Opinion
A121750.
6-26-2009
In re R.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN FRANCISCO CITY AND COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.J. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
R.J. and her five siblings were removed from the custody of their mother, R.J. (Mother), and their alleged father, James J. (Father), by the San Francisco City and County Department of Human Services (Agency) after Mother was arrested for assaulting Father. The children were living in squalid and unsafe conditions, and the older children were found to have been emotionally traumatized by exposure to years of frequent, serious, and mutual domestic violence between the parents. After more than a year of reunification services, during which the parents participated in therapy and various educational programs, they continued to engage in domestic violence. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and ended unsupervised visitation.
The parents contend the juvenile courts findings that return of the children would create a substantial risk of detriment and that the parents received reasonable reunification services were not supported by substantial evidence. They also argue that counsels representation of all six children jointly created a conflict of interest and the courts requirement of supervised visitation was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 2, 2006, the Agency filed a child dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) with respect to R.J., age 12, K.J., age 10, J.J., age 9, D.J., age 6, N.J., age 4, and Y.J., age 2. The petition alleged that Mother and Father had engaged in domestic violence in front of the children, neglected and failed to supervise them, and abused drugs, and that the children had developed behavioral and emotional problems as a result of the parents conduct.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The petition stated that on September 18, 2006, Mother, while intoxicated, ran Father down with a vehicle, injuring his pelvis. A restraining order was issued. Four days later, Mother still bore bruises and scratches from the confrontation that preceded the vehicular assault. Social workers sent to investigate the family reported a filthy and disordered home with an overpowering stench of urine, walls and floors smeared with dirt and feces, a lack of furniture, and various other unsanitary and dangerous conditions. Family members stated that Mother and Father abused alcohol, smoked marijuana in their home, and engaged in frequent domestic violence. The children were badly traumatized from the living conditions and displayed behavioral problems. R.J. exhibited aggressive and violent behavior toward her siblings and others; K.J. engaged in bulimic behavior; J.J. had difficulty controlling urination; and the younger girls exhibited nervous symptoms. Mother had an extensive history with the Agency, accumulating several reports of neglect and child behavioral problems over the past four years. Father was listed as an alleged father, since he and Mother had never married, despite a long relationship.
Fathers failure to achieve more than alleged father status was the basis for our rejection of his prior appeal in this matter (In re R.J. (Jan. 23, 2008, A117237) [nonpub. opn.]). We hereby grant the Agencys motion to take judicial notice of this decision. Although Father apparently has made no further legal effort to achieve presumed father status, it is not disputed that he is the biological father of these six children.
Mother told police she had had over 100 physical confrontations with Father, less than half of which had been reported. Six arrest reports from the period 2003 through 2008 submitted later by the Agency documented startling incidents of domestic violence. The parents had engaged, apparently on roughly equal terms, in confrontations that featured screaming and yelling, pushing and shoving, beating with fists and implements, kicking and stomping with feet, biting, grabbing of genitals, slashing, stabbing and spearing, spraying caustic chemicals, and battering with a vehicle. These brawls resulted not just in physical injuries to the couple but also damage to the interior of their home and its furnishings. The children were present for at least some of these incidents. The juvenile court ordered the children detained, and they were placed with their maternal grandparents. After a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court sustained allegations that the parents had a relationship characterized by domestic violence, had substance abuse problems, and failed to supervise their children, resulting in behavioral problems. It found jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), and continued the childrens placement with their grandparents. The court struck allegations of child abuse and failure to maintain a safe and sanitary home.
Each of the children was evaluated by a psychologist, and all but the youngest were found to have serious traumatic symptoms, essentially shell-shocked from their home life with the parents. They were described by a treating psychologist as " `some of the most traumatized kids weve ever seen. " The time away from their parents led to a gradual improvement in many of their symptoms.
As required by statute, the Agency provided reunification services to the parents. They were directed to parenting, substance abuse, and violence/anger management programs, as well as individual therapy. Ultimately, the parents completed substance abuse, parenting, and domestic violence classes. Mother eventually began a more extensive, 52-week domestic violence class, and she participated in joint therapy with the two youngest children. The Agency resisted providing them couples therapy, believing that it would be ineffective until the parents had made more progress with their individual therapy. Mother eventually requested family therapy, but the Agency declined, in part because it concluded she was not adequately utilizing the services that had been made available. Nonetheless, the Agency arranged for family therapy with Mother in October 2007, but when she did not take advantage of it, the Agency withdrew the offer until her visitation with the children became "more consistent."
Over the course of the reunification period, the parents visited periodically with the children, with mixed results. Sometimes the visits were successful, other times chaotic and exhausting for all concerned. By July 2007, the parents had progressed to an assortment of supervised and unsupervised visits. In October, however, the Agency petitioned the court to require that visits be supervised and occur separately for Mother and Father because the parents had difficulty dealing with the children. The difficulty resulted in a replay of the couples aggressive pattern, with counterproductive anger and conflict and predictably negative consequences for the children. In addition, the parents tolerated, without intervention, a level of aggression among the children that the Agency viewed as alarming. One of the children reported that during a visit with both parents, the parents shut themselves in a bedroom, leaving the children unsupervised. R.J., the oldest, then locked the other children out of the house.
Throughout the reunification process, the Agency remained dubious that the services were having the intended effect of ensuring that the children would not be subjected to further violence and trauma. In August 2007, for example, the Agency commented that "[t]he mother knows about a lot of services, and can advocate for them, but it is unclear whether she realizes yet the changes she herself will have to make as a goal of these services." Particularly concerning were the parents continued denial that their children suffered from psychological problems as a result of their exposure to traumatic conditions and their tendency to blame the Agency for the familys difficulties. Again in an August 2007 report, the Agency noted, "the mother is . . . making very small steps towards addressing the events that led to her children being detained. There still seems to be a great deal of defensiveness and blaming of others, which is impacting her ability to benefit from services and make real progress." Father was subject to identical concerns. Symptomatic of his tendency to blame others, in July 2007, Father filed a small claims action against three Agency workers, alleging they "ha[ve] slandered my character and discriminated against me continuously to the family law courts, abusing `hearsay as truth with a lot of manipulation and misleading reports." In December 2007, the Agency reported, "[w]henever the childrens concerns are discussed with the parents, [the parents] deny that those things happened or claim their children are lying. . . . There does not seem to be empathy for what the children might be experiencing, and no acknowledgement from the parents that they need to change." Throughout the process, the parents had a tendency to shade unpleasant truths, if not lie outright to the Agency, and they encouraged the children to do the same.
The nature of the parents relationship was both a concern and a mystery during the dependency proceeding. Restraining orders were in effect during the initial portion of the dependency, and the parents claimed not to be involved with each other any longer. Yet similar orders had been issued more than once in the past as a result of their mutual violence, and the couple ignored the orders, reuniting voluntarily. During the reunification period, there were frequent reports that the parents were spending time together, despite their denials, and they continued to profess mutual hope for a future as a couple. In late November 2007, Mother was arrested for committing domestic violence on Father. Both parents bore minor injuries from the confrontation. Fathers comments to police at the time indicated that the couples "dating" relationship was ongoing. Because the violent relationship between the two parents was the primary cause of the dysfunction in the family, the uncertainty about the status and nature of their relationship made evaluation of the childrens status more difficult.
The Agencys October 2007 request to suspend unsupervised visitation was granted provisionally, with a final decision to be made at the next periodic review hearing later that month. The hearing was continued several times, and prior to any final decision both parents filed their own section 388 petitions to change the visitation arrangements. Mother sought reversion to weekly unsupervised visitation, with all children present. Father sought similar relief, along with the request that both parents be permitted to visit simultaneously.
Trial on the contested, consolidated 6-month and 12-month reviews, along with the competing visitation petitions, began on January 2, 2008, and was conducted intermittently until April 14. Twenty-one witnesses testified, including the parents, the social workers involved, and various therapists. The Agency recommended that reunification services to the parents be denied and the children placed permanently with the grandparents with whom they were living.
During the hearing, the childrens therapists testified that each of them had suffered serious traumatic symptoms from their home life with the parents and had gradually improved during the period of separation. In general, they believed that successful placement of the children could occur only with a caretaker who was sensitive to the trauma they had suffered, but the therapists contacts with one or both parents suggested that neither parent was wholly able to acknowledge that trauma. Mother testified about various physical problems she had suffered in recent years and the difficulty they caused for her in caring for her seven children. She claimed that she no longer lived with Father and minimized, denied, or explained away the various episodes of violence between them. She did, however, acknowledge that the children had been exposed to domestic violence, as she had been during childhood. Father also denied that he and Mother were living together. He minimized the violence between them, characterizing it as "arguing" and attributing much of the violence between the couple to Mothers physical condition. Although he acknowledged that the police had been called many times to separate the couple and had often arrested either one or the other, he asserted that Mothers claims of violence by him were false. He also claimed that it was an accident when Mother ran him over with the car.
One of Mothers children by a different father, who was living with her, is not involved in this appeal.
The juvenile court denied the parents request for unsupervised visitation as to all children other than R.J. The court explained, "Im guided by the preferences of the children, where they say that they are happy with the way that things are in the visits taking place under supervision." R.J. was permitted unsupervised visits on "a trial basis."
The court accepted the Agencys recommendation that reunification services be terminated. The court found that return of the children to their parents would create a substantial risk to their safety and well-being, citing the following reasons: (1) the parents had a 15-year history of domestic violence, possibly involving 50 to 100 incidents; (2) the children had been "profoundly affected" by this violence, effects that would require years to overcome; (3) the "parents, each of them, have minimized or otherwise recharacterized their domestic violence conduct, calling certain conduct accidents, or mishaps, or accidents of daily living, or just outright denial of the things that happened, and that each of the parents have failed to appreciate the extent, frequency, and magnitude of the domestic violence"; (4) the parents failed to "acknowledge and appreciate" the impact of their behavior on their children; (5) the most recent incident of violence demonstrated that despite all the classes and therapy, the parents had "not significantly progressed in learning how to prevent and avoid domestic violence between themselves"; and (6) the parents continued living together, despite their denials. The court also concluded that there was no substantial probability that the children would be returned to the parents by the time of the 18-month review and directed long-term placement with their grandparents, rather than a termination of parental rights.
The experiment with unsupervised visits for R.J., begun in April, was terminated a month later. At a hearing on May 5, approximately three weeks after the courts order, counsel for the children reported that R.J.s conduct had undergone a noticeable change since the unsupervised visits were begun. She had become resistant to social workers at school and was using the excuse of unsupervised visits with Father to manipulate school employees. Ten days later, the juvenile court held a hearing on R.J.s unsupervised visits. The Agencys status report submitted for that hearing stated that since the visits had begun R.J. "has become aggressive and manipulative with her siblings," taunting the younger children with candy and money given to her by the parents during the unsupervised visits. More troubling, she had reverted to earlier disruptive behavior, coercing the younger children with threats of violence and inflicting and inspiring violent acts among them. As a result, the younger children had become secretive and withdrawn, considerably increasing the grandparents difficulty in caring for the children. The Agency concluded that "[R.J.s] acting out behavior muddled by this `special privilege as she sees it, is jeopardizing both her placement and her relationships with her siblings." As a result, it recommended against further unsupervised visits. R.J.s therapist, although noting that R.J. was "very excited" about the unsupervised visits and desired to continue them, concluded they were not in her best interests because of the confusion and behavioral changes they had caused. Relying "in particular" on the therapists testimony and "her strong recommendation that the visit[s] should return to supervised visits," the court reimposed supervised visits.
II. DISCUSSION
Father contends (1) the attorney representing the minors had a conflict of interest because the childrens interests differed, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying unsupervised visitation, (3) the juvenile courts finding that the children would suffer detriment if returned to the parents was not supported by substantial evidence, and (4) he was not provided reasonable reunification services. Mother contends (1) the juvenile courts conclusion that the two youngest children, N.J. and Y.J., would suffer detriment if returned to her was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) she was not provided reasonable reunification services; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in not granting unsupervised visitation. She also joins in Fathers argument regarding attorney conflict of interest.
A. Conflict of Interest
Father argues that "[m]inors counsel had an actual conflict of interest as the readiness of each individual child to return home and/or to have unsupervised visits differed and counsel could not effectively advocate one position without either ignoring or discounting the other position. While some of the children were in a position to return home, others were not." In addition to this general argument, Father contends that counsel had an actual conflict in addressing R.J.s experimental unsupervised visits.
The Agency claims that Father lacks standing to make this argument because he never established presumed father status. Even if this position is correct, Mother undoubtedly has standing to raise the argument (e.g., In re Barbara R. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 941, 953), and she has joined in Fathers argument. We therefore address it. The Agency also argues waiver, but it has been held, by analogy to criminal law, that such a conflict is not waived by the failure to bring it to the attention of the juvenile court. (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 564.)
The juvenile court may appoint a single attorney to represent a group of siblings only if the differing positions of the children do not create an actual conflict of interest or the reasonable likelihood of such a conflict. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.660(c)(1)(A) & (B).) Once appointed, the siblings counsel has an ongoing duty to monitor the proceeding and request separate counsel if an actual conflict develops. (Ibid.; In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 58.) "[A] conflict typically arises when the circumstances of a particular case present `a substantial risk that the lawyers representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by . . . the lawyers duties to another current client . . . . " (In re Zamer G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1264-1265.)
We find no merit in Fathers argument that a conflict existed merely because the children were at different levels of maturity, which might cause them to be situated differently with respect to reunification and visitation issues. This did not make the childrens legal interests adverse, but merely different. Nor did it necessarily create a risk that counsels representation of one would compromise representation of the others. In theory, counsel could easily advocate a particular outcome for one child and a different outcome for another, based on their individual needs and interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.660(c)(1)(C)(iii) ["a purely theoretical or abstract conflict of interest among the siblings" does not necessarily create a conflict requiring separate counsel].) No conflict was created, for example, by the fact that some of the children might have been better prepared for unsupervised visits than others. Counsel could have discriminated among them in this respect without advocating inconsistent or adverse legal positions, since the distinctions would be based on the unique circumstances of each child.
In contrast to the merely theoretical conflict presented by the siblings differing levels of maturity, R.J.s experimental unsupervised visits presented a concrete situation. Father argues that a conflict existed because R.J.s strong preference for unsupervised visits conflicted with the interests of the other children, who were upset by her behavior after the visits began.
There is a strong argument that no conflict existed. While the childrens counsel had a duty to inform the court of R.J.s wishes, which strongly favored unsupervised visits (§ 317, subd. (e)), counsel had no duty to advocate for those wishes. "Despite the seemingly inherent conflict in all dependency cases where a minors counsel takes a position contrary to the minors stated wishes, the Legislature has expressly provided that the best interests of the minor, not his or her wishes, determine the outcome of the case. [Citations.] `[T]he paramount duty of counsel for minors is not zealously to advocate the clients objectives, but to advocate for what the lawyer believes to be in the clients best interests, even when the lawyer and the client disagree. [Citation.] In this regard, a minors counsel may not `act as a mouthpiece for the child or advocate a position counsel has reason to believe might endanger the child. [Citations.]" (In re Kristen B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1541.) Counsel determined that R.J.s interests, despite her desires, were not served by unsupervised visits. For that reason, her legal interests were wholly aligned with those of her siblings.
Even assuming a conflict of interest existed, any such conflict was harmless. The decision of the juvenile court is not to be reversed as a result of conflict of interest affecting minors counsel unless there is "a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different" but for the failure to appoint separate counsel as a result of the conflict. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Here, there is no such possibility. The evidence leaves little doubt that R.J. did not have the emotional maturity to cope with unsupervised visits. The visits appeared to be the cause of a flurry of self-destructive behavior, including resistance to the social workers at school and aggressive and manipulative behavior toward her siblings. This was not merely bad for her brothers and sisters, but bad for R.J. as well. Her behavior risked not only the progress she had made at school, but it also risked her placement with her grandparents, who suggested they could not keep R.J. if she continued to misbehave. R.J.s personal therapist, in addition to her counsel, concluded that unsupervised visits were not in R.J.s best interests, and the juvenile court relied heavily on the therapists opinion in terminating the visits. Under these circumstances, there is little chance that, even if separate counsel had been appointed, the new attorney would have taken a different view of R.J.s best interests. Further, even if new counsel had been appointed and advocated for unsupervised visits, there is little chance the juvenile court would have permitted them to continue. As a result, any conflict was harmless. (In re Celine R., at p. 60.)
B. Substantial Risk of Detriment
Under section 366.21, subdivision (f), which governs 12-month review hearings in dependency proceedings, "the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." This statutory requirement of a substantial risk of detriment sets a "fairly high" standard. (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 789 (David B.).) At this point in the dependency process, the presumption is that the child will be returned. As a result, the burden is on the Agency to demonstrate that a substantial risk of detriment exists, precluding reunification. (Ibid.)
Father challenges the juvenile courts conclusion that a substantial risk of detriment existed in returning the children to both parents, while Mother challenges that finding at least as to the youngest two children. We apply a substantial evidence review to the juvenile courts finding of a substantial risk of detriment. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 974 (Alvin R.).)
It is unclear whether Father contends the court erred with respect to both parents, or merely as to Mother. The resolution, however, is identical as to both in these circumstances. Further, because Mother joins in Fathers arguments, we address Fathers argument without regard to his individual standing to raise the issue. (See fn. 4, ante.)
The parents argue that the children should have been returned because they not only successfully completed the reunification services, but also participated in additional programs as well. While compliance with the reunification plan "is a pertinent consideration," it is "not determinative." (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1341.) We agree with the juvenile court that in these circumstances mere completion of the reunification program was insufficient to justify reuniting parents and children. These children were severely traumatized by a lifetime of exposure to a parental relationship characterized by frequent, extraordinarily angry, and often violent confrontations. As the juvenile court noted, Mother estimated that she and Father had engaged in physical violence over 100 times in the course of their relationship. The emotional stress this placed on these small children, helplessly anticipating and witnessing their parents threaten and assault each other on a monthly basis, can hardly be imagined. The result, as one psychologist noted, was " `some of the most traumatized kids weve ever seen. " The parents past behavior unquestionably was a clear "detriment to the safety [and] emotional well-being of the child[ren]." (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)
A substantial risk of further detriment upon reunification could be avoided only if there was reason to believe the parents behavior would change, either because their relationship had ended or because the parents had managed to find a peaceful way of conducting their relationship. There was little evidence of either. Although the parents denied they were continuing in their relationship, there was substantial evidence they continued to see each other with some frequency.
The juvenile courts conclusion that the parents had not made significant progress in avoiding violence in their relationship was similarly supported by substantial evidence. Mother attended a number of programs on domestic violence, but the Agency was continually concerned, based on her attitude and behavior, that she was not taking the lessons to heart. Doubts about a lack of change in the parents relationship were confirmed when, in November 2007, Mother was arrested yet again for committing domestic violence on Father after a confrontation in which both suffered injury. The parents tendency to minimize the role of violence in their relationship, commonly observed by those involved in this matter, was confirmed at the hearing and noted by the court. In testifying, both parents tended to excuse or deny the existence of the violence that was clear from their arrest records and statements to police and in the traumatic reaction of their children. The juvenile court was justified in concluding that the parents were unlikely to change their behavior and were unable honestly to acknowledge its violent nature. Because the parents were likely both to reunite and to resume the pattern of violence so destructive to their children, the juvenile courts conclusion that reunification presented a substantial risk of detriment was warranted.
Citing Jennifer A. v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, Mother characterizes the November 2007 violence toward Father as "one misstep" that should not disqualify her from reunification services. As the discussion above demonstrates, however, it was not just the November incident, but Mothers larger pattern of behavior and her unwillingness to acknowledge the ingrained nature of violence in their relationship that supported termination of services.
Mother argues that the finding of detriment cannot be made with respect to the two youngest children because they did not show the same symptoms of trauma displayed by the older children. In effect, she argues, the two youngest children should be returned because they have not yet been traumatized. The "substantial risk of detriment" test of section 366.21 does not, however, focus on the past but on the future. There is no reason to believe that the two youngest children would not develop the same symptoms as the other children if exposed over a period of time to the violent conduct that caused severe trauma to the older children. The juvenile courts decision was based on the conclusion that the parents would resume the same relationship if reunification were granted. The younger children, regardless of whether they have been traumatized to date, would be subject to the same future risk of detriment as the other children if reunification were granted.
The parents argue that the Agencys perception that they had not internalized the lessons taught with respect to domestic violence in the services provided does not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of substantial risk of detriment, citing In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 289, and Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1751. Here, however, there was more than an Agency perception that the parents had not learned from the reunification process. As discussed above, the parents confirmed through their behavior and their testimony that they had not. It was not only the Agencys perception of their failure to internalize the necessary lessons, but also the parents own conduct demonstrating that failure, that provides substantial evidence supporting the juvenile courts conclusion.
C. Reasonableness of Services
The parents contend they were not provided reasonable reunification services because the Agency did not approve family therapy. Mother also contends she should be found to have been denied reasonable services because she was precluded from contacting the social worker in charge of the matter.
Preservation of families is the first priority of the child dependency laws. (In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1112.) Accordingly, when a child is removed from a parents home, the supervising agency is required to formulate a plan for reunification of the child and parent and to provide to the parent reasonable reunification services "that [a]re designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child." (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) These "[r]eunification services implement `the laws strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible. [Citation.]" (In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1787.)
Reunification services must be tailored to the unique needs of the particular family. (David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.) The supervising agency must identify the problems leading to the loss of custody, offer services designed to remedy those problems, maintain reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proves difficult. (Id. at p. 794.) All that is required, however, are reasonable services. "In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) In reviewing a juvenile court finding after a 12-month review hearing that reasonable reunification services have been provided, we apply the substantial evidence test. (Id. at p. 545.)
We find substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts conclusion that reasonable services were provided. The parents were provided with extensive services, including several classes tailored to their perceived deficiencies, individual psychological therapy for each parent, and supervised therapeutic visitation with the children. The parents contend that family therapy should have been provided, citing the testimony of some of the therapists involved that the family was ready for such therapy. The Agency logically reasoned, however, that family therapy was premature until the parents had made some progress in controlling the domestic violence in their relationship. It was not, after all, the dynamics between the parents and their children that were precluding reunification; it was the parents inability to keep their own relationship free of violence. As a result, contrary to Mothers claim, family therapy was not a "critical aspect" of the reunification plan. Until there was some reason to believe that the parents either would not reunite or could conduct their relationship without violence, reunification was unlikely. It was therefore the domestic violence classes that were critical, and the parents do not fault the Agencys effort in this regard.
Nor do we find any insufficiency in the Agencys forbidding Mother to contact the social worker in charge directly, rather than through the Agencys legal counsel. Mother was not precluded from contact with the social worker entirely, but direct contact was forbidden as a result of Mothers aggressive conduct toward the social worker. Mother points to no additional services that might have been provided, other than the family therapy discussed above, if direct contact would have been permitted.
The parents rely largely on Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 962, in which the court detained a child who had been physically abused by his father. (Id. at p. 966.) The agency recognized that in order to reunify the father and child, the two would need joint counseling, since the child strongly resisted even visiting with, let alone living with, his father. Because of the childs resistance, however, the agency also recognized that the child would need individual counseling before joint counseling could succeed. (Id. at pp. 967-968.) Despite this recognition, the agency was slow to obtain an individual counselor for the child, and by the time of the review hearing, the child had yet to complete individual counseling, let alone begin the necessary joint counseling. (Id. at pp. 968-969.) Given the failure to begin joint therapy, which was a necessary prerequisite to reunification, the court found no substantial evidence to support the finding that reasonable reunification services had been provided. (Id. at pp. 972-973.)
As the preceding discussion makes clear, the circumstances of Alvin R. are quite different from those presented here. In Alvin R., the agency had failed to provide the type of services that it acknowledged were necessary before reunification could occur. The critical barrier to reunification in this case was the parents domestic violence. In contrast to the agency in Alvin R., the Agency provided both programs specifically directed at domestic violence and individual therapy in an attempt to overcome the parents problem.
The parents also cite Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340. In that case, although the child had been removed as a result of domestic violence between the parents, the agency failed to enroll the mother in a domestic violence program. (Id. at p. 1346.) As noted above, there was no similar oversight here.
D. Visitation
The parents also challenge the juvenile courts grant of the Agencys section 388 petition to impose separate, supervised visitation and its rejection of their counter-petitions to maintain joint, unsupervised visitation. Section 388 petitions are judged by the best interests of the child, and we review the juvenile courts order for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317-318.)
Father contends that he was denied unsupervised visits because of Mothers inability to control the children and that the parents circumstances should have been considered separately. In fact, although it is true Mother had some difficulty controlling the children during visits, the Agency requested supervised visits after it learned that the parents were engaging in aggressive behavior towards each other during visits and had, on at least one occasion, shut themselves in a bedroom during an unsupervised visit, permitting the children to run unsupervised. It was not the case that unsupervised visitation was denied solely as a result of Mothers conduct, without separate consideration of Father. On the evidence presented, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that separate, supervised visits were in the childrens best interests.
Mother contends that the children wanted to visit with her and that overnight visits with the two youngest children would have been in their best interests. The juvenile courts order did not, however, preclude all visitation. It merely required supervision of the visits. Further, as the juvenile court found, the children preferred supervised visits. (See, e.g., In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432 [childrens preferences are not determinative but should be considered].) On the evidence discussed above, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile courts denial of Mothers section 388 petition, including its decision not to renew the overnight visits of the two youngest children.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
We concur:
Marchiano, P.J.
Graham, J.