Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL035965, Donna L. Crandall, Judge.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Pamela Ratner Sobek and Christine Livingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
In 2009, R.E. admitted committing petty theft, a misdemeanor. The juvenile court declared him to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and granted home probation.
A 2010 subsequent petition alleged R.E. possessed cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) He admitted the allegation after the juvenile court denied his motion to suppress evidence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1; all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.) The court reinstituted wardship (§ 602) and placed R.E. on probation.
On appeal, R.E. challenges the juvenile court’s denial of the suppression motion, arguing the high school campus security officer who searched him did so without a warrant, consent, or a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We conclude that although the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard to arrive at its decision, the court’s ruling is nonetheless correct. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.
I
FACTS
According to testimony adduced during the suppression hearing, Marilyn Jones, a Dana Hills High School campus supervisor and security officer, noticed R.E. and two other students walking toward the school’s football stadium press box at approximately 10:20 a.m. on March 26, 2009. The press box is one of several designated areas that are considered out-of-bounds to students during school hours. These areas are so designated in an effort to keep students on campus and to control various nefarious activities, including the ingestion of narcotics. It is also a violation of school rules to be caught in an out-of-bounds area. Jones radioed for another campus supervisor, Deborah Helms, to contact the students. As Helms responded to the area, Jones continued to watch the students. It appeared to her that one of them was serving as a lookout while the other two went behind the press box. She could not, however, see exactly what the students were doing.
Jones testified that Helms soon arrived at the press box. She escorted the students to the assistant principal’s office. The assistant principal contacted Orange County Sheriff’s Deputy John Good, who was then working as a school resource officer. According to Good’s testimony, his duties at the school included, “Safety for the school, for the students and for the staff. Our presence on campus help [sic] out with school rules, law violations, searches, take reports of thefts or any other problems that the students or teachers might have.” Good testified the assistant principal separated the students, talked to all three of them, and then asked Good to search R.E. It was during this search that Good retrieved a small plastic bag containing a white powdery substance from R.E.’s pants pocket. R.E. identified the substance as cocaine.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court denied the motion, relying on the California Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556. Quoting from the case and applying facts from the instant case, the court stated, “Although individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure under the Constitution, the usual perquisites can be modified when a special needs — those rules — render those rules [] impracticable. Special needs exist in a public school context, in light of the high governmental interest in education, and the need to maintain order in schools, and in light of the minimal intrusion on a minor stopped and questioned. [¶] Here, the campus supervisor saw three individuals going to an area, that is an out-of-bounds[] area that being behind the press box. She saw one who was, by his behavior, acting as a lookout; which certainly raised suspicions in her mind. She alerted the second campus supervisor, who went to the area, brought the three minors out, and based on that information provided by those campus supervisors to the assistant principal, it was the assistant principal’s decision that the minors should be sequestered and searched. [¶] Deputy Good clearly was acting as an agent of the assistant principal, in fact, his testimony stated: ‘I conduct the searches, because I am trained to do so and the assistant principals are not.’ [¶] So given, all of those facts and the holding in the In re: Randy G. case, it appears to the court that this search was completely reasonable under the circumstances, so the motion to suppress is denied.”
Defense counsel distinguished In re Randy G. from the instant case by noting that the former dealt with a detention and patdown search in public, not a search conducted on a school campus. The court countered, “And I agree with you; however, I think it is the court’s belief that that also would extend to a search, so long as it is not arbitrary or capricious. And in this case, it certainly does not appear to be either arbitrary or capricious.”
II
DISCUSSION
R.E. argues the juvenile court erred by denying his suppression motion because he did not consent to the search and Officer Good did not have a reasonable suspicion the search would turn up evidence of wrongdoing. We disagree.
A juvenile court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is subject to the same standard of review as a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. “‘On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court which are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts support the court’s legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (In re William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468.) With respect to the Fourth Amendment rights of students on a school campus, public school officials are considered government agents within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, making their conduct subject to the constitutional rights of their students against arbitrary and capricious detentions and unreasonable searches and seizures. (In re Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 567; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 561; In re Lisa G. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 801, 805.) However, there is also a recognized need for greater flexibility when examining the Fourth Amendment rights of students because the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds must be balanced against the child’s interest in privacy. (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 339 (T.L.O.).)
In T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. 325, a teacher discovered two female students smoking in the girls’ restroom, T.L.O. and another girl. Because smoking in the restroom is a violation of school rules, the teacher took the students to the assistant vice-principal’s office. T.L.O.’s cohort admitted the violation, but T.L.O denied it. The assistant vice-principal then demanded to see T.L.O.’s purse. Upon opening the purse, the assistant vice-principal saw a pack of cigarettes. When he reached into the purse to remove them, he also saw a package of cigarette rolling papers. The assistant vice-principal had experience with other students who had possessed rolling papers and believed that T.L.O. might also be smoking marijuana. Based on this suspicion, the assistant vice-principal thoroughly searched the purse and discovered a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial number of one dollar bills, an index card containing pay-owe information, and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. The assistant vice-principal notified police, who requested that T.L.O.’s mother transport her to the police department. T.L.O. later confessed that she had been selling marijuana at school. After analyzing the various cases involving the Fourth Amendment rights of minor students on campus, the United States Supreme Court concluded: “[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.” (Id. at p. 341.) The California Supreme Court later concluded the characteristics of the school setting require application of the reasonable suspicion standard whenever school officers conduct a search of a student or his or her possessions. (In re William G. supra, 40 Cal.3d 550 at pp. 562, 564.) In applying this standard to the instant case, we conclude there were articulable facts that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying the search.
First, R.E. does not contest the validity of his detention; thus, he concedes his detention was not arbitrary, or capricious. With respect to the search, the evidence showed campus security personnel saw R.E. and two friends in an area considered out-of-bounds and known to provide a semi-private area for students to smoke, take drugs, have sex, or simply cut class. Further, while one security officer waited for another to respond to the scene, she saw one student engage in suspicious activity, namely acting as a lookout while the other two ducked behind the press box. There could be no legitimate reason for their presence in that area, or the furtive behavior. Hence, the assistant principal knew R.E. had violated school rules and had reasonable suspicion he participated in illegal activity. Based on the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the assistant principal to suspect R.E. of engaging in wrongful behavior. (See In re Lisa G., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 807, [“A correlation between the wrongful behavior of the student and the intended findings of the search is essential for a valid search of the student under the Fourth Amendment.”].) Accordingly, we conclude the search of R.E. was reasonable under a totality of the circumstances.
R.E. argues the juvenile court improperly extended the holding in In re Randy G., which held detentions may be based on less than a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (In re Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 567), by concluding Officer Good’s warrantless search need not have been based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so long as it was “not arbitrary, capricious, or for the purpose of harassment.” (Ibid.) The Attorney General concedes, the court erred by relying on In re Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th 556. However, this is not the first time a juvenile court has mistakenly relied on In re Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th 556 and yet had its ruling upheld. (See In re Cody S. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 86, 91, fn. 3.) As the Attorney General points out, “‘“No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976; In re Cody S., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 91, fn. 3.) Here, we uphold the trial court’s ruling because the school officials knew R.E. violated school rules and they had a reasonable suspicion he was involved in other wrong doing.
R.E. relies on In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d 550, to argue that even under the appropriate standard, i.e., a search must be based on a reasonable suspicion, the juvenile court’s ruling cannot stand. We have already discussed the facts that support a finding of reasonable suspicion in this case. Furthermore, In re William G. is distinguishable on its facts.
In In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d 550, an assistant principal named Lorenz stopped and searched a student he believed to be tardy or truant because the student happened to be carrying a black, vinyl calculator case that had what Lorenz “thought was an odd-looking bulge.” (Id. at p. 555.) The California Supreme Court held, “The record reflects a complete lack of any prior knowledge or information on the part of Lorenz relating William to the possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs or other contraband. [Citations.] Lorenz’s suspicion that William was tardy or truant from class provided no reasonable basis for conducting a search of any kind.” (Id. at p. 566.)
Here, in contrast, R.E. and two other students walked to an area known to be out-of-bounds to them during school hours. Narcotics use is one of the reasons the area is out-of-bounds, and either R.E. or one of his cohorts seemed to be acting as a lookout while the other two hid behind the press box. Under the totality of the circumstances, the assistant principal, and by extension, Officer Good, had evidence R.E. violated school rules and a reasonable suspicion that he did so to ingest narcotics. We find no error.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J., IKOLA, J.