Opinion
2 CA-JV 2023-0082
02-07-2024
In re Dependency of R.L., S.S., and G.S.,
The Huff Law Firm, Tucson By Daniel R. Huff and Laura J. Huff Counsel for Appellant Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Jennifer L. Thorson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. JD20210534 The Honorable Kimberly H. Ortiz, Judge
The Huff Law Firm, Tucson By Daniel R. Huff and Laura J. Huff Counsel for Appellant
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Jennifer L. Thorson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Judge Sklar authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SKLAR, JUDGE
¶1 Danielle L. appeals from the juvenile court's order adjudicating her three children, R.L., born November 2010, S.S., born December 2015, and G.S., born March 2018, dependent based on neglect. See A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(iii). We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order. See Shella H. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, n.1 (App. 2016). In September 2021, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) removed the children from Danielle's care and filed a petition alleging they were dependent as to her "due to abuse and/or neglect." The petition alleged that Danielle's boyfriend, Michael M., whom the children consider to be their "dad," had hit R.L.'s thighs with a stick causing "severe bruising." The petition also alleged that Danielle had initially reported the injuries were an accident but later acknowledged Michael had inflicted them by mistake. Michael pled guilty to child abuse and was placed on probation. The children were returned to Danielle's care in November 2021, and the dependency was dismissed in June 2022.
¶3 In October 2022, DCS reactivated the dependency because G.S. had arrived to her daycare with a purple "nick[el] size bump" on her left eye brow that she told staff Michael had inflicted when he "slapped the back of her head," causing her to hit her head on a toilet. G.S. later repeated this story in a forensic interview. G.S. also disclosed that in the same incident Michael had hit S.S. on the lips for "being bad" but did not leave a mark. G.S. maintained that Michael hits her and her siblings "all the time with his hand or a belt." The caseworker also reported that S.S. told her that while G.S. was sitting on the toilet backwards, Michael "smacked her in the back of the head causing her to slam her head into the toilet[,] causing the bruise."
¶4 Michael denied having hit G.S., telling law enforcement that he had heard G.S. and S.S. bickering in the bathroom and asked them "hey what are you doing," which scared G.S. and when she turned to look at him, she bumped her head into the toilet. Danielle told a detective that she had not been home when the incident happened but that she had spoken to G.S. Danielle said G.S. told her that she had lied about it because she wanted somebody to get in trouble. The children remained in Danielle's care, and Michael moved out of the home but engaged in supervised visitation twice a week.
¶5 After an eight-part contested dependency hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent as to Danielle, finding that she "neglects the children" by allowing Michael to care for them despite reports of physical discipline and "disbelieving" and "minimizing" reports of Michael's "current abuse."
¶6 Danielle appealed the dependency adjudication, though by the time the opening brief was filed, the juvenile court had dismissed the dependency. We nevertheless decline to find Danielle's appeal moot based on the collateral consequences exception. See Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, ¶ 9 (App. 2012); see also A.R.S. § 8-804(A); Phillip B. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 253 Ariz. 295, ¶ 1 (App. 2022) (DCS maintains central registry of substantiated reports of child abuse and neglect, which can disqualify individuals from obtaining or maintaining licenses, certifications, or employment in working with children). The juvenile court also found the children dependent as to their biological fathers, but they are not parties to this appeal.
Discussion
¶7 On appeal, Danielle argues "no reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's finding of . . . neglect." Under § 8-201(15)(a)(iii), a dependent child is one whose home "is unfit by reason of abuse, neglect, cruelty or depravity by a parent." Neglect, in relevant part, means the "inability or unwillingness of a parent" to provide a child with supervision "if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child's health or welfare." § 8-201(25)(a). We review a dependency adjudication for an abuse of discretion, deferring to the juvenile court's ability to weigh and analyze the evidence. Shella H., 239 Ariz. 47, ¶ 13. And we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's findings. Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 21 (App. 2005); see also A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1) (petitioner bears burden of proving allegations in petition by preponderance of evidence). We will affirm the order "unless the findings upon which it is based are clearly erroneous and there is no reasonable evidence" supporting it. In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Dependency Action No. 118537 , 185 Ariz. 77, 79 (App. 1994).
¶8 Danielle contends that she and Michael successfully completed and benefitted from services during this and the previous dependency, including parenting classes, individual and family therapy, healthy relationship classes, the Nurturing Parenting Program, and supervised visitation. The record supports this argument, and the juvenile court credited Danielle and Michael's successful and beneficial participation in those services.
¶9 The juvenile court, however, was disturbed by Danielle's continued disbelief of G.S.'s original disclosure "despite contemporaneous and unrefuted corroboration" by S.S. Danielle maintains that she had a reasonable basis for disbelieving the allegation because G.S. retracted her claim and apologized for lying. And Danielle testified that R.L. had told her Michael did not hit G.S. and that she had neither seen nor heard from R.L. or S.S. that Michael had used physical discipline since the last dependency. But the record also contains evidence supporting G.S.'s disclosure and the juvenile court's finding that Danielle's disbelief was neglectful. Specifically, G.S. repeated an unchanging account to daycare employees, a DCS investigator, and a forensic interviewer, and S.S. told the DCS investigator the same story. Further, the DCS investigator testified about the safety risk of Michael-a convicted abuser-subjecting the children to "physical abuse" if he had not made behavioral changes. The juvenile court, as the trier of fact, was "in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Danielle's argument essentially amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we are not permitted to do. See Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, ¶ 18 (2018). The court's findings are supported by reasonable evidence and inferences so we must accept them. See id.
Disposition
¶10 We affirm the juvenile court's order adjudicating R.L., S.S., and G.S. dependent as to Danielle.