In child abuse cases, the State must prove abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. In re R.M., 307 Ill.App.3d 541, 551, 240 Ill.Dec. 917, 718 N.E.2d 550 (1999). "Preponderance of the evidence is that amount of evidence that leads a trier of fact to find that the fact at issue is more probable than not."
Id. (quoting In re R.M., 307 Ill.App.3d 541, 551 (1st Dist. 1999)). Additionally, because child custody cases are delicate, difficult matters, the trial court is vested with discretion to an even greater degree than in other appeals to which the manifest weight standard applies.
As a result, "the trial court is afforded broad discretion when determining the existence of abuse. In re R.M., 307 Ill.App.3d 541, 551 (1999). Here, the circuit court conducted a hearing in which it had the opportunity to listen to all witness testimony and examine exhibits.
Following her time at Loretto, a doctor made a diagnosis of "child sexual abuse, suspected." See In re R.M., 307 Ill.App.3d 541, 556-57 (1999) (finding the minor's statements were corroborated by medical records and physical evidence "which the medical staff found to be suspicious for physical abuse.").
The trial court is thus accorded "broad discretion" when determining the existence of abuse. Id. at 63 (quoting In re R.M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 541, 551 (1999)). ¶ 29 As a preliminary matter, respondents challenge the credibility of Officer Kolovitz, but as the State points out, the trial court did not rely upon this testimony in reaching its findings; instead, the trial court based its findings upon: (1) A.D.'s prior removal from respondents' care, (2) respondents failure to participate in reunification services, and (3) the presence of drugs in Renee and C.M. The evidence in this case amply supports the trial court's finding. ¶ 30 The record indicates that, at birth, C.M. tested positive for cannabinoids and was exposed to cocaine in utero. Medical records also indicated that, on the day of C.M.'s birth, Renee tested positive for cocaine and cannabinoids, she appeared intoxicated, and Renee provided "scant prenatal care" before C.M.'s birth. A lengthy history of substance abuse can be a factor in determining whether a child is subjected to an injurious environment.
¶ 51 Because adjudication proceedings are civil in nature, a finding of abuse or neglect need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence (705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2014); In re A.P. , 179 Ill.2d 184, 204, 227 Ill.Dec. 949, 688 N.E.2d 642 (1997) ), i.e. , "that amount of evidence that leads a trier or fact to find that the fact at issue is more probable than not" (internal quotation marks omitted) (In re F.S. , 347 Ill.App.3d 55, 62, 282 Ill.Dec. 499, 806 N.E.2d 1087 (2004) ). Because the circuit court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, its findings of abuse or neglect are "entitled to great deference on appeal and will be disturbed only if [they are] against the manifest weight of the evidence." In re R.M. , 307 Ill.App.3d 541, 551, 240 Ill.Dec. 917, 718 N.E.2d 550 (1999). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence "if review of the record clearly demonstrates that the opposite result [is] the proper one."
As a result, "the trial court is afforded broad discretion when determining the existence of abuse[.]" In Re R.M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 541, 551 (1999). Cases adjudicating abuse and neglect are sui generis and must be decided on the basis of their particular facts.
We do not find this argument persuasive. Although out-of-court statements are generally inadmissible hearsay, the Act provides an exception for the admission of out-of-court statements made by minors pertaining to abuse or neglect. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(c) (West 2012); In re An.W., 2014 IL App (3d) 130526, ¶ 61; In re R.M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 541, 555 (1999). Section 2-18(4)(c) provides:
Those statements were properly before the trial court in the stipulated testimony of Kitakis and in the indicated reports, and it was for the trial court to determine how much weight to give to those statements. See In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d at 102, 324 Ill.Dec. 530, 896 N.E.2d 316 ; In re R.M., 307 Ill.App.3d 541, 551, 240 Ill.Dec. 917, 718 N.E.2d 550 (1999) (in determining whether minor children had been physically abused, the trial court was not required to give more weight to witnesses that actually testified before the court). Based upon the evidence presented, we reject the claim of Christine and Robert that there was insufficient corroboration to support a finding of abuse or neglect. Having reached that conclusion, we will now address the remaining assertions made by Christine in support of her argument on this issue.
” Id. As a result, “ the trial court is afforded broad discretion when determining the existence of abuse.” In re R.M., 307 Ill.App.3d 541, 551, 240 Ill.Dec. 917, 718 N.E.2d 550 (1999). ¶ 32 I. Physical Abuse