Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Super. Ct. No. JV6689 Eric L. DuTemple, Judge.
Michael E. Mitchell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and Charles A. French, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
Kane, J.
Appellant R.M., a minor, was adjudged to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), based on that court’s finding that he committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The victim was appellant’s father who, at the time of the incident, confronted appellant about his failure to do chores. Appellant reacted by throwing a tantrum, a physical altercation ensued and appellant swung a bicycle lock and chain that struck his father on the head. Based on the testimony of appellant’s father, the investigating officer and appellant himself, the juvenile court rejected appellant’s self-defense theory and sustained the juvenile wardship petition. At the dispositional hearing, appellant was declared to be a ward of the court and placed in a group home. Appellant appealed, contending that (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the petition, (2) the juvenile court improperly restricted cross-examination of appellant’s father about his (i.e., the father’s) prior fights with others, and (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor. We discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment below.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Case
On July 31, 2009, appellant was 14 years old and lived with his father in Tuolumne County. Around 4:00 p.m., appellant’s father returned home from work and spoke to appellant about some chores that appellant had failed to complete. Appellant had about 1, 500 baseball cards spread out on the bedroom floor. When his father asked him to pick up the cards, appellant said “No, absolutely not.” Appellant then climbed out the bedroom window even though his father had told him not to do so. His father closed the window and left the bedroom. Afterwards, appellant called his father back into the bedroom and told him that he had reopened the window and there was nothing his father could do about it. Appellant went out the window about three more times, loudly banging on the front door and the gate. Appellant “was being very defiant.”
For convenience, appellant’s father, David M., will be referred to herein simply as appellant’s father.
When appellant returned to his bedroom, his father stood between him and the window. He pushed appellant onto the bed and told appellant to stay there because he was “tired of him going in and out of this window.” Appellant then jumped off the bed and came after his father. Appellant’s father believed that appellant “was going to either strike or there was going to be an altercation, so I put my arms around him almost in a bear hug.” He told appellant to calm down. Appellant said, “Dad, stop doing this. Stop doing this.” His father responded that he would “let up when you’re done.” At that point, appellant struck his father twice in the forehead and his father let go and walked out of the room, saying he was going to call the police. He told appellant, “[y]ou attacked your mom, you’re not doing the same to me.” As his father walked out of the room, appellant climbed out the window again.
Appellant’s father did not call the police, since he hoped that things would settle down. However, appellant did not calm down, but came through the front door carrying a lock and chain in his hand. Appellant “had it coiled around his right hand with the lock hanging off about four inches.” Appellant stopped and stared at his father while holding the lock and chain, and his father told him he should leave because the police were coming, even though he had not actually called the police. Appellant said “[n]o, no, no, ” walked out of the kitchen and slammed the kitchen door (which is glass), then opened it and slammed it again and went outside.
Appellant’s father also described the lock as dangling about 10 inches.
Appellant’s father went outside to see what appellant was going to do, because in the past appellant had damaged property when he got angry. A pounding noise could be heard at the front gate of the house and it appeared that appellant had hit the fence and made a hole in it. When appellant’s father opened the gate, he saw appellant with the chain and lock. Appellant swung the lock and hit the fence next to his father. “I think he was trying to intimidate me, because he swung it at the fence right by my head, about three feet away.” At that point, appellant’s father realized that appellant was not calming down and “this could possibly go bad, ” so he attempted to get the lock away from him. He grabbed appellant’s hand, trying to get the lock, but could not do so. The two then wrestled to the ground. Appellant’s father testified that appellant “got a perfect swing with [the lock and chain] and hit me on the left side at the top of my head.…” After being hit in the head, appellant’s father pushed appellant away and called the police. He could not believe appellant would ever do such a thing to him.
Sonora Police Officer John Mager responded to the scene. Officer Mager observed that appellant’s father had “a significantly raised bump and a small cut” on the left top of his head. When Officer Mager contacted appellant, he was crying and extremely upset. Appellant said he was mad at his father because his father took away some of appellant’s computer privileges. Appellant told Officer Mager that “while he was throwing the tantrum, he had picked up a lock, the lock here, and struck his father in the back with it.” Appellant also told Officer Mager that “he was throwing a tantrum and his dad put him in a bear hug, ” which his father did in order to gain control of appellant. The officer did not observe any marks on appellant, and appellant said he was fine.
B. Defense Case
On cross-examination, appellant’s father admitted that he was 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 227 pounds, while appellant weighed only 115 pounds and was only 5 feet 5 inches tall. Appellant’s father acknowledged that when he put appellant in a bear hug or headlock, appellant asked him to stop a number of times. Appellant’s father also admitted on cross-examination that he had been involved in previous fights with other people. The prosecution objected (on grounds of lack of relevance and Evidence Code section 352) to defense counsel’s question about when appellant’s father had last been involved in a fight with anyone, and the court sustained the objection. Appellant’s father did testify that his children had never seen him in any physical altercation with another person.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He stated that when his father came into his bedroom and spoke to him about not doing his chores, his father imposed a one-week computer restriction. His father also told appellant that he would suffer an additional week of computer restriction for every time he exited through his bedroom window. Appellant responded by repeatedly going out the window to goad or provoke his father into adding more restriction time. When appellant’s father finally came into the bedroom, he had a look of frustration and “aggression.” Appellant’s father “put [him] in the bear hug, slash headlock.” Appellant began to feel dizzy and nauseous and begged his father to stop. He was afraid because nothing like this had happened before. Trying to escape from his father’s hold, appellant swung the lock and hit his father on the shoulder. Appellant elbowed his father and was able to get away and run outside with the chain and lock. His father followed, got appellant into another bear hug and they struggled until appellant was able to knee his father in the gut, at which time his father released appellant and fell down. When the police arrived, appellant admitted to Officer Mager that he (appellant) was “throwing a temper tantrum” or that he had had an “episode.”
C. Procedural History
On August 4, 2009, a juvenile wardship petition was filed in Tuolumne County Juvenile Court charging appellant with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) On August 14, 2009, after a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition. On September 22, 2009, a dispositional hearing was held. Appellant was declared to be a ward of the court and he was placed in a group home. He was ordered to serve 54 days in juvenile hall, and was given credit for 54 days. The court also held that the offense committed by appellant, a so-called “wobbler, ” would be deemed a felony. Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding that Minor Committed the Offense
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that he committed assault against his father with force likely to produce great bodily injury. We disagree.
“In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) In making that determination, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses any substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We resolve all conflicts and indulge all legitimate inferences in support of the judgment, and we may not substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact. (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 216) “Reversal … is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Applying this standard, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find appellant committed the assault as alleged in the petition. The trier of fact was entitled to believe appellant’s father’s testimony regarding the events of that day. That testimony reflected that appellant’s father was attempting to restrain appellant, who was not only throwing a tantrum but was swinging a bicycle lock and chain in a threatening manner. When an effort was made to take the lock and chain away from appellant, a scuffle took place and appellant struck his father on the head with the lock and chain. That same testimony also negates appellant’s theory of self-defense. The juvenile court was not required to believe appellant’s conflicting version of events, and we must defer to the court’s findings of fact since they were supported by substantial evidence.
II. Ruling Restricting Cross-Examination Was Not Prejudicial Error
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred when it cut off his cross-examination of appellant’s father about prior fights that appellant’s father had with other individuals. Appellant argues that such cross-examination might have elicited evidence of his father’s violent or aggressive character, tending to show that his father was the aggressor in this case and that appellant acted in self-defense (see Evid. Code, § 1103; People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 446-447). Thus, he claims the juvenile court’s evidentiary ruling violated his right to present a defense and to confront witnesses. The juvenile court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to the “prior fights” line of questioning based on Evidence Code section 352 and lack of relevance. Having carefully reviewed the matter in its full context, we are unable to conclude on the record before us that the juvenile court abused its discretion; but even if error did occur, it was not prejudicial.
Evidence of the victim’s character is admissible in a criminal action to prove that the victim acted in conformity with that character. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, when a defendant claims self-defense to a homicide or assaultive crime, evidence of the victim’s violent character may be relevant to show that the purported victim was in fact the aggressor. The victim’s character for violence may be proved by either reputation evidence or specific acts. (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 587; People v. Shoemaker, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at pp. 446-447.)
Generally speaking, a trial court’s application of the ordinary rules of evidence-including the rule stated in Evidence Code section 352-is not an infringement of a defendant’s right to present a defense or to cross-examine witnesses. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 807-808; People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82.) Under Evidence Code section 352, a trial court may in its discretion exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “‘Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.’” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 301; see also People v. Singleton (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1, 18-19.)
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, including those based on relevance and Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 214-215; Evid. Code, § 354.) As with other types of evidence, character evidence proffered under Evidence Code section 1103 to prove the victim’s aggressive character is subject to restriction under Evidence Code section 352, and a trial court’s ruling in that regard will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Shoemaker, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 449 [“Absent a clear showing of abuse, ” the trial court’s ruling must be upheld].) “Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time. [Citation.] Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.)
We now turn to the evidentiary ruling at issue in this case. Some background is helpful to understanding the context of the objection. Defense counsel first questioned appellant’s father in detail about the events on the day of the incident that led him to put appellant in a bear hug and the subsequent contact they had outside, when appellant’s father was struck with the lock and chain. Defense counsel asked appellant’s father how frequently he did this “hold” on appellant, and appellant’s father responded it had been necessary to use such means of restraining appellant “seven to ten times” in the past. Appellant’s father explained: “We’ve had [appellant] in counseling nine years, and he’s been on, probably, 20 different medications for anger and inability to control his actions. So, yeah, we were-we were told to not wrestle or fight him, but-but to restrain him if talking doesn’t work.” Then defense counsel asked appellant’s father a series of probing questions relating to appellant’s father’s personal character, such as whether he had “anger issue[s], ” whether he had “A.D.H.D., ” and whether he had any felony convictions, all of which were answered in the negative.
The following exchange then took place:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Have you ever been in any fights with other people?
“[APPELLANT’S FATHER]: Yes.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And when was the last one?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Well, Your Honor, this-I’m going to object to this as certainly beyond in terms of 352.
“THE COURT: Are we talking about fights with adults?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, what’s the relevance?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Fights with anybody.
“THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And for the record, Your Honor, this has to do directly with the instruction of self-defense, with the reputation in what people have heard, et cetera, about
“THE COURT: No. No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -about violence with other people.
“THE COURT: No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And he’s already answered affirmatively.
“THE COURT: [Defense counsel], next question. You’re not going to get that in.”
As noted, defense counsel sought to cross-examine appellant’s father regarding the details of prior fights because it may have elicited information relevant to appellant’s claim of self-defense. The juvenile court obviously disagreed with that proposition, but it did not explain its ruling. Since the objections raised were those of relevance and Evidence Code section 352, we assume the juvenile court concluded that the details of prior fights engaged in by appellant’s father with other adults were of such remote relevance or of such minimal probative value, if any, that such testimony would simply waste time or confuse the issues. (See Evid. Code, § 352.)
The People argue herein that cross-examination of appellant’s father was properly restricted regarding “prior fights” because appellant’s claim that he acted in self-defense was untenable under the circumstances. The testimony at trial describing the incident between appellant and his father clearly showed that appellant threw a temper tantrum and his father merely sought to restrain him with a bear hug. Further, the evidence showed that it was appellant who punched, kicked, and kneed his father, but his father never struck appellant and was only trying to get the lock and chain out of appellant’s grasp. And although appellant’s father suffered injuries to his head and back, appellant had no injuries. According to the People, on such a record “any previous fights that [appellant’s father] was involved in with ‘anybody’ was not relevant to the factual scenario in this case.”
We agree with the People that the evidence at trial overwhelmingly indicated that appellant’s father was merely attempting to restrain appellant with a bear hug in light of appellant’s out-of-control, “tantrum” behavior that included swinging a lock and chain in a threatening manner. In light of such evidence, appellant’s claim of self-defense was highly improbable. To this, we would add that appellant’s counsel did not inform the juvenile court, by offer of proof or otherwise, of the nature of the anticipated testimony. For example, there was no offer of proof indicating that appellant’s father was ever the aggressor in any previous fight with any adult, or that any previous fight had a basis for a reasonable comparison to the present incident. (See People v. Thomas (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 327, 329 [explaining need for offer of proof].) On such a record, it would have fairly appeared to the juvenile court that the subject of the proposed cross-examination (i.e., what may have transpired in a fight between appellant’s father and some other adult at some previous time) was at best merely a tangential matter of little or no probative value in the present case. Consequently, we are unable to conclude the juvenile court manifestly acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in its restriction of further cross-examination as to prior fights engaged in by appellant’s father with anyone.
We note that appellant’s father’s detailed description on the stand about what happened was strongly confirmed by Officer Mager, who testified that appellant admitted he threw a tantrum and that “while he was throwing the tantrum, he had picked up a lock … and struck his father in the back with it.” Appellant also told Officer Mager that his father had to put him in a bear hug during this tantrum in order to “gain control of him.”
In any event, even if there was error, appellant failed to establish prejudice and none is apparent on this record. The erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require reversal except where the error caused a miscarriage of justice. (Evid. Code, § 354; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1001.) “‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, ” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’” (People v. Richardson, supra, at p. 1001; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Considering the strength of the testimony that appellant’s father was merely attempting to restrain his out-of-control son who unfortunately reacted violently by swinging the lock and chain at his father’s head, it clearly would have made no difference to the outcome of this case if the trial court had ruled differently.
III. There Was No Abuse of Discretion in Determining the Offense Was a Felony
Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 gives the juvenile court the following discretion: “If the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.” In the case of such so-called “wobbler” offenses, a juvenile court is required to make an express declaration on the record whether the offense is being punished as a misdemeanor or a felony. (In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1207.) Section 17, subdivision (b), provides that a sentencing court may, in its discretion, designate a wobbler to be a misdemeanor, in which case “it is a misdemeanor for all purposes.”
Here, at the time of the dispositional hearing, appellant requested the juvenile court to reduce the section 245, subdivision (a)(1), violation to a misdemeanor. The juvenile court declined to do so and declared the offense to be a felony. Appellant contends that decision was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
“‘The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ [Citation.] Concomitantly, ‘[a] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.)
The juvenile court explained that its decision not to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor was based on a consideration of appellant’s need for a structured environment and treatment under court supervision. It explained that what is “at stake here … is the ability of the Court to have flexibility to deal with treatment, because that is what I think [appellant] needs[, ] … [a]nd that flexibility could be limited if the Court doesn’t see a lengthy period of jurisdiction and see to it that things go well.” For this reason, the juvenile court determined it was in appellant’s best interest to deny the request to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor. It is clear that the juvenile court’s decision was based on the legitimate sentencing objective of making sure appellant’s treatment progressed and that there would be a sufficient time period of court supervision thereof. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Wiseman, Acting P.J.Detjen, J.