This precedent has been followed uniformly by our State's appellate court. (See Gaines, 188 Ill. App.3d 451; People v. Goodwin (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 56; In re R.L.W. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 521.) Moreover, a grant of immunity under statutory authority must be in strict compliance with the terms of the statute.
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 106-1, 106-2.) Relying on People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald (1977), 66 Ill.2d 546, 363 N.E.2d 835, and on In re R.L.W. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 521, 397 N.E.2d 530, defendant asserts that the language of these statutes does not provide in any manner for the transmutation of transactional immunity into use immunity. In both of these cases, the witness' transactional immunity was granted under sections 106-1 and 106-2 of the State statute, and the courts were required to determine the effect of that immunity upon other State prosecutions.
People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald (1977), 66 Ill.2d 546, 550-51. See also In re R.L.W. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 521, 523-24. We therefore conclude that the defendants are compelled to answer and produce documents in their deposition or suffer the penalty of contempt.
People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 897, 533 P.2d 1024, 1047, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 407. Moreover, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that a trial court has no inherent power to grant immunity and may only do so by virtue of statutory authority ( People v. Rockola (1930), 339 Ill. 474, 171 N.E. 559; People v. English (1964), 31 Ill.2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455; In re R.L.W. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 521, 397 N.E.2d 530). Sections 106-1 and 106-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 106-1 and 106-2) encompass the extent of availability immunity in criminal cases, and would be inapplicable here, as they deal with immunity for witnesses rather than defendants. Furthermore, these paragraphs authorize only transactional immunity. ( People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald (1977), 66 Ill.2d 546, 363 N.E.2d 835.)