A family court's discharge of counsel, though, does not necessarily make a trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable way to decide whether parental rights should terminate. Cf. In re RGB, 123 Hawai‘i 1, 25, 229 P.3d 1066, 1090 (2010) (observing the failure to timely appoint counsel always calls "the justice of the [trial] court's decision ... into serious question"). Instead, the trial's fundamental fairness turns on the case's circumstances.

In addition, "the right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases, where applicable, includes the right to effective counsel." In re RGB, 123 Hawai‘i 1, 25, 229 P.3d 1066, 1090 (2010) (construing federal constitution).

Id.See, e.g., S.C.D. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 841 So.2d 277, 279 (Ala.Civ.App.2002)(quoting Crews v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 358 So.2d 451, 455 (Ala.Civ.App.1978)); Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258, 1265 (Alaska 2014); Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 164, 205 S.W.3d 778, 794 (2005); In re Darlice C., 105 Cal.App.4th 459, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 472, 475 (2003); People ex rel. C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo.App.2007); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 425 A.2d 939, 943 (1979); In re R.E.S., 978 A.2d at 189; J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children and Families, 170 So.3d 780, 790 (Fla.2015); In re A.R.A.S., 278 Ga.App. 608, 629 S.E.2d 822, 825 (2006); In re RGB, 229 P.3d 1066, 1090 (Haw.2010); In re M.F., 326 Ill.App.3d 1110, 261 Ill.Dec. 132, 762 N.E.2d 701, 709 (2002); In re A.R.S., 480 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1992)(citing In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1986)); In re Rushing, 9 Kan.App.2d 541, 684 P.2d 445, 448–49 (1984); In re Adoption/Guardianship of Chaden M., 422 Md. 498, 30 A.3d 935, 942 (2011); In re Adoption of Azziza, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 363, 931 N.E.2d 472, 477 (2010)(citing In re Stephen, 401 Mass. 144, 514 N.E.2d 1087, 1090–91 (1987)); In re Trowbridge, 155 Mich.App. 785, 401 N.W.2d 65, 66 (1986); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo.Ct.App.1989); In re A.S., 320 Mont. 268, 87 P.3d 408, 412–13 (2004); In re Guardianship of A.W., 192 N.J. 301, 929 A.2d 1034, 1037 (2007); In re Jessica F., 126 N.M. 664, 974 P.2d 158, 162 (Ct.App.1998); In re Elijah D., 74 A.D.3d 1846, 902 N.Y.S.2d 736, 736 (2010); In re S.C.R., 198 N.C.App. 525, 679 S.E.2d 905, 909 (2009); In re K.L., 751 N.W.2d 677, 685 (N.D.2008); In re Wingo, 143 Ohio App.3d 652, 758 N.E.2d 780, 791 (200

To ensure the prompt and final determination of petitions to terminate parental rights, many jurisdictions require that these claims be raised on direct appeal. See Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental–Rights Termination Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J.App. Prac. & Process 179, 200 (2004) (“The most common vehicle for raising an ineffectiveness claim in a parental-termination case is the direct appeal of the termination order.”); see also State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah Cty. v. Geist, 310 Or. 176, 796 P.2d 1193, 1201 (1990) (“Because of the importance of expeditious resolution of termination proceedings, and absent statutes providing otherwise, we hold that any challenges to the adequacy of appointed trial counsel in such proceedings must be reviewed on direct appeal.”); In re RGB, 123 Hawai‘i 1, 229 P.3d 1066, 1085–86 (2010) (collecting cases). Other state courts allow parents to raise ineffective assistance of counsel in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see In re Paul W., 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 329, 333 (2007), or by a motion made under rules similar to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), see Ex parte E.D., 777 So.2d 113, 116 (Ala.2000).

See, e.g.,S.C.D. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 841 So.2d 277, 279 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (quoting Crews v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 358 So.2d 451, 455 (Ala.Civ.App.1978)); Chloe W. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 336 P.3d 1258, 1265 (Alaska 2014); Jones v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 164, 205 S.W.3d 778, 794 (2005); In re Darlice C., 105 Cal.App.4th 459, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 472, 475 (2003); People ex rel. C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo.App.2007); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 425 A.2d 939, 943 (1979); In re R.E.S., 978 A.2d at 189; J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children and Families, 170 So.3d 780, 790 (Fla.2015); In re A.R.A.S., 278 Ga.App. 608, 629 S.E.2d 822, 825 (2006); In re RGB, 229 P.3d 1066, 1090 (Haw.2010); In re M.F., 326 Ill.App.3d 1110, 261 Ill.Dec. 132, 762 N.E.2d 701, 709 (2002); In re A.R.S., 480 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1992) (citing In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1986)); In re Rushing, 9 Kan.App.2d 541, 684 P.2d 445, 448–49 (1984); In re Adoption/Guardianship of Chaden M., 422 Md. 498, 30 A.3d 935, 942 (2011); In re Adoption of Azziza, 77 Mass.App.Ct. 363, 931 N.E.2d 472, 477 (2010) (citing In re Stephen, 401 Mass. 144, 514 N.E.2d 1087, 1090–91 (1987)); In re Trowbridge, 155 Mich.App. 785, 401 N.W.2d 65, 66 (1986); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo.Ct.App.1989); In re A.S., 320 Mont. 268, 87 P.3d 408, 412–13 (2004); In re Guardianship of A.W., 192 N.J. 301, 929 A.2d 1034, 1037 (2007); In re Jessica F., 126 N.M. 664, 974 P.2d 158, 162 (Ct.App.1998); In re Elijah D., 74 A.D.3d 1846, 902 N.Y.S.2d 736, 736 (2010); In re S.C.R., 198 N.C.App. 525, 679 S.E.2d 905, 909 (2009); In re K.L., 751 N.W.2d 677, 685 (N.D.2008); In re Wingo, 143 Ohio App.3d 652, 758 N.E.2d 780, 791 (2

David S., 270 P.3d at 784 (citing In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 283 n. 6 (Alaska 1991) (right to counsel); V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42, 45 (Alaska 1983) (right to effective assistance of counsel)).N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 929 A.2d 1034, 1039 (2007) ; see also In re RGB, 123 Hawai‘i 1, 229 P.3d 1066, 1085 (Haw.2010) (noting “state courts have struggled to determine the proper procedural vehicle for raising ineffective assistance of counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings”).See Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental–Rights Termination Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J.App. Prac. & Process179, 199–205 (2004).

In conducting the balancing analysis here, the Court will draw from the criminal context as an analogous situation with liberty interests at stake to delineate what process is generally sufficient. See Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 349–51 (4th Cir.1994) (drawing analogy between emergency removal of child and adult arrest and allowing “incremental” increase in time before judicial review of removal of child because the associated deprivation of liberty was “less comprehensive in scope than that resulting from an arrest”); see also In re RGB, 229 P.3d 1066, 1114–15 (Hawaii 2010) (noting that nearly every state has determined that parents faced with parental rights termination proceedings are afforded the right to counsel and some have drawn analogy to criminal law). In the criminal context, after arrest and arraignment, it is not uncommon for a defendant to wait months before receiving a full trial on the merits.

Id. (citing In re RGB, 123 Hawaiʻi 1, 26, 229 P.3d 1066, 1091 (2010)).

In addition, the burden was on Defendants to establish that each prong had been satisfied. See In re RGB, 123 Hawai‘i 1, 17, 229 P.3d 1066, 1082 (2010). 2. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendants' HRCP Rule 55(c) motion to set aside entry of default

Although we have long held that courts may permit an untimely appeal when "defense counsel has inexcusably or ineffectively failed to pursue a defendant's appeal from a criminal conviction," State v. Knight, 80 Hawai‘i 318, 323, 909 P.2d 1133, 1138 (1996), this court has not before addressed the complete denial of a criminal appeal as it relates to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Antone framework. Cf. In re RGB, 123 Hawai‘i 1, 54, 229 P.3d 1066, 1119 (2010) (Acoba, J., dissenting) (arguing that counsel's wrongful omission that resulted in forfeiture of appeal in a civil case involving termination of parental rights warranted post-judgment relief under Antone ). However, this court has definitively stated that "failure by appointed counsel ‘to commence the simple steps for appeal is a blatant denial of due process.’ "