She argues only that the cause must be remanded for further dispositional proceedings because the court failed to comply with the statutory requirement that a written factual basis be provided in support of the guardianship determination. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002). The State, citing In re R.M., 283 Ill.App.3d 469, 219 Ill.Dec. 149, 670 N.E.2d 827 (1996), argues that the requirement of a written factual basis is "permissive" and subject to waiver where a respondent parent fails to object at trial. Section 2-27 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides in relevant part as follows:
" The State further argues that "[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that the "knew or should have known" standard applies in this case, and that the events of October 5, 1996, transpired just as respondent and her baby-sitter claimed that they did, respondent either knew or should have known that her baby-sitter would leave Marcos alone in the apartment." Alternatively, the State argues that respondent unintentionally disregarded her parental duty, based on its interpretation of In re R.M., 283 Ill. App.3d 469, 670 N.E.2d 827 (1996), as discussed below, and that respondent is in effect per se guilty of neglect of M.Z., thus requiring no showing whether she knew or should have known her sister would leave M.Z. alone. In so doing, the State appears to associate that part of respondent's argument here, that there must be a showing that she should have known that her sister would leave M.Z. alone, with an unintentional disregard of her parental duty.
Since there is no other indication in the record that respondent requested a reasonable efforts hearing or that he raised an objection in the trial court regarding the alleged lack of such a finding, the issue has been waived. In re R.M., 283 Ill.App.3d 469, 472, 219 Ill.Dec. 149, 670 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1996). Finally, we note that even in Patricia S., this court did not order the cause remanded.
In any event, not only has respondent waived her challenge by not objecting to the circuit court's alleged oversight, section 2-27 does not mandate the court to state the basis of its determination. In re R.M., 283 Ill. App. 3d 469, 472, 670 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1996). Significantly, the record indicates that the prior case for abuse and neglect against respondent was not closed as a result of respondent completing services considered imperative to address and rectify the reasons for her prior mistreatment of M.B. Rather, the case was closed when custody of M.B. was transferred from respondent to the child's natural father.
However, that issue is waived because the foster mother's counsel did not object during the juvenile court hearing. In re R.M., 283 Ill. App.3d 469, 472, 670 N.E.2d 827, 829 (1996). Though the DCFS counsel was present, she was not representing Margie B. and so lacked standing to object on her behalf as to that issue.