Opinion
E041050
4-24-2007
In re R.O. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ESTHER O., Defendant and Appellant.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Esther O. Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Esther O. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights to R., Reynold, and S., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
On August 31, 2004, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (Department) detained Mothers minor children, R. (two years old) and Reynold (one year old). Reynold was detained after Reynold O., Jr., (Father) abandoned Reynold at the home of a 15-year-old neighbor. R. was discovered asleep on a "pile of junk" in Fathers apartment that was in "utter shambles." Father explained that he and Mother had gotten into a fight and she had left to check into a home for domestic violence. The Department determined Father had several convictions for assault and domestic violence and both parents had a history of mental illness that is "exacerbated by the use of street drugs." Father admitted that he and Mother use drugs. R. was detained.
Father denies paternity to Reynold even though he was married to Mother at the time of the childs conception and birth, and is listed on the birth certificate as the childs father.
On September 2, 2004, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). According to the detention report, Mother had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder for which she was prescribed medication. When Mother became pregnant, she stopped the medication upon a doctors advice. She believed that going off her medication was the root cause of the family problems. The children showed no signs of abuse; however, they were detained and both parents were given "frequent and liberal" visitation.
The jurisdiction/disposition report filed on September 22, 2004, recommended that the court sustain the allegations in the petition, declare the children dependents of the court, and order reunification services for both parents. The report indicated Mother had two older children (11 and 13 years old) living with their father. On November 2, 2004, the court sustained the petition as amended, declared the children dependents of the court, ordered reunification services for both parents for six months, and granted frequent and liberal visitation.
On January 12, 2005, Mother gave birth to S. On April 5, 2005, the Department filed its six-month status report recommending an extension of reunification services and overnight weekend visitation between both children and Mother. The children appeared to have adjusted to their out-of-home placement with their maternal great-grandmother, who expressed an interest in adopting the children if the family did not reunify.
At the time of the report, Father was in custody and had not enrolled in any court-ordered services. Meanwhile, Mother had completed a parenting program, submitted to random drug testing with negative results, and was scheduled to complete treatment with Alternatives to Domestic Violence (ADV). Mother initially visited with the children on a biweekly basis while she was incarcerated. After her release, the Department facilitated daily visitation. The Department observed and reported a lack of bonding between Mother and the children. The report concluded that Mother was in compliance with her reunification plan but would need more time in treatment.
At the subsequent six-month review hearing on May 2, 2005, the juvenile court authorized overnight weekend visitation between Mother and the children, subject to a suitable home evaluation and Mothers successful participation in her case plan. On June 23, the court placed the children with Mother pursuant to a family maintenance plan. Father was permitted only supervised visitation with the children, and Mother could not be the one supervising.
On July 1, 2005, the Department filed a subsequent petition pursuant to sections 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and 342. S. suffered a severe head injury, including swelling of the brain, epidural hemorrhage, and two fractures. According to Mother, S. was injured when, on June 28, Father entered the home without permission and threw a toy paddle that bounced off a wall and struck S. in the head. The Department was informed by a law enforcement officer that the nature of S.s injuries conflicted with the explanation offered by Mother. Mother told the Department that Father had been to her residence twice since the children were returned to her. The Department concluded Mother had "clearly violated a court order which states that [Father] . . . not have unsupervised contact with the children." The Department recommended that R., Reynold and S. be detained pending further investigation. On July 5, 2005, the juvenile court detained the children and awarded frequent and liberal visitation to parents as directed by the Department.
One of Mothers older children later confirmed that Father had been in Mothers home with the children for three days prior to S.s injuries.
On July 22, 2005, the Department filed a jurisdiction/disposition report in which it recommended that R. and Reynold be declared dependents of the court and that no reunification services be provided to either parent. The Department pointed out that Mother had violated court orders by allowing Father to have contact with the children. Thus, the Department recommended that Mother not receive services pursuant to "subsection 361.5(b)(5)." The children were doing well in their confidential foster care placement.
In the addendum report filed on October 28, 2005, the Department stated that Mother had been arrested on July 26, 2005, for violating the terms of her probation. On August 4, 2005, Mother contacted the Department and asked what "she could do for services." She was told that she had completed services and that was why her children had been returned to her. The issue was her disobedience of court orders forbidding Father from having unsupervised contact with the children. On August 4, the Department discussed visitation with Mother, informing her that the Department would need a court order. Meanwhile, a warrant was issued for Fathers arrest. A contested jurisdictional hearing was set.
In the status report filed on November 8, 2005, the Department stated that "[s]ibling visitation has occurred at least twice a month between the children, [R.], Reynold, [S.], and Paul [N]." The report noted that Mother had been sending correspondence, drawings and cards to the Department while she was in custody. The Department forwarded the correspondence to the foster parents. The Department opined that the chances for reunification were "very poor" because "[t]he parents have a dangerous lifestyle and significant child protective services history." According to the Department, "[t]he treatment of the parents may be so difficult and lengthy that the children would remain years in foster care." Mother had been incarcerated at Smith Correctional Facility since July 2005.
On December 8, 2005, the court conducted a contested review/jurisdictional hearing as to R. and Reynold. Mother appeared but did not offer any affirmative evidence and did not object to any evidence. The court found the allegations of the amended section 387 petition to be true, declared R. and Reynold dependents of the juvenile court, and terminated reunification services as to both parents. The court further determined that a permanent plan of adoption would be appropriate and set a section 366.26 hearing. With respect to S., the Department amended the petition to add allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (e). The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the amended petition, declared S. a dependent of the juvenile court, and denied Mother reunification services.
In January 2006, Mother was transferred to Robert Presley Detention Center. Mother left telephone messages with the Department inquiring whether she could have visitation with the children upon her release from jail in March 2006. S.s foster mother, a maternal great-aunt, reported that Mother telephoned her from jail and demanded to see S. The social worker told the foster mother to direct Mothers calls regarding visitation to the Department. The social worker also advised that visitation was not mandated while Mother was incarcerated; however, the foster mother could take S. to visit Mother.
On January 27, 2006, Mother and the social worker spoke via the telephone. The social worker reported they "discussed her [visitation] options since she was incarcerated." Mother communicated that she realized jail visits may be detrimental to the children, but she hoped the maternal great-aunt would bring S. for visits. The social worker informed Mother that the visitation with S. was up to the maternal great-aunt; however, visitation would resume upon Mothers release from jail. The social worker also advised Mother to keep in close contact with her attorney. In February 2006, the social worker advised S.s foster mother that Mothers visitation with the children after her release from jail would be facilitated by the Department.
On March 10, 2006, the Department filed a section 366.26 report recommending that Mother and Fathers parental rights be terminated as to the children. The report stated that both parents were incarcerated and unable to visit with the children. The Department noted that Mother had made phone calls requesting visitation with her children and had been corresponding with them while in custody. R. and Reynolds foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. W., expressed a desire to adopt both children. S.s caregiver, Emily H., also wanted to adopt S. Noting that both the W. family and Emily H. are appropriate caretakers, the Department recommended that the respective adoptions proceed. Mother was released from custody on March 28, 2006. A visit was scheduled for March 30, 2006.
On April 6, 2006, Mother met with the social worker and the foster parents to discuss visitation. Mother was agreeable to a visit once every two weeks. Visits were scheduled for April 13 and April 20, 2006. The Department communicated scheduling information to Mother.
Following her release from jail, Mother participated in supervised visitation with the children. R. suffered negative behaviors as a result of the visits. Reynold did not appear to get involved in interacting with Mother. In May 2006, the social worker decided to cancel the May 18, 2006, scheduled visit since R. seemed to be negatively affected. The social worker personally informed Mother that this visit would be cancelled and that the next scheduled visit was on June 7. Mother was polite and agreed to the change.
The children had been in stable foster care residences since being detained in June 2005. R. and Reynold had been placed with their foster parents for a period of time at the beginning of the dependency proceeding; however, the children had been removed from their care since a relative (maternal great-grandmother) was approved for placement. The children remained in the great-grandmothers care from February 2005 until they were returned to Mother in June. When the children were again removed from Mother, they were returned to the original foster parents. The children were bonded to the foster parents, who continued to be interested in adopting them.
S., who was removed from Mother when he was approximately five months old, was placed with a foster mother who had bonded with him. However, a maternal great-aunt also qualified for placement. S. was placed with his maternal great-aunt in October 2005. The maternal great-aunt sought adoption of S. It appeared that S. was well cared for and was bonded to her.
On June 7, 2006, the court held a section 366.26 hearing. Mother testified she had three or four opportunities to visit with the children since her release from custody. Mother had been incarcerated for the previous eight months. While in jail, Mother had only one visit with S. and no contact visits with R. or Reynold. Mother testified that she repeatedly asked the Department to arrange for more visitation. The Department informed her that visitation would be left to the discretion of the foster parents. Mother requested further contact with the children; however, despite "plenty of phone calls" she received no response from the Department. Regarding her bond with the children, Mother said, "Theres nothing more important in my life than my children. I want to see them grow up. I want to see them do well. I want to be their mother. Thats what I am." Mother also testified about the bond that the children had with their older siblings. Mother argued that a permanent plan of adoption would not be appropriate due to that sibling bond. The court considered the reports submitted by the Department, along with Mothers testimony, and found that none of the exceptions to adoption set forth in section 366.26, subdivisions (a) through (e), inclusive, applied. The court found that it was likely the children would be adopted, and terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father as to R., Reynold, and S.
Mother appeals.
II. VISITATION
On July 5, 2005, after the children were removed from Mothers custody for a second time, the court granted frequent and liberal visitation. However, Mother was incarcerated later that month. On December 8, Mother was denied reunification services and was noticed that a section 366.26 hearing was set for April 2006. During eight months of incarceration (late July 2005 to late March 2006), Mother only had one visit with S. and no visits with R. and Reynold. Mother repeatedly asked the Department about visitation, but the Department merely responded that visitation was up to the caregivers. On appeal, Mother contends the order terminating her parental rights must be reversed because she was denied her substantive due process right to visitation while she was incarcerated.
"Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) provides that if a parent is incarcerated, the court shall order reasonable services unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that services would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment, the court shall consider the age of the child, the degree of parent-child bonding, the length of the sentence, the nature of the crime, and the degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered. Reunification services for an incarcerated parent are subject to the time limitations imposed in section 361.5, subdivision (a), and may include, among others, telephone calls and `[v]isitation services, where appropriate. [Citation.]
"Section 361.5, subdivision (f) provides that when a court does not order reunification services to a parent under that paragraph, and either sets a section 366.26 hearing or the other parent is being provided reunification services, `[t]he court may continue to permit the parent to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child. [Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶]
"As noted ante, section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) states that a juvenile court `shall order that reasonable reunification services be provided to an incarcerated parent unless it determines that services would be detrimental to the child. Once the juvenile court has denied reunification services under subdivision (e)(1), section 361.5, subdivision (f) gives the court discretion to allow the parent to continue visitation with his or her child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child. In the latter event, subdivision (f) provides that the court does not have discretion to continue to permit visitation. The statute expressly states that when the court does not order reunification services, it `may continue to permit the parent to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental. [Citation.] The statute does not say . . . that the court `shall continue to permit visitation unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child. The term `may in subdivision (f) does not mean `shall. [¶] . . . [¶]
"Indeed, the Legislatures use of both `shall and `may in the same paragraph in section 361.5, subdivision (f) indicates the words have different meanings. Subdivision (f) provides that if the court does not order reunification services at the dispositional hearing, it `shall determine if a section 366.26 hearing should be set. Subdivision (f) goes on to say that the court `shall not schedule such a hearing if the other parent is still receiving reunification services. The last sentence of subdivision (f) states that the court `may continue to permit the parent not receiving services to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child. We construe the word `may in the last sentence of subdivision (f), therefore, as permissive, i.e., as giving the juvenile court discretion to permit or deny visitation when reunification services are not ordered, unless of course it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child, in which case it must deny visitation.
"This is a logical distinction. Visitation is an essential part of a reunification plan. `In order to maintain ties between the parent or guardian and any siblings and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent or guardian, or to encourage or suspend sibling interaction, any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, shall provide as follows: [¶] (1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for visitation between the parent or guardian and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. [Citation.] Visitation is no less crucial for an incarcerated parent receiving reunification services. [Citations.] Therefore, when reunification services are being provided, it is error to deny visitation with the parent to whom the services apply unless there is sufficient evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the child. [Citations.] On the other hand, visitation is not integral to the overall plan when the parent is not participating in the reunification efforts. This reality is reflected in the permissive language of section 361.5, subdivision (f)." (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 456-459, fns. omitted.)
Here, although the juvenile court denied further reunification services, it was silent regarding visitation. However, given the language of section 361.5, subdivision (f), visitation was not mandated at this stage in the proceedings. Thus, we cannot find that the Departments failure to facilitate visitation during Mothers incarceration amounted to an error warranting reversal of the termination order.
Moreover, we note that Mother did not file any writ following the December 8, 2005, hearing that denied reunification services and set the section 366.26 hearing. Nor did she subsequently petition the court to compel visitation. As the Department notes, its management of the visitation order is subject to the courts supervision and control. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1010.) However, where the Department abuses its responsibility in managing the details of visitation, Mother may bring that matter to the attention of the juvenile court by way of a section 388 petition to modify the order. (Ibid.) "Due process requirements in the context of child dependency litigation have . . . focused principally on the right to a hearing and the right to notice." (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 412-413.) Having failed to raise the visitation issue at the trial level, Mother now complains that, "through no fault of her own, her due process rights [were] compromised. (In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504.)" We disagree.
We note that Mothers counsel informed the court that he "did advise mother that one option would be a [section] 388 motion once she is released from custody."
Mothers reliance on In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 (Hunter S.) is misplaced. As the Department notes, the facts in Hunter S. differ from the facts in this case. In Hunter S., the child refused to participate in visitation with the mother, refused to accept mothers telephone calls, and refused to respond to her letters. (Id. at p. 1501.) At the section 366.26 setting hearing, the court ordered the Department to set up visitation. (Ibid.) At a postpermanency hearing, mothers counsel informed the court that mother had not seen the child in 17 months. The court acknowledged the existing visitation order. (Id. at p. 1502.) Six months later, the mothers counsel again raised the issue of visitation, requesting the court to change the visitation order. (Id. at p. 1503.) The court denied the request. (Ibid.) The request was again raised 10 months later, but the court did not make any ruling. Finally, the mother filed a section 388 petition seeking to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and to reinstate reunification services. (Ibid.) The court denied the section 388 petition and terminated parental rights. Mother appealed, in part, on the grounds that she had been deprived due process regarding her right to participate in visitation with her child. (Id. at p. 1504.)
In a footnote, Mother notes: "The Hunter S. [supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 1497] court reversed the trial court order terminating parental rights on other grounds and did not find it necessary to reach a decision on the merits of mothers due process argument. (Id. at p. 1508.)"
On appeal, our colleagues in Division 8 of the Second Appellate District pointed out that the mother "consistently raised the issue of the juvenile courts failure to enforce its visitation order for over two years." (Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) Both the mother and her counsel pointed out the lack of visitation to the welfare agency and to the juvenile court. The mother did not receive any assistance. The agency did nothing to facilitate visits and the juvenile court did not believe it had a duty to enforce the existing visitation order. Thus, the appellate court held that the juvenile court erred in failing to enforce the visitation order. (Id. at pp. 1507-1508.)
Here, in contrast, Mother did not raise any issue regarding visitation to the juvenile court. Instead, she acquiesced in what the Department dictated. Even after Mother was released from jail, we note that she agreed to cancel a visit in May. Having failed to voice her objections at the trial court level, Mother has waived this complaint on appeal.
III. SECTION 366.26, SUBDIVISION (c)(1)(A), EXCEPTION
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to apply an exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).
Courts have reached different conclusions as to the standard of review that applies to a juvenile courts ruling on exceptions to adoptability under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). In In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575-576, the court held that a finding that no exceptional circumstances exist to prevent the termination of parental rights is reviewed under the substantial evidence test. In contrast, in In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal. App.4th 1339, 1351-1352, the court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review. For purposes of the present case, it makes no difference which standard applies because, as we discuss below, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err under either test.
One court has observed, "The `benefit exception found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) may be the most unsuccessfully litigated issue in the history of law." (In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1255, fn. 5, disapproved on other grounds by In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414.) The parent has the burden of establishing the foundational facts for the exception. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides: "[T]he court shall terminate parental rights . . . unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (A) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship."
In the juvenile court, the burden was upon Mother to establish the facts necessary for the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), exception to apply. (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1119-1120.) Her burden was substantial. She was required to demonstrate that "the relationship promotes the well-being of the child[ren] to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child[ren] would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging that a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child[ren] of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child[ren] would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated.
"Interaction between natural parent and child[ren] will always confer some incidental benefit to the child[ren]. The significant attachment from child[ren] to parent results from the adults attention to the child[ren]s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child[ren] to parent." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
On appeal, Mother points to evidence in the record in support of the fact that during the first year that R. and Reynold were removed from her custody, they "either lived with [her] or were in frequent and close contact with her from the day they were born until July, 2005. Therefore, as of the date of the section 366.26 hearing, [R.] had spent @75% and Reynold @ 66% of their lives with [her]. Even [S.] lived with [her] for the first five months of his life." Mother argues that she "has been the childrens primary caretaker for most of [R.] and Reynolds lives. She then raised [S.] for the first, crucial five months of his life. During this time she formed a parent-child relationship that continues to the present. There is no indication in the record that [she] abused or failed to adequately care for the children while they were in her custody." However, Mother did not make this assertion below. Instead, she complained that the Department had not facilitated visitation with the children during her eight months in jail.
Regarding the bond between Mother and her children, the following exchange occurred:
"Q. And if you could describe for the Court, how do you see your bond between these three children and yourself?
"A. Theres nothing more important in my life than my children. I want to see them grow up. I want to see them do well. I want to be their mother. Thats what I am.
"Q. So you still feel theres an attachment between yourself and these three children?
"A. I dont think I will live, and Im not saying Ill kill myself, but I just feel very sick.
"Q. Could you answer my question, though? Do you think theres still a bond between yourself and
"A. I know theres a bond. Its undeniable. We have our family. My older sons lose hope also, because they miss their brothers."
Thus, Mothers showing and argument below went primarily to the issue of visitation, to the exclusion of any evidence there was such a strong relationship between her and the children that adoption would result in great harm to them. Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Mother failed to establish the applicability of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), exception.
Alternatively, there was substantial evidence to support the trial courts conclusion that the exception did not apply. While there may have been evidence in the record that earlier on in this dependency there was a strong bond between Mother and the children, and that Mother had participated in visitation, in the more recent reports that was no longer the case. In July 2005, Mother lost custody of the children when she failed to abide by court orders and the terms of her probation by exposing the children to the violent behavior of Father. As the Department notes, "[w]hile [Mother] was motivated to `rapidly complete services and reunify, [she] was not motivated to provide the necessary care to the [children] so that she could retain custody." When returned to the foster parents, the children were immediately comfortable. They did not display any symptoms of separation from either Mother or their other siblings. However, when visits with Mother resumed in April 2006, R. began experiencing "more sleep disturbances and acting out type behavior at home." Because we do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts but instead must consider the record most favorably to the juvenile courts order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion, we must conclude that Mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile court committed reversible error.
Notwithstanding the above, Mother relies largely on In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681 (Amber M.), a case in which an order terminating a mothers parental rights was reversed pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). Mother points to the fact that in Amber M., the two older children had lived with their mother for significant portions of their young lives, and similarly, the youngest had lived with her for the first seven months of her life. She also points to the fact that the mother in Amber M. visited as often as she was permitted and acted in a loving and parental role during visitation. (Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 689-690.) However, Amber M. is distinguishable in a very important aspect. There, the court had before it a report from a psychologist who had conducted a two-hour bonding study. The psychologist concluded that Amber and her mother shared `"a primary attachment" and a "`primary maternal relationship" and that "`[i]t could be detrimental to sever that relationship." (Id. at p. 689.) Ambers therapist likewise believed they had a strong bond and it was important for the relationship to continue. Testimony from a court-appointed special advocate (CASA) indicated that Ambers brother loved and missed his mother and had difficulty separating from her, but the CASA believed the children should remain with their grandparents because their mother was not ready to care for them. Thus, said the court, "The common theme running through the evidence from the bonding study psychologist, the therapists, and the CASA is a beneficial parental relationship that clearly outweighs the benefit of adoption." (Id. at pp. 689-690.)
In contrast, no such evidence was presented here. Rather, the evidence presented showed that the children were not detrimentally attached to Mother such that they would benefit from continuing the relationship.
Finally, even if the Department should have been precluded from arguing that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), exception did not apply because of the Departments failure to facilitate visitation between Mother and the children, as we have previously stated, Mother has still not pointed to any evidence presented at the time of the hearing that there was such a strong relationship between her and the children that adoption would result in great harm to them. Instead, Mother speculated that the termination of her parental rights will cause the children a detriment in the future as teenagers. According to Mother, she was a foster child who had been separated from her mother who was schizophrenic. Mother testified: "I hunger for the love and the need of my children and my family. I had these children, because I wanted a family. It was not a mistake. I planned it. I got married with their father, and now Im almost divorced. I have no contact with him. I was in love. [¶] My family — I dont feel the love that I need from my family. I dont get it, and its not all about me. Its about them, and I know what its like, okay. Right now they may be fine, but when they hit the teenage years, I dont believe that theyre going to do well. I dont think that they will do well with other people. [¶] . . . [¶] I think theyre better with me from experience. My brother got adopted, and I got put in a foster home. And I got thrown all over town. CPS didnt do anything good for me." Although the above shows Mothers bond to the children, it does not show the reciprocal bond from the children. Consequently, Mother has not demonstrated that, regardless of the visitation issue, a different outcome should have resulted based on the record before this court.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mothers parental rights is affirmed.
We concur:
KING, J.
MILLER, J.