Opinion
No. 5-002 / 04-1934
Filed January 26, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark J. Smith, Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to a child. AFFIRMED.
Douglas Johnston, Muscatine, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Dana Christiansen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Arlen Poock, Muscatine, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Stephanie, the mother of sixteen-month-old Robert, appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights. She contends the State did not prove the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. On de novo review, we affirm.
Robert's father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and does not appeal.
The Department of Human Services (DHS) first became involved with this family in November 2003 after Robert's father, Robert Sr., held Robert and Stephanie in their apartment and would not let them leave, resulting in a founded report of denial of critical care and failure to provide proper supervision. A no-contact order was entered against the father, he having assaulted Stephanie. DHS implemented family-centered services to address Robert Sr.'s combative behavior, and Stephanie's cognitive deficits and history of instable housing, multiple short-term romantic relationships, and association with people who might pose a risk to Robert.
After services were implemented, concerns continued about Stephanie's ability to care for and supervise Robert adequately. She was not complying with the safety plan established for Robert, nor was she following through with recommendations for doctor appointments and medications for him. These concerns came to a head on February 6, 2004 when DHS received a report Stephanie had left Robert with her current paramour without telling him where she would be, when she would return, or how to contact her. The paramour became concerned when he ran out of formula for Robert and was unsure how to handle any emergency that might arise. When Stephanie returned, she agreed to voluntary placement of Robert in foster care. The incident resulted in another founded report of denial of critical care and failure to provide proper supervision.
The juvenile court found Robert to be in need of assistance on April 8 under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2003) and 232.2(6)(n). The court continued his placement in foster care and set a permanency hearing for six months later.
Stephanie made some initial progress in following the case permanency plan and was given more visitation. Her participation in services and progress toward plan goals quickly became sporadic, however, resulting in a return to one weekly two-hour visit with Robert. During visits she needed help with routine tasks such as changing diapers and preparing Robert's bottle. Her electricity was turned off and she lost her apartment for nonpayment of rent. She continued to have contact with Robert's father, despite the no-contact order.
After the permanency hearing, the court changed the plan goal from reunification to adoption and directed the State to file a petition for termination of the parents' rights. The State petitioned to terminate the parents' rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(a), (e), (h), (k), and (l). Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court terminated Stephanie's parental rights to Robert under section 232.116(1)(e).
On appeal, Stephanie seeks a reversal of the termination, contending she should be given more time to comply with the case plan. She argues being a victim of domestic abuse has had "a profound effect on her psyche and ability to parent;" her cognitive deficits, which affect her parenting, were not given proper weight by the juvenile court; and the initial placement of Robert with DHS was voluntary on Stephanie's part. The State replies that the evidence supports termination under either section 232.116(1)(e) or (h) and that we can affirm the termination on any ground pled, even if was not a ground relied on by the juvenile court. See In re T.N.M., 542 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e)(3) provides:
There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "significant and meaningful contact" includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.
Stephanie and her mother both testified at the termination hearing. Stephanie admitted, and her mother agreed, that she has not complied with the case permanency plan. Stephanie said she did not think some of the requirements were necessary and did not understand some of the others, but that there were no other or additional services she thought DHS should have offered.
We find clear and convincing evidence supports termination of Stephanie's parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e). She has not taken affirmative steps to assume the duties of a parent. She has not made "a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan," which resulted in a reduction of visitation to two hours per week. This prevents "significant and meaningful contact" with Robert and Stephanie's ability to "establish and maintain a place of importance in [Robert]'s life." We affirm the termination of Stephanie's parental rights.
The State also pled section 232.116(1)(h). We find clear and convincing evidence in the record that Robert could not be returned to Stephanie's care at the time of the termination hearing. Although the juvenile court did not base its decision on this section, we affirm the termination of Stephanie's parental rights under this section also.