354], the court held that an ordinary unaltered ice pick concealed upon the person was a dirk or dagger as a matter of law because the Legislature intended to prohibit classic instruments of violence as well as their homemade equivalents. ( Id. at p. 404.)
But this does not help Gallager because, where everyday tools and utensils are concerned, it has been routinely held the trier of fact must determine if the item qualifies as a dirk or dagger. (See People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 851-852 [pocketknife with handguards and folding blades that lock]; In re Quintus W., supra, at p. 645 [“kitchen knife with a blade that was four and five-eighths inches long”]; In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401, 404 [“ice pick of ordinary commercial manufacture”]; People v. Villagren (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 720, 727 [hunting knife]; People v. Ferguson (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 13, 18 [“ordinary kitchen knife, having a wooden handle and a steel blade eight inches long, with a point and one cutting edge”].) The reason for such outcomes was well-stated by Villagren: “We reject appellant’s contention that the trial court should have held that as a matter of law the hunting knife was not a ‘dirk or dagger.’
(Grubb, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 617, 621.) In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401 (Robert L.) involved a defendant who, when asked by an officer why he had a concealed ice pick in his possession, replied, “‘You know why I carry it. It is for protection.
The question of what constitutes a dirk or dagger has bedeviled courts for decades. Various objects ranging from ice picks ( In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401, 404-405 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354] ) to steak knives ( In re Quintus W. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 640, 643-645 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 30]) to a metal wire wrapped in a shoelace ( People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 711-712 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418]), have been found to be dirks or daggers. Various other objects such as barber scissors ( Bills v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 855, 859-862 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 582]) and awls ( People v. La Grande (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 871, 872-873 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 709]), have been found not to constitute such a weapon.
Court of Appeal cases have split over the applicability of the Grubb language to concealed dirks or daggers. In People v. Ferguson, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d 13 (butcher knife with an eight-inch blade, a point, and one cutting edge), In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354] (common ice pick) and In re Quintus W., supra, 120 Cal.App.3d 640 (steak knife with a blade four and five-eights inches long), the Second District held it was proper to allow the jury to consider the surrounding circumstances and the subjective intent of a knife's possessor when determining whether the concealed instrument was a dirk or dagger. In Bills v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 855 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 582] (unaltered barber scissors), and People v. La Grande (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 871 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 709] (leather or wood awl seven and one-half inches long with a sharp point), the First District limited application of the Grubb language to clubbing weapons "of the kind commonly known as a blackjack, slungshot, billy. . . ." (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd.(a).)
Other cases, however, have found items such as ice picks and pointed pieces of metal to be dirks or daggers where the possessors of these items intended to use them as weapons or where the items could be used for one purpose only — to stab. ( In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401, 404 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354] ; People v. Cabral (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 707, 711-712 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 418].) We need not resolve this conflict concerning whether nonknives may be dirks or daggers as the present case involves a knife.
There is a division of authority as to the analytical role played by the defendant's reasons for carrying an alleged dagger. (Compare In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401, 405 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354] [ice pick, carried for "protection," is dagger]; In re Quintus W., supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 645 [same as to kitchen knife]; with Bills v. Superior Court, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at pp. 861-862 [intended use of instrument irrelevant under § 12020; barber scissors carried as a defensive weapon held not dagger].) There is logic in the position stated by Justice Compton, dissenting in In re Robert L., supra, at page 409, that it is "bootstrapping" to use one element of the crime — the manner in which the instrument is carried — to supply the other element — the instrument's characterization as a dirk or dagger.
Subdivision (e) of section 12020 indicates the Legislature so intended since it provides knives carried in sheaths worn openly suspended from the waist of the wearer are not concealed within the meaning of the section. Since the only concealed weapons which are forbidden by the section are dirks and daggers, each is obviously a form of knife. (But see In re Robert L. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 401 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 354].) The complete definition provided in Ruiz is as follows: "A dagger has been defined as any straight knife to be worn on the person which is capable of inflicting death . . . [t]hey may consist of any weapon fitted primarily for stabbing.