Opinion
No. 347733
08-20-2019
In re O. Y. RICHMOND, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-000756-NA Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and GLEICHER and SWARTZLE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals the order terminating his parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to custody of the parent). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The trial court removed the minor child from respondent's care in May 2017 because respondent was manufacturing crack cocaine in the family home while the child's mother was pregnant with the child, and the child was born with cocaine and opiates in her system. Respondent admitted the allegations in the petition, and the trial court placed the child with her cousin. Respondent's service plan required him to participate in individual substance-abuse therapy, random drug screening, and parenting classes; maintain a legal source of income and suitable housing; and undergo a substance-abuse assessment. Respondent was terminated from his parenting classes and individual substance-abuse therapy several times. Respondent also missed 44 of 52 total drug screens and only had one negative drug screen. The foster-care agency was unable to verify that respondent had a suitable home for the child. Finally, respondent was incarcerated in Ohio from January 24, 2018, to April 4, 2018.
Because the child's mother died of a drug overdose during the pendency of this case, this opinion does not address issues related to her parental rights. --------
The trial court initially terminated respondent's parental rights on June 20, 2018. Because respondent alleged that he was unaware of the termination hearing, the trial court granted respondent's motion to reopen the proofs in this case. Following an additional termination hearing, the trial court again terminated respondent's parental rights on September 10, 2018. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that statutory grounds existed to terminate his parental rights.
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). To be clearly erroneous, a trial court's determination "must be more than maybe or probably wrong." In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. In reviewing the trial court's determination, this Court must give due regard to the "special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." Id., citing MCR 2.613(C).
The trial court found that three statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights, namely MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent argues that the trial court lacked clear and convincing evidence to terminate his parental rights under these statutory subsections. "Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent's parental rights, even if the court erroneously found sufficient evidence under other statutory grounds." In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) authorizes a trial court to terminate parental rights if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
The statutory basis to terminate a parent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) exists "when the conditions that brought the children into foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services." In re White, 303 Mich App at 710 (cleaned up).(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
The trial court entered the initial dispositional order in this case on July 3, 2017, more than 182 days before the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights on September 10, 2018. Respondent admitted the allegations in the original petition. Although respondent denied that he used cocaine, he admitted that he packaged cocaine at his home and that he used marijuana. The child tested positive for opiates and cocaine at the time of her birth, and before her death from a drug overdose, the child's mother blamed the child's positive test on the drugs respondent was packaging at the house that they shared.
In its order terminating respondent's parental rights, the trial court found that respondent still had a substance-abuse problem because he recently tested positive for opiates and he missed 44 drug screens. The trial court also found that respondent failed to participate fully in or benefit from his service plan. The record supports these findings. Respondent was terminated from his substance-abuse counseling and parenting classes multiple times, and he never completed either program. Respondent failed to verify that he had suitable housing and failed to maintain contact with the foster-care agency. Despite all of the services offered to respondent, he only completed 8 of 52 drug screens. Only one of respondent's drug screens was negative, and his August 15, 2018 drug screen, which was taken after the trial court reopened the proofs in this case, was positive for opiates. The trial court removed the child from respondent's care because of problems with illegal drugs; these problems continued to exist at the time of termination despite the extensive services offered to respondent. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Because only one statutory ground need be established to terminate a respondent's parental rights, see In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 33, we decline to address the additional statutory grounds under which the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights.
B. BEST-INTEREST FACTORS
Respondent next argues that termination of his parental rights was not in the child's best interests. "Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews a trial court's ruling regarding best interests for clear error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).
The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine a child's best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. In considering the child's best interests, the trial court's focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. "In deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the court may consider the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (cleaned up). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. Furthermore, a child's placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to consider when making its best-interests determination, In re Gonzales/Martinez Minors, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d 868 (2015), and a child's placement with relatives weighs against termination, In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). "Relative" is defined by MCL 712A.13a(1)(j) as:
an individual who is at least 18 years of age and related to the child by blood, marriage, or adoption, as grandparent, great-grandparent, great-great-grandparent, aunt or uncle, great-aunt or great-uncle, great-great-aunt or great-great-uncle, sibling, stepsibling, nephew or niece, first cousin or first cousin once removed, and the spouse of any of the above, even after the marriage has ended by death or divorce.Thus, a child's biological parent is not her "relative" for this purpose, but a child's cousin is her "relative." See MCL 712A.13a(1)(j); In re Schadler, 315 Mich App at 413.
In its order terminating respondent's parental rights, the trial court found that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests because respondent failed to comply with or benefit from his service plan. The trial court specifically addressed respondent's August 15, 2018 drug screen that was positive for opiates as a cause for concern because of respondent's history of substance abuse. The trial court additionally found that respondent was no closer to reunifying with the child than he was when the child was removed from his care. Finally, the trial court found that the child was "thriving and bonded" in her cousin's care and that, despite this relative placement, termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests.
The record supports each of the trial court's findings. Respondent testified at the termination hearing that he had a suitable home and a legal source of income, that he frequently visited the child, and that he financially supported the child. Respondent asserted that he participated in services and that he no longer had a substance abuse problem. Respondent's testimony, however, was not corroborated by any supporting material and was directly contradicted by the testimony of two foster-care workers and the cousin with whom the child was placed. The cousin did not corroborate respondent's testimony that he frequently visited the child and testified that respondent never provided any financial support for the child. The foster-care workers testified that respondent was repeatedly terminated from his substance-abuse counseling and parenting classes. Respondent never completed either program and a foster-care worker was never able to verify that respondent had suitable housing. Furthermore, respondent's August 15, 2018 drug screen was positive for opiates, refuting his testimony that he no longer had a substance-abuse problem. Finally, one of the foster-care workers testified that the child was thriving in her cousin's care and that the child's cousin wished to adopt the child. The trial court expressly stated that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests despite this relative placement. Accordingly, the child's relative placement was properly considered by the trial court when it made its best-interests findings. See In re Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411-412. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle