Opinion
C087749
03-16-2020
In re PATRICK RICHARDSON On Habeas Corpus.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17HC00308)
The People appeal the superior court's order granting inmate Patrick Richardson's petition for writ of habeas corpus. This appeal primarily concerns whether habeas corpus lies to correct the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's (CDCR) failure to allow Richardson to cross-examine an adverse witness at his serious rule violation hearing, as provided for in the CDCR regulations, even though Richardson is sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for murder and thus ineligible to earn conduct credits. (See In re Maes (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1103-1104 [defendant convicted of murder not entitled to earn postsentence conduct credit].)
The People argue habeas corpus is unavailable to Richardson because his LWOP sentence prevents him from having a liberty interest in the custody credits confiscated by the hearing officer for the rule violation. While not expressly stated, this argument presumes that a conduct credit liberty interest is required in order to maintain a writ of habeas corpus proceeding for CDCR's non-compliance with its regulations. The People also challenge the merits of the habeas corpus decision, arguing the hearing officer properly exercised his discretion to exclude all of Richardson's proposed cross-examination questions, and notwithstanding this refusal, some evidence supports the hearing officer's decision requiring denial of Richardson's petition.
During oral argument on this matter, it was confirmed that defendant had already received the new serious rule violation hearing ordered by the superior court as a result of defendant's habeas corpus petition. We issued an order directing the parties to address, given the above, why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot. We now dismiss the appeal as moot.
We take judicial notice of this rehearing (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459, subd. (a); People v. Osorio (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1411 [taking judicial notice of CDCR paperwork reflecting parolee's discharge from parole]), despite the People's failure to follow appropriate procedure in making their request. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1) [requiring the filing of a separate noticed motion and proposed order].) We also grant the People's request for judicial notice of the existence of certain superior court decisions. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (a), 459, subd. (a).)
I. BACKGROUND
Richardson was sentenced in 1992 to LWOP for first degree murder with a concurrent term of 15 years eight months for other crimes. He was serving that sentence when he allegedly exposed himself to Correctional Officer C. Fields.
Officer Fields issued a rule violation report charging Richardson with indecent exposure in violation of California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3007. She described his behavior as "inappropriate, offensive, and disrespectful."
An investigatory employee was assigned to gather information relevant to the rule violation report. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3318, subd. (a).) The report reflected the investigative employee's refusal to ask Officer Field 10 questions suggested by Richardson, as well as the basis for each refusal.
At the rule violation hearing, Richardson pled not guilty and testified that: (1) the light was off with his TV on at the time of the incident; (2) his genitals were not exposed when Fields came to the door; and (3) he was not informed of the impending rule violation report "[b]efore [his] pants were up." Officer Fields also testified at the hearing, but was not asked any of Richardson's cross-examination questions. Thereafter, the hearing officer determined that Richardson was guilty of indecent exposure by a preponderance of the evidence, relying on the rule violation report, Field's consistent statement to the investigative employee, and the testimony elicited at the rule violation hearing. Richardson was assessed a credit forfeiture of 61 days, loss of canteen and vender package privileges for 90 days, and was referred for assessments for the security housing unit, designation with an "R" suffix, and restriction from family visiting. Richardson exhausted his administrative appeals of this determination.
An "R" suffix alerts custodial staff that the inmate has a history of sexual offenses as defined by title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, section 3377.1, subdivision (b). (In re Farley (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1358.) It is designed to protect the safety of "inmates, correctional personnel, and the general public" and results in a requirement that the inmate not be "assigned outside the security perimeter." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3377.1, subd. (b); id. subd. (b)(10).)
Thereafter, Richardson filed a habeas corpus petition in superior court alleging due process violations because of the prison's refusal to follow statute/regulations that afforded him the right to cross-examine the correctional officer to whom he allegedly exposed himself. The superior court issued an order to show cause.
The People's return asserted that Richardson's petition must be denied because he did not have the requisite liberty interest. The People argued that, although he had been assessed a loss of custody credit, Richardson's LWOP sentence precluded his earning of those credits. The People further argued on the merits that (1) the hearing officer properly refused to ask the questions as both irrelevant and inappropriate, and (2) some evidence supported the hearing officer's guilty finding.
The superior court granted the habeas corpus petition, reasoning: "Petitioner was assessed the loss of 61-days of credit. The fact that the assessment will not change the duration of his term in prison should not deprive Petitioner of his right to due process." The court then went on to find seven of the 10 requested questions should have been asked as relevant to either Officer Field's perception of the event or potential bias. The refusal to ask the relevant questions violated due process and required a new hearing. The People timely appealed. The People's petition for writ of supersedeas to stay the superior court's order was denied.
II. DISCUSSION
As noted, Richardson has already received the requested rehearing on his serious rule violation, wherein his cross-examination questions were posed to the witness in accordance with the superior court's decision. While we are generally prohibited from considering extra record evidence on appeal (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405), it is appropriate to consider such evidence to determine whether subsequent events have rendered an appeal moot. (People v. Osorio, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1411 [citing In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676].)
" 'A case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical impact or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.' [Citations.]" (In re Stephon L. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1231; see also In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054 [an "appellate court will not review questions which are moot and only of academic importance, nor will it determine abstract questions of law at the request of a party who shows no substantial rights can be affected by the decision either way"].) This court is bound to " 'decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' [Citations.]" (In re Miranda (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 757, 762.) Richardson has already received the relief requested, and any action by this court will have no practical effect on his case. (See id. pp. 763-764 [dismissing habeas petition because parolee had already received a new parole hearing].) The parties' supplemental briefs concede this mootness.
The People nonetheless argue that we should exercise our discretion to decide their arguments concerning the lower court's jurisdiction and the hearing officer's discretion. Respondent "acknowledges that there are some public policy reasons" to address when an inmate serving an LWOP sentence has enforceable due process rights, but otherwise concludes the case should be deemed moot. We are not persuaded any portion of this case should be retained and will dismiss the appeal as moot.
III. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
/S/_________
RENNER, J. We concur: /S/_________
DUARTE, Acting P. J. /S/_________
KRAUSE, J.