Courts and commentators alike have looked to the legislative history of section 525 in an attempt to determine that section's meaning. See, e.g., Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265, 270-271 (6th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 164-165 (3d Cir. 1984); Henry v. Heyison, 4 B.R. 437, 441-442 (E.D.Pa. 1980); In re Richardson, 15 B.R. 925, 928 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1982); In re Rose, 23 B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1982); Annot., 68 A.L.R.Fed. 137, 141 (1984) (Protection of Debtor from Acts of Discrimination by Governmental Units Under § 525 of Bankruptcy Code of 1978); 3 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 525.
However, considerable authority supports the proposition that section 525's enumeration is not exclusive. See, e.g., Henry v. Heyison, 4 B.R. 437 (E.D.Pa. 1980); In re Richardson, 15 B.R. 925 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1982); 3 L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy § 525.01 (15th ed. 1984). Because the PUC has not resisted this claim on the ground that section 525 does not prohibit this discrimination, the parties have not fully addressed this problem.
Despite the Defendants' failure to cite same, we are also compelled to take note of the decisions in In re Goldrich, 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985); and Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984), which could be read as supporting the Defendants' position. We are also compelled to note, in passing, three local cases in which claims under 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) were rejected, Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Begley, 46 B.R. 707, 712-16 (E.D.Pa. 1984), later decision aff'd, 760 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1985); and In re Richardson, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1982). In Johnson, the Court of Appeals held that a college could withhold transcripts despite a bankruptcy filing where the underlying student loan was nondischargeable.
However, the debtor failed to prove that his prior bankruptcy was the sole reason for the denial of his loan and was therefore unsuccessful in obtaining the injunctive relief which he requested. The case most like the present one is In re Richardson, 15 B.R. 925 (Bkrtcy.Ct.E.D.Pa.), rev'd, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1982). In that case the state agency analogous to the defendant, NYSHESC, the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), refused to guarantee a new student loan to the plaintiff there because an earlier loan discharged in bankruptcy had not been repaid.
Furthermore, subsequent case law will not reopen final judgments decided prior to the decision in question. See In re Richardson, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa.1982) and In re Otero Mills, Inc., 21 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D.N.M.1982).
See generally In re Jacobs, 149 B.R. 983, 993 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993) (injunctive relief is warranted where an administrative order to show cause was issued); cf. In re Richardson, 15 B.R. 925, 928 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (dispute under section 525 was ripe due to imminent action by defendant),vacated in part, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In this instance, I shall accept arguendo Mrs. Antonious's argument that the threat of litigation against her is real and imminent.
See generally In re Jacobs, 149 B.R. 983, 993 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993) (injunctive relief is warranted where an administrative order to show cause was issued); cf. In re Richardson, 15 B.R. 925, 928 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (dispute under section 525 was ripe due to imminent action by defendant), vacated in part, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Where the debtor offers no such evidence, the dispute is either not ripe, or purely advisory. In this adversary proceeding, the defendants' motions for summary judgment assert that they have not taken any steps in state court that would render Mr. Ciccimaro's claims against them justiciable.
These provide that it was permissible for educational financial aid institutions to refuse educational aid to debtors who sought bankruptcy relief but had not discharged their pre-existing educational loans. Courts have applied the same reasoning to grants and loans. See In re Elter, 95 B.R. 618 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1989) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) does not prohibit discrimination in the granting of credit for a student loan); In re Richardson, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa.1982) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) does not preclude denial of guaranteed student loan for past loan-default); and In re Goldrich, 771 F.2d 28 (2nd Cir.1985) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) does not apply to extensions of credit). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Great Lakes did not violate the anti-discrimination provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 525, by failing to eliminate the notation of default.
As she sought a grant and not a student loan, thus eliminating the issue of her ability to repay, she distinguishes decisions such as In re Goldrich, 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985), which focus in part upon "future financial responsibility or ability," S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 81 (1978), U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 1978, p. 5867, as a legitimate basis for state action. Accord, In re Richardson, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1982); In reElter, 95 B.R. 618 (Bankr.E.D.Wisc. 1989).
Therefore, a New York statute having provisions similar to the applicable Wisconsin statute was found to be valid. A Pennsylvania regulation, with substantive similarities to Wis.Stat. § 39.32(3)(g), concerning the eligibility requirements for granting student loans was not invalidated in In re Richardson, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D.Pa. 1982). The bankruptcy court had found that 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) applied to granting of student loans after discharge of other student loans.