The point of the disciplinary rule, therefore, is not restraint of free expression by lawyers because they are lawyers. That could not survive the constitutional principles we reviewed in In re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 474-75, 591 P.2d 728 (1979). Rather, the rule addresses the incompatibility between a prosecutor's official function, including his responsibility to preserve the conditions for a fair trial, and speech that, though privileged against other than professional sanctions, vitiates the proper performance of that function under the circumstances of the specific case.

"* * * Oregon's Bill of Rights guarantees * * * the specifically political right of the inhabitants of the State `to consult for their common good,' to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, [A]rticle I, section 26." In re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 474, 591 P.2d 728 (1979). In City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, supra, n 4, in holding that a local government had authority to regulate door-to-door solicitation by ordinance, subject to constitutional limitations, but the so-called "Green River ordinance" in question was overbroad and, therefore, invalid under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, because it prohibited all solicitation for any purpose at any time, we said:

The rule proscribes lawyers' comments of a kind designed or likely to have a prejudicial effect on prospective jurors. In Re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 475, 591 P.2d 728 (1979). DR 7-107 was adopted following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States involving the highly publicized murder trial of Sam Sheppard, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 16 L Ed 2d 600, 86 S Ct 1507 (1966).

In re Fadeley, supra, 310 Or at 590 (Unis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See In re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 474-75, 591 P.2d 728 (1979) (same principle stated for lawyers). Rather, Canon 3A(6) addresses the incompatibility between a judge's official function, including his or her responsibility to promote public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, and speech that, although privileged against other professional sanctions, vitiates the proper performance of that function under the circumstances of the specific case.

"The point of the disciplinary rule, therefore, is not restraint of free expresson by lawyers because they are lawyers. That could not survive the constitutional principles we reviewed in In re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 474-75, 591 P.2d 728 (1979). Rather, the rule addresses the incompatibility between a prosecutor's official function, including his responsibility to preserve the conditions for a fair trial, and speech that, though privileged against other than professional sanctions, vitiates the proper performance of that function under the circumstances of the specific case.

(Footnote omitted.) See also In Re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 591 P.2d 728 (1979); seealso Koch v. City of Portland, 94 Or. App. 484, 766 P.2d 405 (1988). ORS 181.400 (2) is not narrowly limited in the way that Cooper and the cases that it cites require.

Moreover, "professional employee" has been defined as, "such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel together with their junior professional assistants." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974); cf. Hammill v. Young, 168 Mont. 81, 540 P.2d 971 (1975)(veterinarian); In Re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 591 P.2d 728 (1978)(attorney). And, to exclude physicians from the definition of a professional, as suggested by Moore, would strain the plain meaning of the statute and result in an absurdity.