In re Reapportionment

7 Citing cases

  1. In re Reapportionment of General Assembly

    828 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1992)   Cited 12 times
    Discussing Voting Rights Act objections raised to the 1992 reapportionment plan

    Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 759 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). In accordance with the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, and our earlier decisions in In re Reapportionment I and In re Reapportionment of the Colorado General Assembly, 647 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1982) (" In re Reapportionment II"), the Final Plan must be consistent with six parameters (in the following hierarchy from the most to the least important): (1) the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment; (2) section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; (3) article V, section 46 (equality of population of districts in each house); (4) article V, section 47(2) (districts not to cross county lines except to meet section 46 requirements and the number of cities and towns contained in more than one district minimized); (5) article V, section 47(1) (each district to be as compact as possible and to consist of contiguous whole general election precincts); and (6) article V, section 47(3) (preservation of communities of interest within a district). Colo. Const. art. V, § 46 provides: " Senatorial and representative districts.

  2. In re Reapportionment, Colo. Gen. Assem

    45 P.3d 1237 (Colo. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    Noting technical violation of section 46 where deviation was 5.001 percent

    See In re Reapportionment 82, 647 P.2d at 198 (returning plan to Commission based upon unconstitutional sequencing of elections in two senate districts, because one senate district encompassed residences of two incumbent state senators while a second senate district lacked a state senator); In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting resubmitted plan as less consistent with the hierarchy of constitutional criteria than the previously submitted plan and ordering the Commission to submit the original plan with the court-ordered election sequencing modifications); In re Reapportionment 92-I, 828 P.2d at 185 (returning plan to Commission because it divided Pitkin County and the City of Aspen, and the Commission's explanation "did not rise to the level of an adequate factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied the equal population requirement of the Colorado Constitution."

  3. In re Reapportionment of the Colorado General Assembly

    332 P.3d 108 (Colo. 2011)   Cited 7 times

    2002); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 213 (Colo.1992); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209 (Colo.1982). By its nature, reapportionment is an inherently political endeavor.

  4. Beauprez v. Avalos

    No. 02SC87 (Colo. Mar. 13, 2002)

    See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 213 (Colo. 1982). In addition, the judiciary does not have the power to order the general assembly to convene, consider issues, or enact specific legislation, rendering the general assembly an improper defendant for the relief requested by the Avalos plaintiffs. See, e.g., Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore, the judiciary cannot compel the governor to sign legislation, rendering Governor Owens an improper defendant for the relief sought by the Avalos plaintiffs.

  5. Beauprez v. Avalos

    42 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2002)   Cited 35 times
    Holding that once the constitutional requirements “are satisfied, a court may consider non-constitutional criteria that have been articulated by the state as important state policy”

    Further, the secretary of state is required to implement a court-ordered redistricting plan. See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 213 (Colo. 1982). In addition, the judiciary does not have the power to order the general assembly to convene, consider issues, or enact specific legislation, rendering the general assembly an improper defendant for the relief requested by the Avalos plaintiffs.

  6. In re 1983 Legis. App. of House, Senate

    469 A.2d 819 (Me. 1983)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that a district that was contiguous only at a single point "approach[ed] the limits of what is constitutionally permissible," but still met the contiguity requirement

    [A] state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977); Assembly of California v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal.3d 638, 658, 639 P.2d 934, 951, 180 Cal.Rptr. 297, 309 (1982); In re Reapportionment of Colorado General Assembly, Colo., 647 P.2d 191, 194, appeal after remand, Colo., 647 P.2d 209 (1982); Logan v. O'Neill, 187 Conn. 721, ___, 448 A.2d 1306, 1314 (1982). We shall not intervene in the apportionment process unless we are convinced that the Legislature failed to use proper judgment or was in fact motivated by impermissible discriminatory intent in making the compromises necessary to harmonize state and federal standards.

  7. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session; Constitutionality Vel Non

    414 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1982)   Cited 17 times
    Holding election of state senators after redistricting resulting in truncation of terms was justified to accomplish state constitutional requirement that senators be elected from their districts

    These cases are representative of decisions throughout the country which have held that holdover terms do not constitute a violation of the equal protection requirement. Robinson v. Zapata County, Texas, 350 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (S.D.Tex. 1972); Carr v. Brazoria County, Texas, 341 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.Tex. 1972), aff'd 468 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1972); Pate v. El Paso County, Texas, 337 F. Supp. 95 (W.D.Tex. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 400 U.S. 806, 91 S.Ct. 55, 27 L.Ed.2d 38 (1970); Long v. Docking, 283 F. Supp. 539 (D.Kan. 1968); Stout v. Bottorff, 249 F. Supp. 488, 495 (S.D.Ind. 1965); In Re Apportionment of Colorado General Assembly, 647 P.2d 191 (S.Ct.Colo. 1982), modified, No. 825A6, (S.Ct.Colo. Feb. 19, 1982), modified, 647 P.2d 209 (S.Ct. Colo. 1982); Barnett v. Boyle, 197 Neb. 677, 250 N.W.2d 635, 637 (1977); People v. Lavelle, 56 Ill.2d 278, 307 N.E.2d 115 (1974); Visnich v. Sacramento County Bd. of Education, 37 Cal.App.3d 684, 112 Cal.Rptr. 469 (1974); Griswold v. County of San Diego, 32 Cal.App.3d 56, 107 Cal.Rptr. 845, 849-50 (1973); Marston v. Kline, 8 Pa.Cmwlth. 143, 301 A.2d 393 (1973); New Democratic Coalition v. Austin, 41 Mich. App. 343, 200 N.W.2d 749, 755 (1972); Twilley v. Stabler, 290 A.2d 636, 638 (Del. 1972); Yates v. Kelly, 113 N.J. Super. 533, 274 A.2d 589 (1971); Harris v. Shanahan, 192 Kan. 183, 387 P.2d 771, 796 (1963); Anggelis v. Land, 371 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Ky.App. 1963); Selzer v. Synhorst, 253 Iowa 936, 113 N.W.2d 724 (1962); Farrelly v. Cole, 60 Kan. 356, 56 P. 492, 500-01 (Kan. 1899).