Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County Super. Ct. Nos. JW109596-03 & JW109596-04. Jon E. Stuebbe, Judge.
Donna J. Hooper, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Marcia A. Fay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Dawson, J. and Kane, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant R.F. was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court, initially placed on probation, repeatedly violated probation, committed additional offenses and was committed to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). On appeal, the parties agree this court must strike part of the juvenile court’s disposition order and remand the matter for the juvenile court to correctly calculate appellant’s credits for time served.
The juvenile court herein stated appellant was committed to the “California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice.” “The California Youth Authority (CYA) was renamed California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice, effective July 1, 2005. The Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) is part of the Division of Juvenile Justice. (Gov. Code, §§ 12838, 12838.3, 12838.5, 12838.13.) DJF is referenced in statutes, such as [Welfare and Institutions Code] sections 731 and 733, that formerly referred to CYA. In this opinion, we will use the name DJF.” (In re M.B. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1474, fn. 2.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2006, appellant admitted the allegations of a petition filed in the Juvenile Court of Kern County (No. JW109596-00) that he was within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on his commission of misdemeanor unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, for taking his mother’s car without permission (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and placed him on probation for three years under his mother’s custody, subject to various terms and conditions.
In 2006 and 2007, subsequent petitions were filed in the Juvenile Court of Kern County that alleged appellant violated probation based on conduct ranging from being out of parental control, being expelled from school for using an inhalant on campus, and testing positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. Appellant admitted the allegations. The court continued appellant on probation subject to various terms and conditions. The court initially allowed him to remain at home under his mother’s supervision and then committed him to Camp Erwin Owen.
In June 2008, appellant was arrested after he admitted that he participated in a residential burglary with two accomplices, during which they ransacked a house, found the keys to a car parked in the garage, loaded various items from the house into that car and stole the car. Appellant was also charged with committing another residential burglary with one of the same accomplices, Aldo S., during which a firearm was stolen and appellant later assaulted someone with that weapon. Aldo S. admitted they committed that burglary and loaded the stolen goods into a U-Haul truck.
On June 12 and 19, 2008, two supplemental petitions (Nos. JW109596-03 & JW109596-04) were filed in the Juvenile Court of Kern County pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 and 777, charging appellant with multiple felonies arising from the burglaries.
On June 24, 2008, appellant admitted the following charges in petition No. JW109596-03: count 1, residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)), and count 4, violating probation. Appellant admitted the following charges in petition No. JW109596-04: count 2, assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), count 4, residential burglary, (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)), count 7, receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)), and count 8, violating probation. The court dismissed the remaining charges and enhancements without prejudice.
On August 13, 2008, the juvenile court conducted the disposition hearing and committed appellant to DJF. The court set appellant’s maximum confinement time at nine years four months, less 118 days credit for time served. The court ordered appellant to serve consecutive periods of confinement on three petitions: the original petition filed on February 14, 2006 (No. JW109596-00) and the supplemental petitions filed on June 12 and 19, 2008 (Nos. JW109596-03 & JW109596-04). The court ordered appellant not to associate with Aldo S., not to initiate contact with the victims, to stay away from the victims and not to enter onto the property of the victims. The court further stated: “All prior orders not specifically set aside or modified are to remain in full force and effect.”
On August 27, 2008, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges two aspects of the juvenile court’s orders from the August 13, 2008, disposition hearing. First, appellant contends that when the court committed him to DJF, it lacked jurisdiction to state that all prior orders were to remain in full force and effect, it could not reimpose the same terms and conditions it had previously imposed when he was on probation and it lacked jurisdiction to impose the stay-away orders. Second, appellant contends the court improperly calculated his credits for time served and offers his own calculation of the correct figure.
Respondent concedes the court improperly imposed the stay-away orders and reimposed the same terms and conditions as previously imposed for probation. Once a minor is committed to the DJF, the supervision of the minor’s rehabilitation is a function for the DJF rather than the juvenile court. (In re Allen N. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 513, 515-516.)
“[T]he juvenile court’s imposition of discretionary conditions of probation constitutes an attempt to regulate or supervise the minor’s rehabilitation, a function solely in the hands of [DJF] after the minor’s commitment. Nor is it of any import … that similar parole conditions may be imposed by [DJF] or that there is not yet a conflict between the conditions imposed by the court and [DJF]. Simply put, the imposition of probationary conditions constitutes an impermissible attempt by the juvenile court to be a secondary body governing the minor’s rehabilitation.” (In re Allen N., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 516; see also In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1208 [commitment to DJF deprives the juvenile court of any authority to directly supervise the juvenile].)
Respondent further concedes the juvenile court did not properly calculate appellant’s credits for time served and points out discrepancies between the calculations provided by the probation department and appellant. Respondent requests remand of the matter for the juvenile court to properly calculate the credits. Appellant agrees that remand is necessary to correct the calculation.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s disposition order of August 13, 2008, is modified to strike that portion in which appellant was ordered not to associate with Aldo S., not to initiate contact with the victims, to stay away from the victims, not to enter onto the property of the victims, and that “[a]ll prior orders not specifically set aside or modified are to remain in full force and effect.” The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to recalculate appellant’s credits for time served. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.