At pages 1332 and 1333 thereof the author in distinguishing certain Oklahoma cases stated: "No intention to omit provision for two grandchildren, children of the testator's deceased son, so as to avoid the application of the statute stipulating that whether a testator omits to provide for any of his children, or for issue of any deceased child, they should take as in case of intestacy unless it should appear that such omission was intentional, was found, in Re Revard['s Estate] (1936) 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973, where the testator bequeathed $5 to each of his children, including the above-mentioned son, who had been dead three years, and also to the grandson of another deceased child, but failed to provide for or mention children of the first son, and it did not appear whether the testator was aware of the death of such son, and there was no indication that he ever knew of the existence of such grandchildren. "The fact that a testator mentioned a deceased son in his will, making a $50 bequest in his favor, was held, in Riley v. Collier (1924) 111 Okla. 130, 238 P. 491 (overruled on another point in Spaniard v. Tantom (1928) 131 Okla. 75, 77, 267 P. 623) not to authorize the assumption that he also had in mind children of such son, from whom he had been estranged for many years and whom he knew to be dead, and that they were intentionally omitted, and such grandchildren were therefore held to be entitled to share under the above statute."

[The issue of after-born children not provided for in a will is addressed in 84 O.S. 1991 § 131[ 84-131]]. See also In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973, 975 (1936). Whether the omission was unintentional is not critical in a pretermission inquiry. What is crucial is whether the face of the will shows an intent to disinherit.

" Soderstrom v. Bonner, 180 Okl. 355, 71 P.2d 117 (1937), made no reference whatsoever to the Act of February 27, 1925, and finally, In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okl. 524, 63 P.2d 973 (1936), dealt with the will of a member of the Osage Tribe "of less than half-blood, to whom a certificate of competency had been issued." It is thus readily apparent that the Act of February 27, 1925, which by its terms is applicable only to the will of Osage Indians of one-half or more Indian blood, was not determinative of any of the issues in that case, and it was, in fact, never mentioned by the court.

N.W.2d 337, 338 [Iowa 1972] ; Matter of Estate of Rivas, 233 Kan. 898, 901, 666 P.2d 691, 693 [1983] ; Radford v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 185 Ky. 453, 459, 215 S.W. 285, 288 [1919] ; Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La.Ann. 1417, 1438–1439, 27 So. 851, 860 [1900] ; Smith v. Howard, 86 Me. 203, 205–206, 29 A. 1008, 1009 [1894] ; Harding v. Schapiro, 120 Md. 541, 548, 87 A. 951, 954 [1913] ; Blake v. Williams, 23 Mass. 286, 314 [1828] ; In re Sewart's Estate, 342 Mich. 491, 499–501, 70 N.W.2d 732, 736–737 [1955] ; Lane v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 356 Mo. 76, 82, 201 S.W.2d 288, 291 [1947] ; In re Smith's Estate, 126 Mont. 558, 563, 255 P.2d 687, 690 [1953] ; In re Forney's Estate, 43 Nev. 227, 232, 184 P. 206, 206 [1919] ; Cade v. Davis, 96 N.C. 139, 147, 2 S.E. 225, 228 [1887] ; In re Coleman's Estate, 98 N.W.2d 784, 789 [N.D.1959] ; in rE estate oF luoma, 2011–ohio–4701, ¶ 28, 2011 WL 4346403 [cT.app.2011], https://supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/11/2011/2011-Ohio-4701.pdf; In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 526, 63 P.2d 973, 976 [1936] ; Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112, 117–120, 10 A.2d 721, 723–724 [1940] ; cf. Smith v. Normart, 51 Ariz. 134, 138, 75 P.2d 38, 40 [1938] ; but see Neblett v. Neblett, 112 Miss. 550, 559, 73 So. 575, 576 [1916] ; State by Van Riper v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 20 N.J. 286, 301–302, 119 A.2d 767, 775–776 [1956] ). Therefore, although the parties here presumably wished that New York contract interpretation rules would determine the decedent's rights during life and some other aspects of the contract, it would have been odd for them to have sought the application of an outlier rule for choosing the law regarding the disposition of the property upon death.

288, *5 n3 [Del Ch 2008]; Cockrell v Lewis, 389 So 2d 307, 308 [Fla Dist Ct App 5th Dist 1980]; In re Estate of Grant, 34 Haw 559, 564 [Haw 1938]; Davis v Upson, 209 Ill 206, 212-213 [Ill 1904]; Thieband v Sebastian, 10 Ind 345, 347 [Ind 1858]; Estate of Lincoln v Briggs, 199 NW2d 337, 338 [Iowa 1972]; In re Estate of Rivas, 233 Kan 898, 901 [Kan 1983]; Radford v Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 185 Ky 453, 459 [Ky 1919]; Williams v Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La Ann 1417, 1438-1439 [LA 1900]; Smith v Howard, 86 Me 203, 205-206 [Me 1894]; Harding v Schapiro, 120 Md 541, 548 [Md 1913]; Blake v Williams, 23 Mass 286, 314 [Mass 1828]; In re Stewart Estate, 342 Mich 491, 499-501 [Mich 1955]; Lane v St. Louis Union Trust Co., 356 Mo 76, 82 [Mo 1947]; In re Smith's Estate, 126 Mont 558, 563 [Mont 1953]; In re Estate of Forney, 43 Nev 227, 232 [Nev 1919]; Cade v Davis, 96 NC 139, 147 [NC 1887]; In re Estate of Coleman, 98 NW2d 784, 789 [ND 1959]; Estate of Luoma, 2011-Ohio-4701, P28 [Ohio Ct App 2011]; In re Revard's Estate, 1936 OK 844, P10 [Okla 1936]; Pickering v Pickering, 64 RI 112, 117-120 [RI 1940]; cf. Smith v Normart, 51 Ariz 134, 138 [Ariz 1938]; but see Neblett v Neblett, 112 Miss 550, 559 [Miss 1916]; State by Van Riper v Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 20 NJ 286, 301-302 [NJ 1956]). Therefore, although the parties here presumably wished that New York contract interpretation rules would determine the decedent's rights during life and some other aspects of the contract, it would have been odd for them to have sought the application of an outlier rule for choosing the law regarding the disposition of the property upon death.

The purpose of the statute is to protect the issue's right to take unless the will itself gives clear expression of an intentional omission. Weaver v. Laub, Okla., 574 P.2d 609 [1978]; Bridgeford v. Estate of Chamberlin, Okla., 573 P.2d 694 [1978]; Estate of Glomset, Okla., 547 P.2d 951 [1976]; In re Estate of Daniels, Okla., 401 P.2d 493 [1965]; Pease v. Whitlatch, Okla., 397 P.2d 894 [1964]; Monroe v. Lawrence, Okla., 347 P.2d 1016 [1959]; O'Neill v. Cox, Okla., 270 P.2d 663 [1954]; In re Castle's Estate, Okla., 262 P.2d 704 [1953]; Hall v. Williams, 204 Okla. 308, 229 P.2d 584 [1951]; In re Adams' Estate, 203 Okla. 377, 222 P.2d 366 [1950]; Dilks v. Carson, 197 Okla. 128, 168 P.2d 1020 [1946]; In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973 [1936]; Alexander v. Samuels, 177 Okla. 323, 58 P.2d 878 [1936]; Spaniard v. Tantom, 131 Okla. 75, 267 P. 623 [1928]. Two different approaches to the problem of an heir's omission from his ancestor's will are identified in national legal literature by reference to the Massachusetts and Missouri prototype statutes.

Congress has never relinquished control of Indian headrights, and the sale, encumbrance or alienation thereof is only authorized pursuant to acts of Congress. Thus any right of an heir or legatee to share in the corpus is dependent upon the wishes of Congress.Taylor v. Tayrien, 51 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1931); In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973 (1936). Testator could not dispose of his headright except by will which as in all cases must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

This cited case is distinguishable from the present case as hereinafter pointed out. Appellees say that the effect of the decisions of this court in In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973; Riley v. Collier, 111 Okla. 130, 238 P. 491, and Spaniard v. Tantom, 131 Okla. 75, 267 P. 623, is contrary to the conclusion urged by the appellants; that in each of those cases the omitted heir was held entitled to take under the law of intestate succession unless an intention to disinherit the heir at law appears in the testator's will. 84 O.S. 1961 § 151[ 84-151] requires that the will of a testator be construed according to his intention. Whether the will shows an intention by the testator to disinherit the omitted heir is the crux of the matter.

Failure of a will provision, by reason of lapse, ademption, or invalidity of a devise (bequest), resulting in partial intestacy, does not affect the validity of the instrument in other respects. 84 O.S. 1951 § 151[ 84-151]; In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973. 4.

The grandsons present 4 propositions of error but they are all argued together, and it is agreed by all parties that the answer to the following question will be deciding in this case: Does it appear from an examination from the four corners of the will of Mary O. Castle that it was her intention to omit her daughters, Mary Cecil Hendrix and Cleo Van Sickle, from her will? Both parties cite In re Revard's Estate, 178 Okla. 524, 63 P.2d 973, 975, wherein the court said with regard to 84 O.S. 1951 § 132[ 84-132]: "In construing this statute it is important to observe that the test is not whether it was an unintentional omission, such as an oversight.