From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

In re R.M.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Apr 12, 2017
J-S21004-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2017)

Opinion

J-S21004-17 No. 524 WDA 2016

04-12-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: R.M.


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order February 23, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP25JV 0007 of 2016 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

R.M. appeals from the dispositional order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, after he was adjudicated delinquent for burglary (F-2), criminal trespass (F-3), receiving stolen property of a motor vehicle (M-3), simple assault (M-2), resisting arrest (M-2), theft by unlawful taking (M-3), and disorderly conduct. R.M. was ordered to be placed at Loysville Youth Development Center for 2 to 3 months, with possible transition to George Junior Republic if R.M. was on positive status at Loysville. R.M. was also ordered to pay $1,361.00 in restitution to the victim. After careful review, we affirm.

Our standard of review of dispositional orders in juvenile proceedings is well settled. "The Juvenile Act grants broad discretion to the court when determining an appropriate disposition. We will not disturb a disposition absent a manifest abuse of discretion." In re R.D.R., 876 A.2d 1009, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2005).

18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).

18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a).

18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).

18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1).

18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).

18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(4).

On January 18, 2016, at 1:00 a.m., Erie Police Officer Gabriel A. Carducci spotted a late-model, white Ford Explorer that had been reported stolen within the past few days. The officer, who was on routine patrol, followed the Explorer and was ultimately able to catch up with it by following the vehicle's tracks in the fresh snow. Officer Carducci radioed for backup, reporting that he was following the stolen vehicle. When another police officer crossed paths with the Explorer, the Explorer began to rapidly accelerate. Officer Carducci activated his emergency lights and sirens and continued to follow the Explorer, which attempted to evade the police by going through traffic lights and stop signs at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour in a posted 25 miles per hour speed zone. Ultimately, the driver of the vehicle lost control of the car and hit a tree. The driver and passenger, R.M., exited the vehicle and fled from the police on foot.

Officer Nicholas Bernatowicz gave chase to R.M. as he ran south from the accident site. Officer Bernatowicz repeatedly told R.M. to stop; he refused to comply. The officer followed R.M.'s footprints in the snow for a block and a half, which included traversing through a backyard, over two fences, and down an alley. The officer finally apprehended R.M. in a single-car detached garage. The officer told R.M. to show his hands, observing that he had a black object in his right hand. R.M. failed to comply, stood at a "bladed stance" and, at one point, completely turned his back to the officer. Officer Bernatowicz approached R.M., grabbed hold of him, and struggled with him. R.M. resisted arrest and struck the officer in the right knee. With the help of a second officer, R.M. was handcuffed. A search incident to arrest uncovered multiple items on R.M.'s person, including a prescription pill bottle belonging to the victim.

At the delinquency hearing, the victim testified that she had never given R.M. permission to use her vehicle and that she had reported her car stolen two days prior to the instant incident. The owner of the single-family home with the detached garage testified that she had not given R.M. permission to be on her property or in her garage. R.M. testified that he knew the Explorer was stolen, that he was a passenger in the stolen vehicle, that he possessed the victim's prescription pill bottle, and that he had tried to "get away" from the officers as they chased him.

Following the delinquency hearing, the court concluded that, based on the evidence, the Commonwealth had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that R.M. had committed the crimes of receiving stolen property, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal trespass, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and theft by unlawful taking. R.M. filed a motion to reconsider his adjudication for receiving stolen property in light of the fact that he was the passenger, not the driver, of the stolen vehicle. After hearing arguments, the court denied the motion. The court amended the charge of aggravated assault to simple assault and adjudicated R.M. delinquent, finding that he was in need of treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation. R.M. filed post-dispositional motions that were denied.

The court found that receiving stolen property merged with theft by unlawful taking for disposition purposes.

See In the Interest of Scott , 566 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 1989) (joint and constructive possession of stolen vehicle found where juvenile passenger fled on foot after police stopped car and was apprehended; evidence showed defendant acted in concert with driver of stolen vehicle).

R.M. filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. R.M. raises the following issues for our review:

(1) Whether the verdict of the trial court goes against the sufficiency of the evidence because (a) [R.M.] did not have the intent to commit the crime of Burglary, the crime of Criminal Trespass, and Receiving Stolen Property of a Motor Vehicle and/or (b) the evidence does not substantiate an adjudication of delinquency on the
aforementioned allegations of delinquency and/or the Commonwealth cannot meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof for purposes of the aforementioned allegations of delinquency.
(2) Whether the trial court erred at the time of disposition when it determined that [R.M.'s] best placement option was Loysville Youth Development Center (YDC) near Loysville, Pennsylvania, which is further from the Juvenile's home county than other placements that could accomplish the same "treatment, supervision and rehabilitation" goals such as George Junior Republic near Grove City, Pennsylvania, especially in this particular case as Juvenile's mother and sisters visited Juvenile on a daily basis while Juvenile was detained and/or the denial process was ongoing.
(3) Whether the trial court erred when it determined that [R.M.] owed restitution for damages to the motor vehicle, for damages to any tangible property located within the motor vehicle, and/or for damages to any tangible property not located in the motor vehicle especially with the trial court's finding that [R.M.] was adjudicated delinquent at receiving stolen property.[]

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(a)(5) (delinquent child may be ordered to pay "reasonable amounts of money as fines, costs, fees or restitution as deemed appropriate as part of the plan of rehabilitation considering the nature of the acts committed and the earning capacity of the child, including a contribution to a restitution fund"); see also In the Interest of J.G., 45 A.3d 1118, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2012) (under Juvenile Act, "a court has the authority to award restitution where a minor has been adjudicated delinquent. The court also enjoys broad discretion when deciding whether to impose restitution as part of the overall goal of apportioning responsibility and accountability, subject to the child's ability to pay.").

After a careful review of the parties' briefs, case law and the certified record, we conclude that the trial court correctly disposes of R.M.'s first two issues on appeal that concern the sufficiency of the evidence and determination of an appropriate placement facility for R.M. Accordingly, we rely upon the opinion, authored by the Honorable John J. Trucilla, in affirming these issues on appeal. We instruct the parties to attach a copy of Judge Trucilla's decision in the event of further proceedings in the matter.

In his final claim on appeal, R.M. asserts that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution with regard to the stolen vehicle (and its missing contents). R.M. contends that the Commonwealth did not provide any evidence that he was responsible for the damaged car or the items stolen from it, that he was not responsible for these losses because he was not the driver of the car, and that there was no proof that he was in control of any of the lost items.

R.M. was properly held accountable for the damage to the victim's property, which included the items stolen from her vehicle. Here, there was a causal connection between the total losses sustained by the victim and R.M.'s role in the burglary and receipt of the victim's stolen property, including the missing contents of her vehicle. Cf. Commonwealth v. Reed , 543 A.2d 587 (Pa. Super. 1988) (restitution cannot be ordered for property Commonwealth has not proven was either stolen or recovered by defendant). The court properly balanced the need to hold R.M. responsible for the losses with his rehabilitative needs and ability to pay. See In the Interest of M.W., 725 A.2d 729, 732-33 (Pa. 1999) (juvenile court invested with "broad measure of discretion to apportion responsibility for damages based upon the nature of the delinquent act and the earning capacity of the juvenile.").

In cases where multiple juveniles are responsible for a victim's losses, a court should consider the "proportion of the damage caused by" each juvenile. In the Interest of Dublinski , 695 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. 1997). Here, the trial court appropriately apportioned the damages caused by each of the responsible juveniles, R.M. and the driver of the victim's stolen vehicle, when calculating the restitution award. In fact, the court decreased the initial restitution amount ($1,620.99) to further reflect the appropriate proportion of R.M.'s accountability ($1,361.00) after reducing the value of the items. See N.T. Dispositional Hearing, 2/23/16, at 38; Order, 2/25/16 (upon consideration of facts at dispositional hearing court concludes that restitution amount of $1,361.00 "represents the fair and reasonable amount for [R.M.] to pay . . . based on a review of the police reports and in the interest of justice."). Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's restitution order, which is supported in the record, was not a manifest abuse of discretion. In the Interest of J.G., supra.

Although R.M. does not claim that the Commonwealth did not provide proof of the value of the stolen items, we note that it did provide receipts to support the value of the items. See N.T. Dispositional Hearing, 2/23/16, at 10-12.

The total loss to the victim was calculated to be $3,241.99. This included the damage to the vehicle, and several items never recovered from the vehicle (jewelry, two booster seats, 40 caliber clip with ammunition, two DS XL hand games, two RCA portable televisions, and kids' games). --------

Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/12/2017

Image materials not available for display.


Summaries of

In re R.M.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Apr 12, 2017
J-S21004-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2017)
Case details for

In re R.M.

Case Details

Full title:IN THE INTEREST OF: R.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: R.M.

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Apr 12, 2017

Citations

J-S21004-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2017)